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Preface
This work aims at clarifying the problem of interpreting 
the Bible, particularly the New Testament, and thereby making 
some contribution to its better understanding. Its approach 
is from the perspective of '■ demy tho 1 oc, i z i no , " a program initi­
ated by Rudolf Bultmanri. It concerns itself, therefore, with 
human existence, and takes this "existence" as a fundamental 
clue to an interpretation of all that is "the world of man," 
a concept v/hich gathers within its purview everything about 
which man has any knowledge whatsoever.
But this study takes another "fundamental clue" to the 
interpretation of "man's world," namely, Time itself, as the 
implicit control, so to speak, in Bultmann's Christolocical 
formulation, "present eschatologies! occurrence." With thest 
two clues, existence and time, I sought out a contemporary 
thinker who takes both of these clues quite seriously. Martin 
Heidegger is such a thinker.
Beginning, then, from within the "demytho1ogI 2ing contro­
versy," 1 sketch an outline of this controversy, using as a 
guide the two terms "kerygma" and "myth." Then, an attempt 
is made to build a bridge, as it were, between demytho1ogi2ing 
and the thought of Heidegger.
Following this Introduction to Heidegger's thought, seven 
of his works are considered, beginning with his Introduction 
to Beinc and Time, and endino with the tv 0 essays which corm:i
Identitjft and D Ü f c r e n z . The way leads through an analysis 
of "objectification" as the mode of knowledge by which human 
existence determines its "world" and "everything about which 
man has any knowledge whatsoever." V.'ith objectification as 
a theme, the way continues through considerations of freedom 
with its base (ground) in the Nothing wnich is wholly future, 
and of Truth which is likewise rooted in the future. But this 
latter consideration includes a demonstration of the need to 
examine, rather than Nothingness and Futurity, History itself. 
For, it is only in examining history that freedom with its 
roots In Futurity Is enabled to express itself "historically.” 
Historica1ity, then, as the mode of man's existence, is exam­
ined for its Identity with Futurity, i.e., freedom, and for 
its Difference from it: its historicity, its determination s 
"hi s tory."
From this study I conclude that existence is both histor­
ical and non-historica1, i.e., eternal, and that these two 
modes of existence (existence and ex-sistence) are grounded 
in the flux of Time itself, and thus attest to the primacy, 
the creative and limiting power, of Time. Time, then, becomes 
a clue to an interpretation of the biblical doctrine of God 
with its "mythical" modes of representing this primacy of Time 
over all that "is,"
In the Conclusion an emphasis is laid upon the tentative 
character of such a proposal. And it is suggested that the 
only means of determining the legitimacy of this "clue" is the
V i
Bible itself. However, as Bultmann's Théo I op y of the Ne-' Tes­
tament is already an "existentialist" interpretation of the 
New Testament, the readiest way of Gaining insight into the 
validity of this "clue" leads to this work of Bultmann. Where­
upon, an analysis of that portion of this -^’ork which f or mu la to'- 
the concept of "righteousness," i.e., salvation, as mediated 
throucht the "present eschatolocica1 occurrence" is made. An:, 
though still tentative after such a brief analysis, thie "clu-. ” 
nevertheless now' has intimations of merit clinging to it. An 
exhaustive analysis of this work by Bultmann is therefore indi­
cated, using as its analytical criterion this doctrine of Tire 
culled from this study of Heidegger's thought.
My resources for the most part have been those of the 
libraries of Trinity College, Glasgow, and the University of 
Glasgow with its smaller departmental (Systematic Theology) ? i- 
junct. I want to express my appreciation to these Institution^, 
and in particular to the Faculty of Divinity. Professors Ian 
Henderson and Ronald Gregor Smith are tireless in their efforts 
to help research students, and the former, as my advisor, cave 
most freely not only of his remarkable knowledge and %i t, but 
of his warm personal understanding as veil. Eclipsing all such, 
however, has been the "background" contribution made by my v-ife, 
without whose continuing love this work would have been quite 
impossible.
. / ' i fMount Hermon, California V I ( f > f 1 ;___
duly, 1965
Chapter I 
Introduc 11 on
Our purpose in this treatise, is to make some small con­
tribution to what has been aptly termed the " demy tho Î og i 2 1 nc * 
controversy." Wc want to make this quite clear at the outset 
because ve are certain that as the reader moves into the body 
of this study, the question vill repeatedly arise, "’what has 
this to do with demy tholoci zing?" So, in order t.c secure a. 
positive connection, we intend now to build the bridge, as it 
were, so that the correlation that is possible v-ill not only 
be natural, but inevitable. In order, then, that this can hap­
pen, we must first present a brief description of demytholo- 
gizlng and suggest something of the controversy- Secondly, we 
must give an insight into the nature cf this study and wraL It 
is we are trying to do. That is, the connection between them 
must be specified and defended. And, finally, our procedure 
is to be outlined. These, then, are the tasks to be underta­
ken in this Introduction.
1. The Demy the 1ogizing Controversy
The term "demy t'no 1 ogi z i ng" is descriptive of a discipline 
which Professor Rudolf Bultmann has taken unto himself as a 
means whereby the New Testament witness is up-dated. In a man­
ner of speaking, in such a way that it becomes as meaningful
1. "''his term, was coined in English by Prof. Ian Henderson i n  
!iis book, Mv t h i n t he Ne’- Tes ta nie n t ( SCM Press, London, 1 ^  
 ^s a translation of 3ultn:ann's t e n r  En tmy thclocizierer.
2 .
to this Generation as it apparently was in the first centuries 
A. D. Demytho1ogizing is a method of interpretation based on 
the premise that science has made so many changes in the world­
view since biblical times that modern man is virtually power­
less to understand the New Testament as it stands. Its writers, 
it seems, living when they did, saw things in a way utterly 
foreign to the way we see them now. According to Bultmann, 
their world-view included, for example, a cosmology which pos­
ited a three-tiered universe: the heavens with their gods above, 
the earth beneath, and the nether regions of Sheol, or the 
Shades, beneath the earth. The common representations of 
various "phenomena" which were current when the New Testament 
was written were, of course, incorporated in its corpus, and 
thus infect the whole of it. These scientifically primative 
representations Bultmann has termed "myths." But myths, he 
goes on to say, were not intended to be explanations of natura 1 
phenomena. They were intended, rather, to express...
"...man's conviction that the origin and purpose of the 
world in which he lives are to be sought not within it but 
beyond it - that is, beyond the realm of known and tangible 
reality - and that this realm is perpetually dominated and 
menaced by those mysterious powers which arc its source and 
limit. Myth is also an expression of man's awareness that 
he is not lord of his own being. It expresses his sense of 
dependence... [and his] ...belief that in this state of de­
pendence he can be delivered from the forces within the vis­
ible world."3
Demythologi2ing "breaks" these myths in order that they may no 
longer be barriers to understanding. Once the myths have been
2. Kerycma and Myth. Harper and Bros., New York (Torchbook li­
lt ion), 19^1: Bultmann's essay "New Testament and Mytholo­
gy" (pp. 1-33), p. 1.
3 . Ibid. , p. lOf .
3-
explained, then the thoughtful reader can begin to cope 
with the heart, so to speak, of the New Testament witness.
Now, the "heart" of the New Testament witness has been 
termed "kerygma" and means proclamation, communication, but 
more specifically, a communication from God to man. A syno­
nym for kerygma is revelation; another is grace. And the New 
Testament takes the point of view that Christ is God's com­
munication to us, that Christ is revelation, that Christ is 
God's grace. The kerygma, then, is the message of the New 
Testament when this is understood to be the commun!cat i on of 
the grace of God in Christ to man. We put the matter as "com­
munication" in order to dispel any notion that the biblical 
witness as it stands is kerygma. It is not. Kerygma is the 
communication of grace to man. Listeners and readers are as 
much involved as the New Testament writers and Christian 
preachers. Kerygma means that God not only "speaks,” but he 
is "heard" as well. And morel He is acknowledged to be God, 
the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, Savior.
Demythologizing, then, is an attempt to interpret the 
New Testament in such a way that God "speaks" to modern man 
through this interpretation, and communicates his grace.
We have the case, then, of an original interpretation 
which was canonized by the church, and a history of interpre­
tation which ha? evolved in the years since, this history of­
fering all sorts of interpretations of scripture: some feasible, 
some wierd, some utterly rediculous, and some quite reasonable
3 .
and, to a degree, acceptable. But this "history of interpre­
tation" gives rise to a considerable problem. Anyone who is 
at all aware of this history cannot but be impressed vith the 
great variety of interpretations - all dealing v/ith the same 
text. And he is a dull fellow at best who does not begin to 
question the validity of the interpretation he is hearing or 
reading,or making himself.
Bultmann, he will be happy to hear, is a New Testament 
interpreter who has taken the problem of historical relativity 
quite seriously.^ Indeed, one could almost say that his inter­
pretation has evolved in consequence of his wrestling with this 
problem, and that it is attractive to many people today because 
he effects a tenable solution to it. The solution to histori­
cal relativity, he would maintain, is to be found in a new 
self-understanding, that is, in an understanding of existence - 
human existence. That understanding of human existence which 
is wholly dependent upon historic formulations of truth, he 
would say, runs aground on the rocks of historical relativity, 
and more often than not ends in relativism and nihilism,^ an 
attitude epitomized in Pilate's skeptical retort to Jesus,
"What is truth?"^
There are grounds for believing that at the time of the
3. Cf. Hi s torv an_d Eschato 1 oqy, Harper & Bros., New York (Torc>j 
book E d i t i o n T 1962, p. lOfT
5 . Ibid.
6 . Jn. 18:36.
writing of the New Testament, there were, even then, many d i f ­
ferent interpretations being propounded. The author of Luke- 
Acts, for example, was involved in sorting them out and pre- 
t senting his own account of the " t r u t h . T h u s ,  we can be
I reasonably certain that historical relativity is not at all a
 ^ new problem. This reasonable certainty makes Bultmann's inter-
' prêtâtion the more convincing when his solution to the problem
of historical relativity, as crystallized in his understanding
f of existence, is suggested to be precisely what was intended by 
the New Testament writers themselves. That is, Bultmann contends 
that the New Testament authors were trying to communicate to
their readers a new self-understanding, a new understanding of
\existence. He maintains that New Testament thought is primarily
"existential interpretation":
"The theological thoughts of the New Testament ... claim to 
have meaning for the present not as theoretical teachings, 
timeless general truths, but only as the expression of an 
understanding of human existence which for the man of today 
I also is a possibility for his understanding of himself - a
possibility which is opened to him by the New Testament i t - 
■ self, in that it,not only shows him that such self-understan­
ding is the reply to the kerygma as the word of God addressing 
him, but also imparts to him the kerygma itself."^
Perhaps we should take a moment to differentiate between 
"existential interpretation" and the broader, more comprehensive 
term "existentialism." Of the latter, Macquarrie says:
7. Lk. 1:1-4.
8. Theology of the New Te s tament,V o l . II, p. 251 (See note 11 below).
"Existentialism is not a philosophy but a type of philosophy, 
and a type so flexible that it can appear in such widely 
differing forms as the atheism of Sartre, the Catholicism 
of Marcel, the Protestantism of Kierkegaard, Jthe Judaism of 
Buber, and the Orthodoxy of Berdyaev. And agj n , though the 
name of existentialism is relatively new, it does not follow 
that this type of philosophy is new. Mounter has constructed 
a family tree of existentialism with its roots going far back 
into the pre-Christian era."9
Before Kierkegaard, who is generally regarded as the "father" of 
modern existentialism, there were Pascal, Maine de Biran, A ugus­
tine, and Socrates - names which have been associated with this 
type of thought.'^
Now, within existentialism, as a "type of philosophy," we 
find a contemporary expression which has profoundly influenced 
Bultmann's "existential interpretation" of the New Testament, 
namely, that of his colleague and friend, Martin Heidegger. Mac- 
Iqua r r i e has made an interesting and enlightening study of the 
relation between Bultmann's Theology of the New Test ame n t ^  ^ and 
Heidegger's Bei ng and T ime^Z in a book which he called ^  Exis- 
tent ialist Theo l o g y . There he demonstrates how Bultmann appears 
to have depended in large measure upon Heidegger's philosophical 
exposition of existence. Indeed, the extent to which Bultmann 
appears to have depended on Heidegger has been criticised by 
Macquarrie and ot h e r s , ^3 this criticism, however, being but one 
of many which, along with rebuttals, etc., constitute the consid­
erable literature which has been called the demythologizing
4. Here Macquarrie cites Mounter's Exi s tent i a 1 1st Ph i1o s o p h i e s : an 
Introduction, Rockliff, p . 3.
10. An Existentialist Theology, SCM Press, London, 1955, p. I6f.
11. 3p. cit.. Vols, f S II, Trans. K. Grobel, SCM Press, London,
1952 and 1955 resp.
12. Op. cit., trans. J. Macquarrie S E. Robinson, SCM Press, London 1962
13. Op. cit. and The Scope of Demy thologi z i n g . Harper & Bros., New York, 
I960. Here Macquarri e 3Tscusses Buitmann and his critics and 
therefore provides a suitable bibliography of this literature.
7.
controversy,
The controversy itself, as we have intimated, covers a 
wide range of subjects all related to the central issues so 
succinctly captured in the title given to the several volumes 
of Kervcma and Myth. R a t h e r  than become involved in peri­
pheral concerns, we have confined our discussion to these two 
concepts - without, however, doing justice to either. But, if 
the reader wants to pursue the matter, he is referred to the 
titles we are citing and to the bibliographies contained therein.
It should now be clear that we are assuming the whole of 
this controversy. The scope of this treatise is purposefully 
limited to a study of "time" In the thought of Heidegger, and 
to a few provisional suggestions as to its possible significance 
to this controversy. We have felt that we could not even begin 
to do justice to it within the spatial (and temporal) limitations 
which we feel are appropriate to a study of this nature.
2. Heidegger and Demytho1ogizing.
In this preliminary consideration of Heidegger's thought 
we do not leave the matter of demythologizing, but are compel­
led, rather, to see how they relate in this matter of "time."
What we have done so far is to suggest something of the nature 
of the demythologizing controversy. But in the process, we
13* W. Bartsch has edited at least six volumes under the title 
Kerygma urid Mythes , Herbert Re i ch-Evange 1 i scher Veriac, 
Hamburg. R. H. Fuller's English translation, Kery cma and 
Myth (see note 2 above) is but a partial translation cf 
Vol." 1: pp. 35-101, and 123-90.
cited what seened to be major issues, namely, historical relativity 
(which included relativity in textual interpretation) and existential 
interpretation (an attempt to interpret hunan existence in the light 
M o f  historical relativity). Now, when anyone a 11 en.pt s to cope with 
the problem of the relativity of interpretation, he is himself inter- 
I preting. This dilemma is called the "hermeneutical circle." It is 
maintained that it is impossible ever to be free of this circle. On 
the other hand, to see that there is manifest circularity involved, 
can be said to be an insight which is itself already free of the 
circle - else its "circularity" could not be perceived.
As regards these two points of view: the first maintains that 
every interpretation, because it an interpretation, will take its 
place in the history of interpretation and become just another one
\
of many. Now, this first stance is also the second when it is put 
this way. It sees the circularity involved. Do we, then, have two 
points of view, or just one? When looking yet again, we see that 
there j_s a difference between them. The first says that it is impos- 
^8ib 1 e to get outside of this circle, and the second says that such 
insight is itself a 1 ready outside it. The difference between these 
two attitudes, we contend, is enormous, and is based in the difference 
between concrete, i.e., historical, phenomena, say, for example, 
Bultmann's interpretation of the New Testament, and "phenomena" which 
are not in the least historical, or concrete, say, for example, Bult­
mann himself, the man.^^®
14a. This suggestion that "Bultmann himself" is "not in the least
historical, or concrete," is explained in a general way in the 
pages immediately following, but a more explicit explanation 
might well be given here.
We are alluding to the "self" (in this case, Bultmann's) 
which, on Heidegger's interpretation, is always prior to the
(continued on p. B a )
self which Bultmann himself ’ objectifies" and Knows as an "historical, 
or concrete," being. His " o bjectified" self is o b j e c t i f i e d  by a 
"self" which exists in a realm prior to its o b j e c t i f y i n g  activity.
This prior self is the a g e n t , the objectifier. And even when this 
objectifier is itself being objectified and seen, as in Heidegger's 
analysis, to be prior, such t bought is not in point of fact preceding, 
or moving in advance of the agency which i s thinking, i.e., "objecti­
fying," in this manner. Hence, our claim that there is a fundamental 
difference between the "ohenomena1," i.e., historical, concrete, self 
and that "self" which cannot be so objectified because of its prior
relation to the objectifying activity itself.
This attempt to isolate human agency becomes more poignant when 
we move from objectifying another person (who as Buber has so aptly 
shown in I and Thou is all too easily seen to be an "it") to o b j e c ­
tifying ourselves. When the reader reflects upon hi s own agency as
an objectifier of his historic self and of what "he" has done, or is 
doing now, it should become immediately apparent that "he" is doing 
the reflecting. In the next instant, now aware of this activity, the 
reader may reflect upon this agency of his. But try as he rr.ay, he 
cannot in his thought move in advance of his thinking. That is, 
thought cannot precede the thinker himself.
It is the "thinker," then, to which we allude, the agent of all 
objectifying thought, the ex-si sting agent who, by virtue of his very 
^x-sistence, limits and otherwise circumscribes thought by being its 
thinker, its originator.
In our reference to "Bultmann himself, the man," we are speaking 
of Bultmann, the ex-si S t ing originator of his thought, only the latter 
of which is accessible to us - should he decide to record it for p o s ­
terity.
A fuller explanation of this relation between the objectified 
and the objectifying selves cannot be made here in the Introduction, 
for much of the analysis which follows in the ensuing chapters is 
requisite to an adequate understanding of the seemingly cryptic lan­
guage being used here. I plead, therefore, for the reader's patience.
9.
Now the matter begins to get a bit sticky, and we had 
better do some explaining. The "difference" which we are try­
ing to suggest is that between historical phenomena and some- 
"thing" that is not historical. But, is there such a differ­
ence? Of historical phenomena we have some understanding, but 
what do we mean by non-histor1ca1 "phenomena"?
When v/e explain this, we will also be elucidating our 
point of departure from Bultmann's doctrine, Bultmann main­
tains that revelation occurs only to and through existence, 
and in particular, only in the preaching and hearing of the 
w o r d . A l l  well and good. But. he goes on to say that rev­
elation never occurs except "a place can be assigned also in 
the context of natural and historical h a p p e n i n g . H i s  insis­
tence upon the concrete historica1ity of revelation roots 
Christianity to the historic figure of Jesus of Nazareth, and 
Bultmann is quite clear that this root is fundamental to the 
f a i t h , I t  is this root which he believes protects the faith 
from "subjectivism."
When Bultmann insists on both of these conditions - appar­
ently without qualification - we suspect him of trying to have 
his cake and eat it. He wants it both ways at the seme time.
15. See, e.g., his essay, "Revelation in the New Testament," in 
Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bu 1 trr.ann, 
trans. and intro, by S. Ogden, Meridian Books, Inc., New 
York, i960.
16. This is Macquarrie'? summary ( Scope, p. Diql) and he refers 
us to Bultmann's essay, "Zum Problem der Entmytholocisierunc 
in Ke ry cma und My thos, II, esp. pp. 196ff.
17. See, e.g., Kerygma and 1h (English), p. 33.
and this, we contend, is impossible. The critical factor here we 
have underscored. Had he specified that at one rriomenl existence 
can be non-historicaI, and in the next is very much historical, we 
would not quibble. But, as it stands, we must argue that there is 
a radical difference between historical phenomena and existence, 
and that this difference is a matter of "time." It is at the same
time a matter of life and death.
We must be careful here, because Bultmann is fully aware of 
Heidegger's understanding of existence as fut ur e to the "objecti- 
fified" "self" which Dasein "encounters" in consequence of his out- 
ward projection towards... in an over-casting act of will ( umw i 1 1 e n ) 
*which makes possible a priori the self's objectification as "th e r e ."19 
But does he really appreciate the time element involved here? If 
existence must pro-ject in objectification, then, it does so from 
a position that is pr ior to the objects encountered. It projects 
from a moment, if you will, that is prior to the object's arrival 
as "object." Hence, it projects from a time which is prior to ob-
[Jjectificat ion as a completed act. It projects from a time, then,
which is future to all objectified phenomena. Existence, therefore, 
jdwe11s in a time which is prior to historical phenomena. There 
•a difference between existence and the objectified phenomena (inclu­
ding the "self") which make up the "world."
^  As it happens, this difference is infinitesimally small. It
is but a moment, the twinkling of an eye - even less. Never-
; 13. Most of the allusions here and throughout this paragraph are
treated in detail in our Chap. Ill below. But our use of umwi 1 1 en 
here is discussed in detail in Chap, IV below, specifically on 
pp. 140ff.
J
1 1 .
theless, this tiny interval is sufficient to make the radical 
difference of which we speak: the difference between human ex­
istence (life) and history (death). History, v/e maintain, Is 
the realm of knowledge, the realm of language and objectifica­
tion. And the relativity which we perceive in history, i.e., 
knowledge, i.e., language, i.e., objectification, poss i b le
only in vi rtue of non-re la t ivi tv ; an unknowable (objectively). 
unspeakable (except objectively), and unobjectifiable realm 
which Is prior, i.e., future, and absolutely and eternally sc. 
So creat and so sma11 is this difference.
As we have said, in close proximity to this prior dimension 
which we are calling existence, is the realm of objectification, 
i.e., history, etc. Yet, this difference is sufficient to con­
stitute everything in this vast realm of objectification, viz., 
the "v/orld," ^s but an approxima t i on. That is, all knowledge 
of history, etc., is only "approximation knowledge." Kierke­
gaard made this quite clear some time ago.^O The realm of his­
tory is the realm of relativity.
On the other hand, this difference, precisely in virtue 
of its approximation is proximal enough for our purposes to 
constitute one pole in a relation. We began by demonstrating 
the futurity of existence re la tive to his tory in order to es­
tablish the Difference as such. But once this Difference is
19. These characterizations derive from our Chapter V. belcv.
20. See in particular his Philosophica1 Fragments, and Ccnclu- 
ding U nsc lent if ic Pos tscr ipt, trans. W . L cw r y and S', enso r. 
resp., Princeton University Press, 1936 and 1961 resp.
1 2 .
seen, and something of its significance is appreciated, then, 
v/e must return, as it were, to that "base" from which futurity 
was discerned.
It is no good simply to posit existence as prior to his­
tory and leave it there. Existence must be seen to be related 
to history in a way that can only be characterized as an Iden­
tity.''-^  It v/as from the base in history that we stepped back, 
as it were, into the future in order to gain a transcendental 
view of history, which perspective enables insight, for example. 
Into the "circularity” of the hermeneutical circle.
Now we have to reverse^^ our orientation and appreciate 
something of the significance of that base which we left in 
order to find one that is free of relativity. But, in this 
case we need no introduction. The return to history is an 
easy one. This, for the most part, is where v/e have 1 ea rned 
to live and move and have our being. We are "historical" cre­
atures, or so we are repeatedly told. Yes, ve live in time 
alright, but it is in historica1 time, they say. Thus do we 
suspect that in the process of "civilization," history has 
come to determine our understanding of time. But, historical 
time is static; it is captured, as it v^ere, and frozen in 
"events." But events are possible only in virtue of stopping 
time, of cutting it off and bringing it to end in order to con­
stitute the "unity" of events. All knowledge is rooted in unity, 
and unity is an approximation of time, e.g., the "second," and
21, Identity and Difference are treated in Chapter VII belc •.
22, This "reversal" is the heart of our Chapter VI belc'./.
nas approxima t i on îs static, i.e., dead. Time cannot be approx­
imated or measured. Only events, beings, things, units, can 
be measured and used in calculation.
Because these things characterize life in historical time, 
we fear death, and do all v/e can to avoid it and the other con­
sequences of "historical" life: its transience, its ever-chanr- 
ing being born and dying routine, its relativity, its static 
representations of existence. But, at the same time, seeming1\, 
we arc tied to it. Here is that formula again: "at the same 
time"; this bugaboo, this fly in the ointment, but this Lime, 
it may be legitimate. For, now, having seen both sides to the 
coin, so to speak, that is existence, v/e are prepared to see 
the dialectic when v/e insist that historical truth is true, and 
insist at the same time that it is false. Insisting on the his­
torical Jesus as the root of Christian doctrine is only valid 
v/hen, at the same time, it is rejected. Thus do we capture 
something of the dynamic that is revelation: how that it is 
at the same time both eternal and historical. And that v/hich 
is common to both, w?e see, is Time. Thus does it happen that 
existence must seek the durable, the eternal, the non-histori- 
ca1, when all the whlle it is here already, this instant, now.
Having come back down to earth, so to speak, we have com­
pleted one cycle in the movement of time, and have distinguished 
a dialectic between the two modes of existence: that which is 
future, i.e., ex-sistence, and that which is historical, I.e., 
Just plain historical existence. This "relation" is a temporal
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one: in one moment it is a case of Identity with history, etc., 
and in the next it is a case of utter Difference from them.
When these two moments are seen to be the constitutive elements 
of what Kant called "the now-sequence," then we can begin to 
appreciate something of the dynamicity of the experience of 
selfhood, the alternating current, as it were, that make< pos­
sible both the historica11ty and the eternity of human exis­
tence. For, the constant factor here is Time: the moment.
Both Identity and Difference are moments of Time, both their 
distinction and their integrity (Zusammenqehor j qke i t ) being 
made possible by Time itself when conceived to be fundamentaI 
relatIon: the fundamental relation: that relations which grounds 
all else a priori. When Identity reigns, then is existence 
immersed in and identical with history, knowledge, language, 
etc. But in the moment of Difference, then Is existence immerse’ 
in eternity. In thi s moment, identity with history has disin­
tegrated and ex-sistence has burst free of its bondage to static 
representation; it has utterly rejected being "at the same 11 me" 
with anything or anyone that "is" - including the "historical,
i.e., the objectified, self."
The rhythm of Identity and Difference is as close as we 
can come to actually discerning Time. This "rhythm" is the 
fundamental relation which was discerned in the Old Testament 
as "covenant" before it was "forgotten" (Verqessenhe it) and 
became identified w i th history, only to be discovered again 
and termed "the new covenant" and secured in that existence
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which wss Jesus of Nazareth. Thus do we see that on the one 
hand we can analyse Time as it is identical with "historical" 
time, i.e., the phenomenon, but "at the same time," v^ e know 
this to be a static, non-temporal representation which does 
not begin to capture the dynamic which is Time itself. Time 
is manifestly different from all such objectification. Never­
theless, when we have been through this cycle; from existence 
to future ex-sistence, and back again, then we can begin to 
appreciate something of Time's creative power. It alone maker 
possible this hopping back and forth; it makes objectification 
and, therefore, history possible; it makes ex-sistence - to 
which we flee from history - possible. Time is a priori in 
every possible respect.
Seen in this light, and taking into account what Bultmann 
has suggested about existential interpretation as being a feas­
ible interpretation of the intent of the New Testament writers, 
then v/e begin to wonder if there is some correlation between 
TIme. as inadequately grasped here but grasped nonetheless, 
and o^ji, as inadequately grasped in scripture but grasped none­
theless. is the biblical construct, i.e., its doctrine of God, 
a "mythical" view of Time: an appreciation cf its primacy over 
all spatial phenomena, its creative power, its future, i.e., 
eschatolonica 1, aspect, its absolute limiting effect on man, 
its otherness to all attempts to grasp it, its steadfast depen­
dability throughout all of history,world without end (apparent­
ly)? That is to say, is our present-day understanding cf Time
16.
as it relates to existence equivalent to the biblical writers' 
understanding of God as he related to their existence? These 
questions haunt me, and demand some effort to answer them.
Hence, our study.
Such is our attempt to construct a bridge of sorts between 
Heidegger's thought and Bultmann's program of demythologizing. 
We trust that this attempt has not been without some value as 
an introduction to what follows. For, it, was from the back­
ground of Bultmann's thought with its emphasis upon "the pres^n'
21escliatelogica2 occurrence" Snd its obvious reference to time 
that we proceeded to investigate Heidegger's understanding of 
time. In a w^ ay we are guilty of what Heidegger himself appears 
to have done, namely, to start out with an assumption and pro­
ceed to demonstrate its validity. Did he not begin with the
P !.notion that Temporality was a clue to the meaning of Being?^- 
It is hardly surprising, then, to find that he ends his anal­
ysis of Dasein with an analysis of its Being as Temporality.’^-^
However, it has often been suggested in the history of 
thought that one has to have some notion of its answer before 
a question can be posed properly. Some have called this req­
uisite "pre-understanding." What we were looking for, we founo 
Whether or not our findings will be relevant to the demytholo­
gizing controversy, however, is a question that only "history" 
can determine. All we can do now, is wait and see.
23 . See esp. Chap. V, pp. 270-352 in Theoloqv of the Njej-g Testa­
ment Vol. 1.
26. These allusions are treated below in our Chapter il.
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3. Our Procedure.
We will not "spend" time saying here what will be made 
plain later. Suffice it to say that we have been arbitrary 
to a degree in choosing the texts for this study, but not al­
together so. We arc confident that the six works chosen con­
stitute something of a unity without, however, representing 
a particular phase in Heidegger's thought. They span thirty 
years, so, represent a fair cross-section both of his thought 
and cf its development.
We have tried to keep our exposition close to the texts, 
and to be detailed in our study of them. The extent to which 
this has been done may give the reader cause to wonder why so 
little effort, has been given to correlating them more closely 
and avoiding the repetition which occurs in a few instances.
We have felt that the tendency to interpolate is kept to a 
minimum by this procedure, that such repetition as occurs is 
nominal and always sheds more light than was shed before, and, 
finally, that the correlation that should be done will be done 
by the reader himself if our interpretation approaches the unity 
which we think it does.
However, even though we have kept close to the texts, what 
issues from our study is interpréta tion. What Heidegger says 
is always colored by our "interest," namely, to examine his 
thought for its tempora1 allusions. Our interpretation, then, 
will differ considerably from others which have been made becu'-
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of the impact that this “interest” has upon the vhole matter 
of interpretation. " To our knowledge, no one has attempted 
to do Just v'ha t we try here to do. For this reason, what is­
sues from this study may contribute something to the question 
of demytho 1ogizing as well as present Heidegger in a way here­
tofore never done. We believe that Heidegger's significance 
for existentialist theology is yet fully to be appreciated.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the following study 
was very much of an experiment. V'e had no idea v-hen we be^an 
what would materialize. Therefore, an obvious development oc­
curs. Some attempts are made to pull the insights together s 
they occur, but little effort has been given to going back and 
revising early chapters so that they conform «^-ith the more de­
veloped thought at the end (as summarized in this introduction). 
As no study of ihis order is accomplished in a day, time ' ill 
take its toil in terms of minor inconsistencies and va r ia t i or.s 
in terminology, but these do not seriously affect the result'-.
We do ask the reader, however, to make some allowances for t he 
difficulty in formulating a doctrine of Time - assuming for th" 
moment that this doctrine Jjg a correlate to the biblical doctrine 
of God. But for our tedium, obscurity, and awkwardness we mak. 
no excuse, but rather beg the reader's pardon.
So much for preliminaries. Now, on to Heidegger and Time.
;5 » See Bultmann's essay “The Problem of Hermeneutics’’ i r 
Essays, trans. J. Orel;-, 5Cm Press, London, 1955.
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Chapter II
, Heidegger's Introduction to Being and Time
So much for our own introduction (and conclusion) to Hei­
degger's thought. Now we turn to his own introduction. But is 
such a move possible? Is therejindeed a general introduction to 
all that he has written? We hold that his introduction to Be inc 
and Time suffices for our purposes, for in it he outlines his 
life's work to the extent that this can be done near the begin­
ning of that work. Therefore, let us see what he has to sav.
He begins, in the Forward, with an appropriate quotation
^rom Plato which he translates:^
”For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean 
when you use the expression ' be inc.. ' We, however, who used 
to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.
Because he is convinced that as it was in Plato's time, so 
it is in our own, Heidegger states that he intends to ’’raise 
anew the guestion of the mean ing of Beinc,”3 even though nowa­
days there appears to be no perplexity about it. Indeed, he
expresses his intent most succinctly:
’’Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the 
question of the meaning of Beinc and to do so concretely.”^
But this over-a 11 aim is qualified by his next statement, and in 
a way which is to distinguish his approach from all previous at­
tempts - dating back to the first of the pre-Socratics:
1, We use Macquarrie and Robinson's translation unless otherwise 
indicated. All citations from Be inc and T ime in this chapter 
will henceforth be indicated only by page number.
2. Plato, Sophestes kUUa (Heidegger's note).
; . p. 19. 'T. p . 19.
/  :
"Our provisional sim is the Interpretation of t i me ss the pos­
sible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being."5
Here, then, in the shortest possible compass, is the thrust of
his monumental work. He wants to work out the meeni ng of Being in
terms of time, to the extent that this latter makes it possible so
34
to do. We underscore the word "meaning" because Tillich has it 
let the difference between philosophy and theology is that the 
Aformer is concerned to define the "structure" of Being, whereas 
theology is concerned to explicate its "meaning."^ Now, it is 
ofobable that these two men are intending this word "meaning" in 
somewhat different ways, but it can hardly be doubted that Tillich's 
theology is "ontological1y" oriented. This kindred interest in
Being suggests at the very least that Heidegger's focus upon the»,
[,\"»eaning of Being" could, as it has with Tillich, have significant 
theological implications. And we maintain that this is precisely 
tfie case. For the moment, however, it is enough merely to suggest 
tjjie possibility that Heidegger's work has theological significance 
i and to point out that for Heidegger the "meaning" of Being is to 
be sought through an "Interpretation of time" as the possible lim­
iting, or determining, factor " for any understanding whatsoever of 
Being."
Heidegger's Introduction, then, aims at "exposing" the "ques­
tion of the meaning of Being."7 And he begins by building a case 
for reopening the whole question of Being. For, it "has today been 
forgotten." What Plato and Aristotle achieved relative to this
question was destined to "persist" through various treatments and
5. p. 19; As Macquarrie suggests, "horizon" for Heidegger means the 
extreme limit past which it is impossible to go. (fn. p. 19).
6. Systernat i c T h e o l o g y , Vol. I, Nisbet, London, 1953. P. 25.
7. p. il.
1alterations which have appeared since, right down to the "logic" of
Ü
H e g e l /  But what these Greeks achieved "has long since become triv­
ialized." Indeed, there appears to be modern-day sanctions for the 
p  s|iperfluity and "complete neglect" of the question of Being. It is 
' apparently "the most universal and the emptiest of concepts." It 
' so resists definition that attempts to define it are deemed a waste, 
f F|pr , ...
"... an understanding of Being is already included in conceiving 
anything which one apprehends as a being, a thing."da
dnd further, this understanding is one of a basic unity "as over
against the multiplicity of 'categories applicable to things.'"9
But its universality and basic unity do not make it any clearer.
"It is rather the darkest of all concepts ."
' Being's alleged indifinability (because of its universality)
does present a problem, but should the difficulty of solution mean
hat the problem no longer exists? Not sol Its indefinability "does
lot eliminate the question of its meaning," but rather "demands" that
fe take another long, herd look at it. And as to its self-evidence,
lone must conclude that if we already have a pre-understanding of Being
but know not its meaning, then "it is necessary in principle to raise
the question again."
These objections have not been "reasons" for neglecting the
question, but "prejudices," evidently growing out of the question's
inherent difficulty. So much the more should an attempt be made to
formulate the question a d e q u a t e l y / ^  But all we have to begin with
is a "vague average understanding of Being," a pre-understanding.
Therefore, "an investigation of the meaning of Being cannot be
expected to give ... clarification ...
W. p. 2 l . 8a. p. 22. 9. p. 23. 10. p. 24.
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at the outset.”11 Our first task is to “develop the concept 
of Being,” and then, perhaps, we can determine what this still 
obscure understanding means and what roaa blocks to its full 
illumination are inevitable.
But one of the first obstacles we encounter in an attempt 
to develope the concept is that the Being of beings 1^  ^ is not 
itself a being. Being must therefore be “exhibited in a way 
of its o w n . ”^3 The “meaning” of Being, then, will also have 
to be sought in a way peculiar to itself. Now, if Being is 
“what” is to be sought, and it is the Being of beings, then 
“beings” are what must be interrogated for “their” Being. We 
will seek after “what” they “are” in themselves “without falsi­
fication.” The method of interrogation, then, is all-important.
But what beings do we interrogate? And how do we do so 
“without falsification*'? What shall be our method? These ques­
tions are being put by those who are enquiring after Beinc and 
its meaning. And, in asking such questions, the enquirers them­
selves are comporting themselves in their Being in a peculiar 
way towa rds Being. Indeed, it is one of their “modes” of Being. 
The enquirers themselves, then, are beings who seek after Beinc 
and its meaning, and therefore constitute a “peculiar” being, 
the interrogation of which (for its Being) could conceivably 
shed much light on B e i n g / d  it is this being which Heidegger 
chooses from amongst all the others to investigate as to its
11. p. 25.
12. We have elected generally to translate ^  s Seiende as ”be i rv 
(small “b” ) rather than, say, “essents” [Manheim) of "entitie: 
(Macquarrie & Robinson) because of its relation to - 
ing.*' It is a common term and is more universal than “thir 
and less clumsy than "entities.”
13* p. 26. Hi. p. 26f.
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Seine. He wants to begin by determining, so far as is possible, 
the Being of this being that enquirers after Being: the Being of 
“Dasein.” ^^
At this point, Heidegger puts down any objections to the 
apparent “circularity” of this approach, which objections, he 
says, “can be cited at any time in the study of first principles. 
Such arguments, he maintains, “are sterile” relative to “con­
crete” modes of investigation. The approach to Being bv vav of 
beings has been the way of ontology throughout its history. And 
although Being i_s_ presupposed by this approach, this presupposi­
tion is merely of a vague, undifferentiated pre-understanding.
And unless one takes this course, no approach can be made at all. 
For, the Being we seek is the Being “of” beings. In any case, 
this presupposition "belongs to the essential constitution of 
Dasein itself” and, therefore, is a considerable factor in de­
termining the Being of this particular being, and in interpret­
ing its m e a n i n g . T h i s  “factor” merely suggests the more that 
the Dasein is related in a very special and possibly a unique 
way to Being itself.
Having said these things, Heidegcer is still not convinced 
that his readers shall have been satisfied as to the reason for
15. We use this German word as though i t|werelEng 1 i sh, so familiar 
has it become to students of Heideager. Constructed from the
German words for “there” {D^) and “Being" (Se i n ). Dasein is 
used in everyday language “for the kind of Being that belongs 
to persons." (Macquarrie*s fn., p. 27.) The peculiarity of 
German g ramma r is such that in Enalish translation the word 
is usually rendered in what seems to us an impersonal ••av: 
as an “it,” rather than “he” or “she.” Generally, we fol­
low Heidecgor's manner of speaking of it.
16. D. 26.
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reopening the question of Being. Will it not be a matter of 
“soaring speculation about the most general of generalities”?
Is it not to be just more of the same? While the history of 
ontology may suggest such to be the case, this approach sees 
the question of Being to be "both the most basic and the most 
concrete" of all q u e s t i o n s . I t  is so basic as to underlie all 
that has been accumulated to date by every science whatever its 
area of interest, be it History, Nature, Space, Life, Man, Lan­
guage, or other. "Science" interrogates the beings in its area 
in order to establish precisely "v;hat” they "are," and ”how” 
they are. Indeed, some sciences even offer with their explana­
tions their "meaning." Yet, "scientific" investigation has, all 
along, been done solely on the basis of a "vague, average under­
standing,” a pre-understanding, of the Being of these beings, 
and on no more than this. The question of the Being of beings 
and its meaning should, therefore, be the root concern of the 
sciences, but they have been satisfied that their descriptions 
and explanations truly represent the Being of the beings which 
they study, even though the history of these disciplines very 
clearly shows a gradual change in the substance of their results. 
And occasionally, the whole structure of a science is shaken by 
the devastating discovery that some of its most cherished notions 
have been wrong. Newtonian physics, for example, was revolu­
tionized by Einstein. The question of Being, then, ...
"...aims ... at ascertaining the a priori conditions not
17. p. 29.
only for the possibility of the sciences which examine 
beings..., and, in so doing, already operate with an un­
derstanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those 
ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sci­
ences and which provide their foundations.
Until the meaning of Being is cleared up, all ontology and,
therefore, all science is perched upon a precarious ledge,
namely, that of relativity, and, in consequence, is only pro-
vis i ona 1.
This effort to establish the "ontological priority” of the 
problem of Beinc and its meaning is augmented with one intcncec 
to establish its "ontical” priority as well. Tnis latter suf- 
gests that that mode of being which is "scientific” is ”not the 
only manner of Being" which Dasein can have, "nor is it the one 
which lies c l o s e s t . I n d e e d ,  for Dasein, Being is an issue, 
and this "concern" for its own Being is "a constitutive state 
of Dasein's Being." The Casein's "pre-understanding” of Being, 
then, is "pre-ontologica1” in the sense that every Dasein is 
concerned to maintain its own Being in the way that it under­
stands Being.
"That kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport it­
self in one way or another, and always does comport itself 
somehow, we call 'existence* [Existenzj. 1
And "existence" is always understood in terms of possibility:
"to be itself or not i t s e l f . "22 casein "decides" its own ex­
istence whether by active or passive modes, and since this is 
the case, its mode of existence Heidegger terms "existentie11." 
That is to say. Its existence is decided without an express
lb. p. 11. 19. p. 32. 20. p. 32.
21. p. 32, 22. p. 33.
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understanding of Being beyond the vague pre-understanding which 
is pre-ontological. It determines its existence, then, solely 
in the atmosphere, so to speak, of ontical phenomena, in the 
atmosphere of concrete, existing "beings."
in contrast to an "existentiel 1" grasp of existence, there 
is that which stands over it, or apart from it, so to speak, to 
a degree sufficient to permit an appreciation of the existentiell 
as an "ontical" affair. This larger grasp of existence is an 
"existential" or ontological, grasp. It is this latter which 
characterizes an attempt to analyse an existentiel 1 relation to 
Being in order to arrive at a provisional concept of Being which 
is sufficient to permit some explication of its meaning. This 
analysis which Heidegger is proposing, then, is to be an exis­
tential analysis of the existentiel 1 activities of Dasein.2'^
Thus, we arrive at what Heidegger terms "the ontico-ontoIog-
ical priority" of Dasein, though this demonstration has been onlv
provisional,2 I The task which lies before us, if we are to
tackle the question of Being and its meaning, is "the radical i-
zation of an essential t e n d e n c y - o f - B eing."23 But this will not
be easy. Peculiar problems arise at the outset. For example,
because of Dasein*s "ontico-ontologica1 priority," the Dasein
23. We pose the matter in this way so as to make clear at the
outset the stance which Heidegger will later term "ex-sistence 
Ex-sistence stands in a pro- or prior-position relative to 
existence. It is this stance which "enables" (Seinkonnen), i. 
makes possible, ontology and its "objectification^ oT h?3s-• ir . 
It is "future" to the objectified Dasein and its existence; 
hence, ex-sistence and its temporal realm will be deemed 
eminent over the realms of the present and past. This v.iil 
become clear in the chapters to follow.
2L. p. 3^f. 2b. p. 35.
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"is ontically 'closest* to itself and ontologically farthest" 
even thouqh "pre-onto1oqica1ly it is no stranger." That is tc 
say, the Dasein is very close to itself as an ontic being, in­
deed, it "is" this being: "we are it, each of us, we ourselves."'-"' 
Yet, this closeness is not "immediate." Now, in interpreting 
Heidegger here, we would say that there is an interval, a "dif­
ference," however slight, which nevertheless constitutes a breach 
between the Being of Dasein and its ontical existence which lies 
so close at hand. This "difference" does not readily show it­
self in such expressions as we commonly use for self-identity, 
e.g., Heidegger's own: "we are it, each of us, we ourselves." 
Nevertheless, a "difference" lies in the "arc", as a "transitive" 
verb form, and is captured in the common practise of emphasizing 
"identity" by means of duplication, e.g., "we ourselves." This 
interval, then, is what separates the ontic and the ontological, 
and introduces ambiguity at every turn. This insight is very 
much premature to the argument, however, as it stands. Indeed, 
it is based upon the conclusion of the whole existential anal­
ysis of Dasein, namely, that temporality grounds the existentia!- 
ontological constitution of Dasein, and is the meaning of its
Being.27
If this interval does indeed separate Being from beings, 
and our grasp of Being is pre-ontologica1 (ontical, existentiel 1). 
then it is quite impossible for us to grasp Being because cf its
26. p . 36.
2 7 . pp. 36 and [[86.
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"ontologies 1" character. This can be more readily appreciated 
when cast in temporal terms. We can easily grasp present and 
past events because they arc ontical; they exist. But we do 
not pretend to be able to grasp the future except as "possibil­
ities," and these we readily distinguish from "realities." A l ­
ways, then, our grasp of Being is pre-onto1ogica1 ; it is that of 
possibility, and not of actuality.
What, then, is to be our guide in seeking out the Being of
this ontico-ontologica1ly prior being, Dasein? We cannot assume
a dogmatic attitude and presume that because we have a vague
pre-understandinc of Being that it will siffice in leading us
to a clearly illumined concept, however plausible and "self-evi-
might be,
dent" some of the arguments this pre-understanding might provide^ 
especially since we are so much in the habit of thinking Being 
as though it were ontical.
The means by which we proceed, will of necessity preclude 
cherished notions and preconceived ideas of Just what Being is.
In having chosen Dasein as the object of our Investigation, wo 
will have to proceed along the way which this being itself il­
luminates by "showing" itself "in itself and from i t s e l f . '*23 
this can only be done by focusing upon Dasein as it is "prox­
imal ly and for the most part - in its average everydayness," so 
that a "provisional" analysis can be obtained which may possibly 
point the way to Being it self.29
26. p. 17.
29. p. 37f.
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Heidegger emphasizes here in the Introduction not only 
the "provisional" and "partial" character of any existential 
analysis which could be obtained by such means, but he also 
reiterates the "preparatory" nature of this pursuit.3^ His aim 
is to work out the meaning of Being in as concrete a way as pos­
sible. And this approach through Dasein appears to offer more 
promise than any other.
Once the preparatory work leads to a firmer grasp of Being, 
then something like a "philosophical" anthropology could be work­
ed out. But, as with the natural sciences. Being and its mean­
ing are the prior considerations if these derived structures are 
to have anything like a firm foundation.
Temporality, "as the meaning of the Being of that being which 
we call Dasein," is to be suggested,and the provisional ontolog­
ical structures (the existentiels) of Dasein will then have to 
be reinterpreted "as modes of temporality."31 But even when 
this is done, we shall not have "the answer to our leadino 
question as to the meaning of Being in general," though some 
preparation for it shall have been made.
We have come, then, to Heidegger's own special contribu­
tion to the history of ontology: his suggestion that time is a 
primary consideration in apprehending the meaning of Being.
Keeping in mind what he has already said about Casein's pre-
30. p. 3Ô.
1 . O . 38 .
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ontological understanding of Being, we then relate this in­
sight with another, namely, "that whenever Dasein tacitly 
understands and interprets something like Being, it does so 
with time as its standpoint,"32
"Time must be brought to light - and genuinely conceived 
- as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for 
any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern 
this, t ime needs to be exp 1ica ted primordla 11y a s the 
horizon for the understanding of Beinc, and in terms of 
temperality as the Beinc of Dasein, which understands 
Be inc .*'33
That is to say, time must be understood in a way that enables
our "ordinary conception of time" to be seen as deriving from
the "temporality" that is peculiarly Dasein*s.3^1
"* Time * has long functioned as an ontological - or rather 
as an ontical - criterion for naively discriminating var­
ious realms of beings. A distinction has been made between 
'temporal* beings (natural processes and historical happen­
ings) and *non-tempora1 * beings (spatial and numerical re­
lationships). We arc accustomed to contrasting the * time­
less* meaning of propositions with the 'temporal* course of 
prepositional assertions. It is also held that there is a 
'cleavage* between 'temporal* beings and the * supra-tempor­
al* eternal, and efforts are being made to bridge this over.'
Heidegger goes on to stipulate that in the above citation the 
term "temporal" always means simply existing (seiend) "in time.' 
though this designation is "admittedly" rather "obscure." 
Nonetheless, it must be distinguished from "being (sein) in 
time," for this latter "functions as a criterion for distin­
guishing realms of B e i n g . "36 we will try to make this distinc­
tion more lucid. The first phrase (existing "in time") posits 
time as a being among others, as one of Nature's constitutive 
elements, perhaps. Whereas, "being in time" suggests an insep-
<2. p. 39. 3 3* P' 39 (Heidecger's italics)
3g. p. 39. p. 39. 36. p. 39.
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arable relation between time and Beinc, and that if Beinc is 
not a being, then neither is time. Being and time appear to 
constitute a unity, and identity, of such a nature that any 
and all designations of beings are at the same time temporal 
distinctions. For example, we normally look upon historical 
"events" as occurances or happenings "in time," and "date" 
them according to "public time." Thus is there a line of de- 
markation between these events and ourselves. We can take 
them or leave them depending upon their significance. But 
when historical events are understood as "being in time,’* 
there adheres to them something of our own Being, and thev 
are transformed, as it were, from something "over and done 
with" - relics of a time gone by - to beings which are as 
much "alive" as we are, in the sense that neither their form­
ulation nor their meaning can be fixed. They are still in 
flux, as we are in flux. Nor, is it possible ever to "size 
up" events, however insignificant they may appear to be, and 
dispose of them once and for all. The significance of every 
"age" and of all its contemporaries, however nameless they 
may appear to be, is still an open question, and will remain 
so as long as human beings exist. At best, all we can do rel­
ative to "historical" events (which includes human Dasein) is 
to maintain an attitude of awe and mutual respect, ascribing 
to them concern equivalent to that which we maintain towards 
ourselves, ever endeavoring to protect them (as we protect our 
selves) from being "written off" by "historians": .judged tc be 
such and so.
3.2.
We have used "events" in our illustration purposefully.
For, Heidegger's concern for "history" is monumental. His 
researches in the history of philosophy reach back to the very 
earliest thinkers in our western tradition. And rather than 
accepting what others have concluded about these men, he has 
engaged in dialogue with them himself, and has come up with 
altogether "new" interpretations - to the extent that he has 
been accused of " v i o l e n c e . "37 Hi s arguments with later inter­
preters have, as we see them, been geared to reopening the 
past so as to keep it fluid and of a unity with the present 
(with its relation to the future). If he castigates later in­
terpreters, he does so because they are so sure of themselves, 
and of their assessment of the significance of past events.
Nowhere in the history of thought does Heidegger find an 
intensive study of time and its relation to Being, In conse­
quence, he finds no appreciation for the "fact" that "time
"...functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of 
Being. Hitherto no one has asked or troubled to investi­
gate hov/ time has come to have this distinctive ontological 
function, or with what, right anything like time functions 
as such a criterion; nor has anyone asked whether the 
authentic ontological relevance which is possible for it, 
gets expressed when 'time* is used in so naively ontolog­
ical a manner."30
Time, it seems, has "acquired this 'self-evident* function on
its own, so to speak, and continues to to do to this verv d a y .39
But quite in contrast to this common view of time, Heidecger
intends "to show that the centra 1 problematic of all ontolcov
7. See the author's Preface, to the Second Edition of EH 
the Problem of Metaphysics, p. xxv.
8 . p. 39. ~ 39. p. 39.
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1 s rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and right­
ly exp la ined. . .
When Being is "conceived in terms of time," Being itself 
becomes "temporal" in character.''^ Here Heidegger distinguish­
es between the common understanding of "temporal" and that which 
he is to introduce. Thus, he speaks of the "Temporal (with a 
capital "T" in Macquarrie*s translation, tempora1e in the Ger­
man ) determinateness" of the meanino of Being and its modes 
and characteristics .'+2 We follow suite and designate this new 
understanding of time as "Time," leaving the small "t" for the 
common usage insofar as we ourselves are able to distinguish 
between them,
Heidegger's purpose, then, is to work out the "Tempora1itv 
of Be ing" which we take to be synonymous with his previously 
posed aim: "to work out the question of the meaning of Being 
and to do so concretely."^3 For, as he says, "In the exposi­
tion of the problematic of Temporality the question of the mean­
ing of Being will first be concretely answered. "^1-^
We find our above illustration and explanation of "being 
in time" corroborated in what Heidegger asserts about what 
this new understanding of Being must do. If it does not in 
effect open up the whole history of thought to the extent that 
its bounds go all the way back so as to include the "Ancients," 
then we cannot "learn to conceive the possibilities which the 
Ancients have made ready for us."'h^
0. p . Ij.O (Heidegger's italics). q 1, p . 50.
Il2 . p. ho. hj. p. 19. 8’'. p. ho.
15. p . ' ! 0 .
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This "new" understanding of time, as Heidegger puts it, 
itself becomes "ancient" so as to include these distant rel­
atives, and is not simply a modern-day innovation which will 
contribute to a characterization of this particular age as 
distinct from all other ages. Instead of erecting boundaries 
and capitalizing on "differences," this approach breaks down 
all such arbitrary demarcations and welds into a unity all 
that ha s ever been, now, and ever shall be. '^ 6
It follows from what Heidegger has said that if this new 
approach to Being via Time is worked out, the whole history of 
ontology will need to undergo reinterpretation in the light of 
this remarkable development. He speaks, therefore, of the "de­
struction of the history of ontology,"^f but with the insight 
already afforded, we can readily see that it is the "history" 
that is to be shattered - when this latter is conceived to be 
a definite form and character. To be sure, Dasein is histor­
ical, that is to say, it possesses "historicality;" it occurs 
or happens "in time." But the implications of its historica1- 
ity are not necessarily those which have been constituted as 
"history" by historiographers, whether professional or lay.
Or, to put it another way, the "traditonal" understanding of 
existence is not necessarily the only way to interpret it. It 
may not, for example, give to Dasein sufficient breadth and 
depth. If it sells Dasein short, then human "life" is not be­
ing valued sufficiently high. It is too cheap. Heidecoer
36. In this familiar formula, we underscore the forms of th 
verb "to be" so as to emphasize Being's activity in all 
three temporal realms of past, present, and future.
_ 7. p . L 1.
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maintains that "Dasein 'is* its past after the manner of its 
Being which, to put it roughly, always 'occurs* from out of 
its f u t u r e . "^8 Futurity, therefore, adheres to the past in 
virtue of the letter's origin there, so that the Being of Da­
sein must always be interpreted in terms not of actualities 
or realities, but of "possibilities." "Facts," "realities," 
and "actualities" are, therefore, cut. loose from "existence" 
and this latter is "enabled to be" (can be: Se i nkonncn) after 
the manner of Being itself which is temporal, i.e., future.
Tlie ambiguity here is manifold. On the one hand, Heideg­
ger says that the Dasein "i^ its past" and that this "past" is 
"what" Dasein "is,” and that the "past" is what Dasein is "on­
tical ly," i.e., factually.k^ But, on the other hand, the form 
which the past takes when it is seen to be constitutive of Be­
ing (which is future) is fluid,rrather than being static and 
fixed. In a very real way, then, we see Heidegger to be under­
cutting and otherwise destroying the "ontical" sources which 
he needs for a "concrete" working-out of an analysis of Dasein 
as it factually "is." This ambiguity may account for his hav­
ing chosen to treat Dasein as it "is" in its "average every­
dayness." A statistical average is a far safer bet than the 
analysis of any particular person, but it does not solve the 
problem of interpreting the individuals whose behavior is 
thrown into the hopper to be correlated and yield a fictitious 
"average person." The implications of this problem, however.
h o .  Sein und Ze i t , p. wc prefer our own translation here to
Ida cqua rr i e ' s , p . hi. h 9. P. 81.
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are softened when we acknowledge that Heidegger seems to be 
most keenly aware of this problem, and v/i 11 therefore deal 
"kindly" with his "object," realizing all the while that he 
is dealing with "possibility" as over against "actuality." 
For, of all people, Heidegger is aware of the problem of 
"historicity" (Historizitat) which we interpret to be the 
thoughtful realization of the impact of tradition upon exis­
tence .
When "tradition" becomes the "master" of existence, it 
does so by concealing, in effect, what it should transmit.59 
Instead of engaging existence in that thoughtful "repetition" 
wherein it rethinks what is taken for granted in tradition, 
it passes off "conclusions" as "self-evident" and immune to 
genuine questioning. Thus are our historical "sources" - the 
fathers of our culture - concealed from us to the extent that 
they are merely names, dates, and an abbrieviated story which 
purports to tell "what happened" without ever entering into 
the substance of the thought involved. Every schoolboy pro­
vides ample evidence for the ineffectualness of this approach 
to history which is really an imposed tradition.
Now, as a clue to the solution of this problem of tradi­
tion, Heidegger maintains that...
"Greek ontology and its history ... prove that when Dasein 
understands either itself or Being in general, it does sc 
in terms of the 'world,* and that the ontology which has
50. p. 8 3 .
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thus arisen has deteriorated to a tradition in which it 
gets reduced to something self-evident - merely material 
for reworking, as it was for Hegel."51
By this he means that the Greeks had a feeling for the temp­
oral character of Being, which feeling had its effect in es­
tablishing the ''world" as an expression of totality, wholeness, 
unity, but without definite limits. The "world" or "Nature” 
epitomized the "horizon of all possible unity" - the unity 
and futurity of the present and past. But here is the w^ av 
that Heidegger himself puts it: When "the basis of the ancien* 
ontology" is interpreted in the light of "the problematic of 
Temporality," it becomes clear that the ancient wav of inter­
preting the Being of beings is "oriented towards the 'world* 
or 'Nature* in the widest sense," and that it is in terms of 
"time" that Being is understood. "Outward" evidence for this
is to be seen in the "meaning" which Being had; m<pc. -,- or 
> > (signifying in "ontologica 1-Tempora 1 terms” "presence" ).^ 
That is, the Being of beings was interpreted "in the present 
mode of time." Man's Being in Plato becomes a "dialectic," 
but this nives way to a more radical treatment by Aristotle
/ Vin which the i.e., ./ : Vr , becomes "that simple
awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence- 
at-hand," an interpretation which Parmenides had already used 
as a guide to the meaning of Being as ilHLlf* ^
To be noted, however, is the fact that the Greeks under­
stood the temporality of Being without an acquaintance "with
51. p. 83' 52. p. 'l7 53. p. 8,7f.
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the fundamental ontological function of time," or even any 
understanding of its relation to Being, because they take 
time to be a "being" amongst other b e i n g s . 58
This ancient ontology became in the Middle Ages "a fix­
ed body of doctrine" enjoying "the peculiar character which 
the Scholastics gave it," and "traveling the path that leads 
through the Disputationes metaphysicae of Suarez to the 'meta­
physics* and transcendental philosophy of modern times."5h 
In short, it hardened into a "tradition."
Kant was "the first and only person" ever to be driven 
by the phenomena themselves to pursue "the dimension of Tem­
porality," but his was a halting effort at best. Indeed, he 
"shrinks back" and "takes over Descartes* position quite doa- 
matically."56
Descartes, in turn, had, in "claiming to put philosophy 
on a new and firm foundation," omitted a determination 
"the kind of Being which belongs to the res coo i tans, or - 
more precisely - the meaning of the Being of the * sum.*“5/ 
Instead, he "applied the medieval ontology to it in carrying 
through the fundamental considerations of his Meditationes."58
The sum of what Heidegger has indicated here, ever so 
briefly, is that the ancient ontology, when it became in the 
Middle Ages "a fixed body of doctrine," had evidently alr^aiv
58. p. 8 6 . 55. p. 8 3 . 56. p.
57. p . 86. 56. p . 86.
Qhardened into a "tradition," the "essential thinking" that 
went into Greek thought having escaped them. And so has this 
tradition persisted to this day.
Heidegger*s proposed "destruction of the history of on­
tology" has only a positive intent, namely, to "stake out 
the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this al­
ways means keeping it within its 1imi ts."59 "The question 
of Being is to have its own history made transparent." That 
is to say, the hardened tradition must be softened up, and 
that which it conceals must be brought out into the o p e n . 69 
It is the negative aspect of the tradition, then, that is to 
be destroyed so that we may finally "arrive at those primord- 
ia 1 experiences in which we achieved our first ways of de­
termining the nature of Being - the ways which have guided 
us ever s i n c e ."61 Heidegger*s intent is to "display" the 
"birth certificate" of our "basic ontological concepts" and 
this in a way that permits us to participate, as it were, by 
means of a "repetition," in that ancient founding thought. 
Thus will we be brought into a unity with the whole history 
of ontology in a way that tradition could never accomplish.
"In pursuing this task of destruction with the problem 
of Temporality as [his; clue," Heidegger intends first to 
interpret Kant's chapter on the "schematism" in his "Critique 
of Pure Reason " and his doctrine of time in order to show
59. p. 88. 6o. p. 88. 61. p. 8 8 .
ko
"why Kant could never achieve an insight into the problemat­
ic of Temporality."6^ There were two things, Heidegger main­
tains, which prevented this. "He altogether neglected the 
problem of Being," and "he failed to provide an ontology with 
Dasein as its theme." That is, to put it into Kantian Jar­
gon, he failed to "give a preliminary ontological analytic 
of the subjectivity of the subject."^3
Following Kant, Heidegger would take up Descartes* "cog - 
i t o sum," and finally, Aristotle*s essay on time. These br­
ing the "decisive stages" of the history of ontology,68 he 
will have effected, "within the framework of this treatise," 
the destruction of the "ontological tradition," and will 
have demonstrated that the question of the meaning of Being 
is one that cannot, be avoided.65
So much for Heidegger*s basic program as he saw it when 
introducing his "phenomenological" analysis of Dasein as 
Temporality under the title Be i no and Time. However, because 
this "provisional" analysis of Dasein. was deemed to be the 
key access-way to Being, the method of investigation was of 
extreme importance. Heidegger therefore devotes some little 
space in his Introduction both to an explanation of "phenom­
enology" and to its defence as the appropriate methodology.
We have already indicated something of the ambiguity inhere- 
ing in the problem of isolating - not to mention analysing - 
the "ontical" Dasein in its "average everydayness" when "hir>-
62. p. 85* 63. p. 85' 68. p. 8 8 .65. D. 89.
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tory" is exposed to the light of the Temporality of Being.
But we would be ill-advised simply to shrug off either the 
problem or its "provisional" solution as set forth in the 
balance of Heidegger*s book.
Phenomenological analysis investigates phenomena. It 
is geared to the maxim "To the things t h e m s e 1v e s I"66 One 
might be tempted here to say. Ah! You see, already you talk 
in terms of things, that is to say, beings! And you "dupli­
cate" (in "things themselves") in order to emphasize their 
identity. If they "are" themselves, then their Being is al­
ready manifest!
Such a clever little speech, however, overlooks the 
very important little word "To" which throws an entirely 
different light on the matter. The maxim says "To the things 
themselves" - towa rds them. It is, rather than an optimis­
tic expression of achievement, one of hope and of courage.
We press on "towards" the things themselves even though in 
principle they can^^^leve^r^^^^ery^ so circumscribed as to be 
wholly transparent. It takes courage to face insurmountable 
obstacles with "resolution."
Heidegger expounds only the "preliminary conception of 
p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " 6 f He first characterizes the two components 
of the larger concept, and then this latter. The Greek word 
VO jffvnv derives from the verb v , meaning "to show
66. p. 50, 67. pp. 50 ff.
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itself," A phenomenon is that which "shows itself." Further 
study reveals the verb's derivation from words like light,
which further clarify the luminous quality of the noun's 
revelation. The word "phenomenon"carries the root meaning of 
"self-revelation."66 And the phenomena are the "totality" of 
"what the Greeks sometimes identified simply wUth (be­
ings)."
But usage has not, as with most words, been altogether 
consistent. Ambiguity has come onto the scene. Heidegger 
spends some time in trying to sort out the various nuances 
which "show themselves" in the various writings in which the 
word appears. "Phenomenon" can also mean "semblance," that 
which only "seems" to show itself when in reality it is some­
thing e l s e . 69 But these two applications still have an inter­
connection which rests on the former root-meaning. Only phe­
nomena can make a pretense of showing themselves. When a phe­
nomenon shows itself to be other than what it actually is, it 
is nevertheless phenomenal because it shows Itself to be pre­
tending to show itself. That which it pretends to be, its 
semblance. Is not the phenomenon itself, and therefore is to 
be distinguished as a "privative modification."
These two terms have nothing to do with "appearance" or 
"mere appearance." These latter Heidegger equates, for exam­
ple, with the "symptom of a d i s e a s e . "79 Say, a headache is 
real, is a phenomenon, but that doctors discover that it i ^
66. p. 51. 69. p. 51. 70. p. 5 If.
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but a symptom of a malady which hitherto had not ihown itself. 
Was this disease giving the ’’appearance” of a headache? When 
indeed the doctor discovers the disease, which has as one of 
its symptoms a headache, he has in fact discovered the disease 
itself. Prior to this ’’discovery,” however, there was no con­
nection between the headache and the disease, and consequently 
no ’’appearance.” Yet, the term ’’appearance” is used in this 
sense. Something is said to give the appearance, say, of a 
headache. When so used, however, we are actually say inn th%t 
we suspect that there is more than meets the eye, but in fact 
have not seen it. Hence, ’’appearance” refers to ’’something 
which does not show itself.” ’’All indications, presentations, 
symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of ap­
pearing, even though they differ among themselves.”71 An ’’ap­
pearance,” then, is not a phenomenon because the latter has 
not shown itself. Our headache was not the ’’appearance” of 
a deeper malady until its connection had been shown. Thus, 
retrospect may ’’call” it an ’’appearance,” but its correct des­
ignation would be "semblance.”
We have, we believe, clarified an obscurity in this pas­
sage by means of a ’’temporal” analytic. The obscurity in 
Heidegger’s presentation rests in his ’’static” interpretation 
of ’’appearance” when giving the example of a symptom. He 
tries to say that the disease was ’’announcing itself in the 
symptom,” and that in so doing, it was not showing itself, any
71. p . 52.
therefore was not really announcing itself. It was, as he 
puts it, "the announcing-!tself of something which does not 
show itself, but which announces itself through something 
which does show i t s e l f . "72 xe contend that this formula is 
a static rendering of what can only be shown in a temporal 
form. Only hindsight, that is, only aften'the disease has be­
come manifest (and therefore a phenomenon) can It be said to 
have given an appearance of something whi1e at the same time 
failing to show itself. We cannot have it both ways - not 
even by hyphenating "announcing-itseIf," and pawning it off 
as the action of something which has not shown itself.
There is, however, a legitimate relation between phenom­
enon and appearance. If a phenomenon shows itself, it there­
by makes its appearance. When used in this way, appearance 
refers directly to the phenomenon itself and thereby accords 
with its root meaning. Only in this sense is a phenomenon 
also, and at. the same time, an appearance. O
According to Heidegger, Kant uses the term "appearance" 
for the "objects of empirical intuition." These latter are 
genuine phenomena, yet they are said to "hide" "the things-in' 
themselves," and therefore are "appearances." That which is 
purported to lie "behind" the phenomenon and which therefore 
renders it an appearance Heidegger contends "can" be brought 
to show themselves and thereby become phenomenal. "For mani­
festly space and time must be able to show themselves in this
. p. 32. 73. p. 3,3*
way. ”7'!
We must recall that this Introduction was written some time 
before others of his works, and therefore discount a certain 
bravado in what he says here. Though technically there is 
nothing wrong, the implication seems to be that of expectancy: 
he expects to reveal the "phenomenon" of time, for example. 
This, however, may be a matter of subjective interpretation. 
What he says explicitly is that these underlying "thincs-in- 
themselves" can be brought to show themselves, and "can" clear 
ly indicates "possibility" as over against "actuality." As 
will be seen below, we interpret Heidegger to infer in later 
works that this future realm of possibility, instead of being 
phenomenal, is, rather. Nothing, and that Nothing grounds the 
phenomena. Because of this, it cannot be divorced from them. 
That is, there is an Identity with Nothing as well as Differ­
ence. The future retains sufficient hold on all that "comes 
into being" that, in a sense, these phenomena are still com­
ing into being, and therefore have net fully revealed them­
selves as they "are" in "themselves," "Can" time ever become 
a phenomenon and still be future?
In spite of this and the few other problems which appear 
along the way, we are wont to endorse the main thrust of Hei­
degger #s work, especially where it impinges upon our theme.
Let us, then, move on to his concept of the second component 
of phenomenology, namely, the Logos. This concept has many
7'
"competing significations" in Plato and Aristotle, none of 
which usurps the prior place. Or, so it seems, at least, 
until we take hold of the "primary c o n t e n t . " T h i s  content 
requires more than is involved when "discourse" means so many 
things, viz., "reason," "Judgment," "concept," "definition," 
"ground," and "relation." That "discourse" which holds the 
"primary content" "makes manifest what one is ’talking about’ 
in one’s discourse." Aristotle explicates this function of 
discourse in his term <  ^-  ^from which our term "apo-
phantic" derives. Here , "lets something be seen" (Oro -
V c o f K I ) n. nd . . . ; that is, from that which is being talked 
about, i.e., the phenomenon. "Genuine" discourse draws every­
thing that is said f r om the phenomenon under discuss ion.
And in so doing, it enables not only the speaker, but listen­
ers as well, to "see" "what" is being talked about. "What" 
is said accords with "what" is talked about when the discourse 
is rooted in the as \y\. s.
"When fully concrete," discourse has the "character" of 
"vocal proclamation in words." "The Aovr c i s d «-'vn. ...- an 
utterance in which something is sighted in each case."'
And precisely "because the function of the • ~ o y as ' -
uvr-' lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out,
%can the Aoyos have the structure of ^ ~ >s . The Tqv -, here,
has "a purely apophantic signification" which means that it
aims at an identity between what is talked about and the
73. p. 33. 76. p. 36. 77. p. 36.
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course itself. It aims at seeing something as something.
Heidegger now introduces the connection between the Ar,
and A n ' .x. , the "truth." The truth of the y' rests in
. /its capacity as - to dis-close, to reveal, to un-cover,
to dis-cover what it speaks a b o u t .7^ And falsehood consists 
in covering up or otherwise hiding what is truly there, and 
disclosing in its place what is not there. Hence, the A: 
itself is not the primary "locus" of truth. Indeed,  ^  ^ -s , 
"the sheer sensory perception of something, is ’true* in the
/ O ' ' .Greek sense," and is more primordial than the "Pure
Y0>. IV is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of 
Being which beings, as such, may possess." The V'"' ‘ ^ never 
covers up; it is "true" in the purest sense. The least that 
it can be is a non-perceiving lacking straightforward
a c c e s s . B o t h  Xzyxiv (in the sense of lettinc something lie 
before us as it is in itself) and (as the careful takinc-
in of what is there to take in) are more primary than the Ac 
which contains these two. And taken together, they cive to 
the Acyr-t its distinctive and proper m e a n i n g . ^2 This becomes 
evident as we consider now the "preliminary conception of 
phenomenology" and the way the terms "phenomenon" and "locos’' 
fit together.
78. p. 36. 79. p.-36f. Go. p. 37. 81. p. 37.
82. A much fuller explication of the terms v'o?7\, and a7 ,/> , .
and their relation to the appears in Wa s heiss t Denken'
Niemeyer, Tubingen, 193U. No less are we indebted to G. 
Seidel (Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics , U. c Neb. 
Press, Lincoln, 19GL) for his lucid treatment in this ^eccrc. 
Cf. esp. pp. 79-82.
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Heidegger immediately points to an "inner relation be­
tween the things meant by these terms," a relation which we 
have tried to suggest as we went along. The expression ''phe­
nomenology," he says, "may be formulated in Greek as \ > '■
\ / q-> . f , ' ^A. VO \ . "^0 And he says that A* f: < v' means t i .
When we incorporate these terms, we arrive at something like 
this: to let that which lies before us as it is in itself be 
seen as it is by means of vocal expression. This formula we 
take to be the "basic" meaning of the term y s , no less than 
it is of the combined form "phenomenology" - and no less than 
it is the meaning of the term "hermeneutic," i.e., exegesis.
Vie can see, then, why Heidegger says that phenomenology 
has as its maxim, "To the things themselves.*" As a "method" 
of investigation, it neither characterizes nor designates the 
"what" of its subject-matter. All that is involved is a "how" 
"how".it moves towards the things themselves. Phenomenologi­
cal investigation has as its purpose to reveal, to discover, 
to take the wraps off what is there to be seen as it is. The 
results of its investigation are descriptions of phenomena. 
Hence, a phenomenon is something hidden, or covered up. It 
has not been seen already, or if it has, it somehow becomes 
concealed a g a i n , T h e  aim of phenomenological research is 
to disclose the "Being of beings," the phenomena themselves as 
they "are." And Heidegger here reiterates his thesis: that 
Being has been covered up for a long, long time; it has been
63. p. 36. 6L|. p. 39.
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"fcraotten," a case of being wholly oblivious of it (Se i nsver- 
cessenhe i t ).
"Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the 
theme of ontology, and it is our way of giving it demon­
strable precision. Only as phenomenology is ontology pos­
sible. In the phenomenological conception of * phenomenon,’ 
what one has in mind as that which shows itself, is the Be­
ing of beings, its meaning, its modifications and deriva­
tives . "83
And "behind" the phenomena of phenomenology there is 
nothing. But what lies on this side of them is sufficient to 
obscure them - even to the point of total obliteration.^^ We 
interpret Heidegger to be saying here that in a certain sense, 
there is but one phenomenon: Being itself; and that the mul­
tiplicity of so-called phenomena are the means of moving to-
P 7wards this one, true phenomenon.^' It is the One: the one 
which applies to the Many and bestows upon them their unity 
as individuals. But unti1 it is revealed wholly, they are 
fated to partial obscur i ty. If this is a fair interpretation,
then Heidegger’s correlation of Being with Time, and his ques­
tion as to whether Time is the horizon of Being or not,^^ ac­
cords perfectly, and puts Into perspective these lesser "phe­
nomena" which have so puzzled us with their relativity, their 
transience, their "historical" revelation. For, is it not 
"history" that suggestsithat without question the phenomena
85. p. 60.
86. In the "Humanismusbriefe"'^Heidegcer says that it was out of 
the "experience" of the oblivion of Being that Be ing and T ime 
was undertaken. Cf. p. 17.
87. In this sense, "time" could be called a "phenomenon."
88. This is not "eschatologica1," for, in principle, complete 
revelation is Impossible because existence is limited bv tir*'
8y. p. h8b.
•»-Uber den Humanismus, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt, I'
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towards which phenomenology moves in an effort to reveal them 
as they are, to reveal them in their Being, are "hidden"? A.nd 
because they are hidden. Being is also?
Heidegger suggestsfthat there are several ways in which 
the phenomena can be hidden; They can be as yet undiscovered: 
neither known or unknown. They can be covered-over, buried, 
forgotten, ignored. They can also be all but obscured so that 
only a "semblance" remains. Here the possibilities for de­
ceiving are enormous and stubborn.^^ Say, for example, that 
"a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources." 
If it is communicated "in the form of an assertion," it will 
more than lilcely degenerate and be covered-over, and lost. 
Assertions, it seems, cannot represent primal truth. "The dif­
ficulty of this kind of research lies in making it self-crit­
ical in a positive sense."91
As to its "subject-matter," phenomenology aims at reveal­
ing the Being of beings. It is ontology. We have seen how 
Heidegger has narrowed down the field of possible "subjects" 
to the one for which Being is an issue, namely, Dase in. And 
we have discussed the "method" to be used. Does it not follow, 
then, that phenomenology, as a method of investigation, is 
"intcrpre ta ti on"7 It "is a hermeneutic in the primordial sig­
nification of this word." And to the extent that this "pro­
visional" and "preliminary" interpretation will shed light on 
those beings which are not Casein, it "also becomes a ’hermen-
90. p. 60. 91. p. 61.
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eutic* in the sense of working out the conditions in which 
the possibility of any ontological investigation depends."^- 
But there is yet a third sense inwhich the phenomenology of 
Casein is a hermeneutic, and one which is "philosophically 
primary," And that is as "an analytic of the existentia1ity 
of existence.
This latter point needs explanation. If all beings arc 
said to exist, but the structure of Casein’s existence is such 
that "history" is its significant characteristic, then an an­
alysis (interpretation) of its existence should shed light on 
the existence of all other beings because their existence is 
tainted w^ith a distinctly "historical" flavor, namely, relativ­
ity. This latter problem may have provided the intiial im­
pulse to seek a solution, so dominant has the place of sci­
ence been in western culture, but if a solution is to be found, 
it must be by a route other than that which science has taken. 
For, science is able only to confound and compound the prob­
lem. Now, this correlation of the methodology of science with 
that of phenomenology demonstrates the necessity of an exis­
tential analysis of Casein. Furthermore, it explains Heideg­
ger’s recurring polemic against "technique," "calculation," 
and "measurement" so distinctively characteristic of s c i e n c e . 9-
"Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, ... pertains to 
every being." Yet, "Being and its structure Jie beyond ever' 
being and every possible character which a being may possess."
92. p. 62. 93. p. 62.
9 '1. Cf., e.g., the essay,"What is Metaphysics?" in £x i stence 
and Be ino, esp. pp. 356f f.
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"Being i s the ’transcendens’ pure and s imp le. And the
transcendence of Casein’s Being is distinctive in that
it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most
radical individustion. Every disclosure of Being as the
transcendens is transcendents 1 knowledge. Phénoménal eg i cal
truth (the disc 1osedness of Beinc) is ’veritas transccnden- 
 --
Thus is philosophy to be seen as "universal phenomenological 
ontology," As such, "what is essential in it does not lie in 
its actua 1 i tv , " but in its possibility. "'We can understand 
phenomenology only by siezinq upon it as a possibility,"9^
After a fitting apology for the "awkwardness and inele­
gance" of his expressions in the analysis to follow, Heidegger 
proceeds to end this Introduction with an outline of the task 
ahead of him. We should note that the whole work, as outlined, 
was never finished in the formal sense. Indeed, Being and Time, 
as published, constituted but two-thirds of the first half, 
even though the first six editions of the German text carried 
the designation "First H a l f . "97 As outlined here in the In­
troduction, "Part One" was to be "the Interpretation of Dasein 
in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the 
transcendental horizon for the question of Being" - both aspects 
of which we have found discussed in the Introduction. When 
broken down, "Part One" was to have three divisions: 1, "The 
preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein; 2. Dasein and tem­
porality; and 3 . Time and Being." Obviously, the published 
portion consists of divisions 1. and 2 . only.
93. p. 62. 96. p. 6^.
97. In the "Author’s Preface to the Seventh German Edition," 
p. 17.
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"Part Two" was to constitute the "basic features of a 
phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with 
the problem of Temporality as our clue." When broken down, it 
too was to have three divisions: "1. Kant’s doctrine of the 
schematism and time, as a preliminary stage in a problematic 
of Temporality; 2. the ontological foundation of Descartes’
’cogito sum4 ^ and how the medieval ontology has been taken 
over into the problematic of the ’res cog i tans ;’ and 1. Aris­
totle’s essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating
a ^the phenomena 1 basis and the limits of ancient ontology."-^
Now, when we see Heidegger’s own brief summaries of Parts 
One and Tv;o, it is readily apparent that "time" and "Temporal- 
ity" are his prime interests despite the fact that he has al­
ways to deal with beings and their interpretation. We have 
already seen why he must focus upon beings for a glimpse of 
Being, but we have yet to discover in full, and in_detail, whv 
he cannot simply take up "time" as a "phenomenon" - if Time is 
indeed his concern. For an answer to this that goes beyond 
the brief suggestions we have already made, the reader will 
have to read on. We find that time is treated in a pivotal 
way in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, an analysis of 
which follows next. And in the subsequent chapters as well we 
shall find time to be a determining consideration. So that by 
the time we shall have examined in some detail but five works 
(in addition to this Introduction), we shall have accumulated
9b. p. 66.f.
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enough insight into Heidegger’s understanding of Tine to en­
able us to draw conclusions which, to be sure, will be provi­
sional, but firm enough, nonetheless, to warrant considera­
tion. For, our purpose, let us repeat, is provisional: to 
see if further investigations along these lines are worth the 
time that they would "take.”
Someone will ask. Why do you not treat the analysis which 
is to follow here in Be i nq a nd T ime ? For better or worse, we 
contend that it does not warrant such in this treatise because 
it is too "preliminary." We are already assuming, at the out­
set, not the details of Heidegger’s existential analysis, but 
rather his general conclusions, namely, that the meaning of 
the Being of Dasein lies in Temporality. We are not sure that 
"Sein-zum-Tod," for example, is the best way to explicate Ca­
sein’s tendency to Interpret his own being as a unity. "Unit\” 
itself could have been analysed as the peculiarly temporal sig­
nification by which Dasein interprets his own and the Being 
of the things-at-hand; and this as an extension of the concept 
of "totality" by which the "world" is constituted. For, does 
not unity make its appearance solely from within the sphere 
of historienlity as the "ownmost" possibility which can belonr 
to beings? But this is a moot point! Heidegger does not say 
that his analysis is the best that could be made, and over and 
over again he stresses its provisional character. We see no 
Doint in ouarrelinc over such relativities.
55
Our task as we have seen it has been to press on with 
Heidegger into further basic phenomenological analyses whicn 
probe more deeply than those In Being and Time. For, in the 
end, will not all phenomenological analyses be "of" Dasein 
whether explicit or implicit? We have chosen the Kantbook 
because it takes up Kant’s Cr i tlque of Pure Reason and its 
concern for "laying the foundation for ontology." We have 
chosen The Essence of Ground, "What is Metaphysics?" and "The 
Essence of Truth" for similar "basic" researches. Our final 
choice, Icent i ta t und Differenz, follows upon all that goes 
before it and helps to tie it together. It also has a pecul­
iarly "theological" significance which serves to bring the 
whole discussion around to our starting point, and complete 
our study. For our part,.these five works are enough of a 
unity in themselves to constitute the scope of this treatise, 
yet are representative of Heidegger’s whole thought through 
the years, so that by assuming the backdrop of Beinc and Time 
in its general configurations (as suggested in the Introduc­
tion), we end with a fair sampling of the total considerable 
literature through 1957, and thus meet Martin Heidegger, the 
philosopher. But as to the legitimacy of this procedure, the 
reader himself will have to decide. Let us press on, then, 
to lay the foundation of ontology.
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Chapter III 
"Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics"
1. Introductory
Heidegger’s Kant and the Prob1em of Metaphys1cs ^ first 
appeared in 1929, but prior to publication, this "interpre­
tation" of Kant "in its essentials" was presented "in a four- 
hour course" given in the winter of 1923-26. It was repeated 
in 1928, and again in March, 1929»^ By the time the unaltered 
Second Edition was publiched in 1950, Heidegger’s critics had 
had time to speak "reproachfully" of the "violence" of his 
interprétât ion.3 We wonder, however, if these critics were 
themselves violent in their interpretation of this book, for 
it was the author’s intent that it should be a portion of "the 
second part of Be i no a nd T ime."6 That is, it is a crucial 
first step in the "destruction of the history of ontology" 
and should, therefore, be criticised relative to this entire 
history, and not, as might be the case, according to favored 
interpretations of Kant, and quite apart from this history. 
Heidegger’s "Kantbook" is a fundamental first blow dealt this 
entire history. It is fundamental because Kant is the first 
thinker in that history to discern that ontology is a problem. 
And it is a blow because Heidegger points out how Kant failed 
to achieve its solution.6
1. Translated by James S. Churchill; Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1962; hereafter referred to only by pace num- 
be r.2 . Author’s Preface to First Edition, p. xxiii.
J. Author’s Preface to Second Edition, p. xxv.
6. p. xxiii. 5« P» 16. 6 . p. I66ff.
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The traditional concept of metaphysics which Kant inher­
ited contained, according to Heidegger, a "peculiar" albeit a 
"necessary ambiguity."7 The term "metaphysics" had arisen "as 
the collective name for those treatises of Aristotle which 
were classified as following those belonging to the ’Physics»."^ 
His "Physics" were descriptive of Nature (d> vJc . s ) as apprehend­
ed in "experience," whereas "metaphysics" was descriptive of 
what Aristotle considered to be d iXrcrd-i , 9 "First
philosophy" considered both "beings as such (yyg and the
"highest sphere of beincs (t.m -c ; * ■: < ) through which the
being in totality (the Being of beings) is d e f i n e d . H e n c e ,  
"first philosophy" centers upon this ambiguous relation be­
tween Being and beings.
And " ’metaphysics’ remains the title of a fundamental 
philosophical difficulty."!^ In post-Aristotelian philosophy, 
metaphysics was organized around this basic ambiguity. "The 
uevout Christian interpretation" designated as "creatures" 
ail that was not divine, "the totality of creatures defining 
the u n i  v e r s e . "!2 This totality had two main divisions: Na­
ture and Man. Together with God, then, the totality of ail 
"beings" had three divisions, and their studies were termed 
Cosmology, Psychology, and Theology. These three constituted 
metaphysica specialis, a discipline to be distinguished some­
how, as in Aristotelian thought, from metaphy s i ca genera 1i s 
(ontology) which had as its object Being in general,^3 or to
7. p. 10. 8 . p. lOf. 9. p. 11 10. p. 12
II. p . 12. 12. p. 13. 13. p . 13.
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all three divisions of the former.
As it developed through the years, metaphys ica cene rails 
became known as the "queen of the sciences" not only because 
Being in general was applicable to and somehow undergirded 
all three divisions of metaphysics specialis, but also because 
its methodology corresponded to mathematics: "perfectly rigor- 
our," "absolutely binding," and "free from the contingencies 
of experience," In the strictest sense, ontology is "ration­
al and a priori, i.e., it is a pure, rational science."!- it 
was precisely because cosmology, psychology and theology de­
pended so much on "experience" with its subjective contingen­
cies, and therefore yielded "incoherence" and "ineffectualness, 
that Kant sought in ontology the nessary basis or ground upon 
which to build an absolutely coherent metaphysica spec la lis: 
his primary interest. Hence, ontology, the study of Beinc in 
general, became for him "true metaphysics."!^
With his attention now focused upon ontology, Kant ob­
serves that hitherto "its method has been merely a random 
groping, and what is worst of all, a groping among mere con- 
cepts."!6 It "lacks a binding proof of its alleged insights."! 
What constitutes the "inner possibility" of its being what it 
claims to be, namely, "first philosophy," the "queen of the 
sciences"? This question heightens the "ambiguity" between
Ik, p. 13. 15. p. Up.
16. Here and in all subsequent Kantian quotations, we abbrev­
iate his name (K.), cite first or second edition (A or 3). 
and follow with page numbers; e.g., this citation: K . Bx\. 
This Kantian reference is then followed by the pace : 1 cu- text: p. 111.•7. p. IL.
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beings-as-such which are experienced, and that in which they 
all participate, namely, Being in general, a phenomenon which 
itself does not appear as a "being," and therefore is not an 
object of experience. Obviously, the matter of our behavior 
or comportment (Verbal ten) relative to the beings which "are" 
is the problem here, but how to approach it?
Kant appears to have taken liis clue from "science."
The "scientific method" postulates an hypothesis: a possible 
explanation of observed patterns within Nature. On the basis, 
then, of a "possible" explanation, experiments are conducted 
in order to see if Nature conforms to this hypothesis. If so, 
then this hypothesis becomes a "law" of Nature. No "laws" per
se are observable in Nature; they are not encountered as "nat­
ural" phenomena. Rather, they are "projected" as "possible" 
explanations, and simply tested for accuracy. All so-called 
" laws of Nature" have therefore been projected "prior" to their 
testing and proof. In a manner of speaking, then, they have 
been knownjprior to that experience which proved them. There 
must therefore be something about our behavior towards beings 
which has the character of "knowledge a priori." But this 
would mean that we have "ontological" as well as "ontic" know­
ledge. Moreover, it would suggest that such "ontic" knowledge 
as we have, is itself made possible by ontological knowledge.
Thus, both the formulation of the problem as "ambiguous" 
and this clue from science led Kant to approach ontology s a
1 . c . 19.
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problem —  the first man so to d o . I n  consequence, "the 
structure of traditional metaphysics undergoes its first and 
most profound shock."20 Kant sees his task to be "to reveal 
the internal possibility of ontology," to show how it is pos­
sible to have any "ontic" knowledge at a 11.21 This means 
that he must demonstrate that the human mind has certain fac­
ulties which "determine" something about "objects" prior to 
their being given in experience, which determination is essen­
tial to experiential apprehension, i.e., makes it possible. 
Therefore, since ontic knowledge has traditionally been terme’ 
"acts of synthetic judgment," his investigation of ontolocical 
knowledge will interrogate acts of synthetic judgment a priori. 
And since "reason" has traditionally been the faculty which 
supplies the principles of judgment, Kant will interrogate 
"pure" reason, that is, reason deprived of empirical da ta.22 
By such means, he intends to "lay the foundation" - in the 
sense of "architectural" construetion26 - from which can arise 
an unshakeable metaphys ica specia lis; Cosmology, Psychology, 
and Theology.23
2. Characteristics of Human Knowledge.
In order to interrogate "pure" reason, it will be neces­
sary to enter hitherto unexplored recesses of the human mind, 
to move in the direction of a continuing regression to the
19. p. 16. 20. p. 16. 21. p. 17. 22. p. 1821. p. 19. 2 b . p . Iq. 23. p . 21.
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ultimate root of all knowledg. It is to be noted that Heideg­
ger, in this interpretation of Kant’s Cr i t ique, follows him 
in his "characterization of the dimension" within which this 
interrogation is to be made. But Kant, it seems, character­
izes the "essential attributes" of this dimension as "self- 
evident presuppositions."26 Heidegger prefers to treat them 
less lightly.
The "finitude" of human reason is discussed first. Fin- 
itude "by no means consists merely and primarily in the fact 
that human knowledge exhibits many shortcomings: that it is 
unstable, inexact, liable to error, and so on."27 Rather, 
finitude here refers to the "mode" by which "knowledge may re­
late to o b j e c t s , t o  the mode of "intuition" (Anschauunc). 
This mode is fundamentally dependent upon something that is 
offered; it is receptive; it gains all its material from an 
"immediate" relation.
As a term at once definitive for all "human" knowledge, 
"finitude" emphasizes the priority of intuition over "thought" 
and "imagination," however much these latter may, in the course 
of the argument appear to gain ascendency over intuition. It 
is finite human reason that is to be interrogated, whether it 
be based on empirical or upon a priori reception of its object.
Intuition, then, is "primary" cognition,29 Thoucht, on 
the other hand, rather than being primary, is always "at the 
service of intuition."'^ That which thought and intuition
p. 27. 27. p. 27. 28. p. 2 8. 29. p. 2 ,^10. D. 26.
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share in comiaon is their mutual capacity to "represent."
Now, representation "is characterized by an awareness that 
something announces itself and is announced."31 In empiri­
cal knowledge, for instance, "something" announces itself by 
being "there." Awareness of its "being-there" is its "intu­
ition" - in this case, a "sensible" intuition - and recogni­
tion of "its-being-therc" is the conceptual grasp of its re­
lation to other things similar to it. Here, primary intuition 
is active in representing to thought this "single" intuition. 
Thought, in turn, relates this "particular" to the "generality" 
and in this "representation" makes possible its recognition as 
something "known." In this distinction between the "particu­
lar" and "general," we have thought’s contribution to knowledge, 
i.e., "conceptual" thought: the relation of the One to the Many. 
Every finite intuition is "single" (particular) and must some­
how be related to previous intuitions- Without primary intu­
ition, however, conceptual thought would have nothing to relate.32
At this point, "the essence of finite human knowledge is 
elucidated by contrasting it with the idea of infinite, divine 
knowledge, i.e., ’intuitus orig inarius’33."36 Divine knowledge, 
it seems, is also "intuitive" knowledge. But as "divine," it 
cannot be "dependent" upon an object as is the case with "fi­
nite" knowledge. So, infinite knowledge, "in the act of intu­
ition, first creates the object of intuition as such."35 O r , 
as Heidegger puts it, "seeing right through the thing in ad­
vance, such cognition intuits it immediately and has no need of
11. p. 26. 32. p. 28f. 31. K. B?2, o. 28.
3^. p. 28. 35. K. BI3 9, p. 29.
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thought. Thought as such, then, is in itself the seal of lin- 
itude."36 The precise character of finite intuition is such 
that it must be a thinking intuition. And it is in this qual­
ification (as thinking) that the distinction between finite and 
infinite knowledge is caught.37
Finite intuition "is not able to give itself an object.
It must let this object be given."38 This means that finite 
intuition is "derivative" or "receptive,"39 and therefore de­
pendent upon something being given. Hence, finite intuition
is "sensible;" organs of "sense" are required. But this should 
not be construed to mean that finite intuition is dependent 
upon "sense" organs. Rather, it is finite because "our Dasein 
is finite." The senses merely communicate such intimations as 
are given by the things around us.60 Sense organs "serve" in­
tuition, not vice versa. This being the case, the way is left
open for "the possibility of a non-empirica1 sensibility,"’! 
or, less obscurely, for the possibility of the "pure" intuition 
of, say, time and space.
We have already alluded to the rule of thought in knowledge 
how it relates particular intuitions to the many. This process 
also accounts for the "generality" of knowledge, i.e., its com- 
municabi1ity. Now, once the relation of the particular to the 
general is effected, a "Judgment" has been rendered. That is, 
something has been asserted about the single intuition. What? 
Precisely this: that what has been intuited relates in some wa y 
to the many. This kind of Judgment is termed "predication."
36. p. 29. 37. p. 29. 3Ô. p. 30. 39■'-’0 . p. 31. hi. p. 32.
66-
Two other types are possible. That which connects the subject 
to the predicate in some way is termed "apophantic;" and that 
which asserts that this connection is "true" is called "veri- 
tative." Perhaps these should be illustrated. A particular 
intuition is declared to be "a dog:" plainly a generality, a 
concept, and an instance of "predication." To say that "I see 
a dog" is to connect the subject with the predicate: an instance 
of "apophantic discourse." But to say "That dog is rabid" is 
to make an assertion that can either be true or false: a veri- 
tative synthesis.
Since all three of these Judgments will always involve the 
relation of a single intuition with the many, they can be said 
to be "synthetic," that is, they effect a new relation.!^
Hence, they effect a unity: the relation itself. Thus, we can 
speak of this unifying action, this conceptual correlation, as 
"synthetic Judgment" whether it is predicative, apophantic, or 
veritative. According to Heidegger, this synthesis is said to 
"constitute the essence of finite knowledge."d3
With this break-down of the types of Judgments which can 
be made, we can see that it is only the predicative synthesis 
which utilizes an "external" intuition. The apophantic Judg­
ment relates to the subject the predicate how already "given" 
in the prior predicative synthesis; and the veritative, in turn, 
relates these two. In other words, once a "finite" intuition 
is made, a synthesis (something not "external") based on it c&n
62. p. 3 3 . 6j. p. 3b.
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now itself be related, and a new synthesis made, and so on, 
each "new" synthesis presenting itself within - wholly indepen­
dent of empirical intuition. This means that the synthesizing 
capacity of "finite" thought can be termed "infinite" in that 
it "creates" "things," e.g., relations.
Infinite knowledge, it has been said, cannot be "dependent"
upon some ontic thing.
"Absolute cognition itself reveals a being in the act of let­
ting it come forth (ents tehen las sen) , and possesses it ’only’ 
as that which arises from this very act, i.e., as e-ject (Ent- 
stand). Insofar as a being is manifest to absolute intuition, 
it ’is’ precisely in its coming-into-Being. It is the beinc 
as thinc-in-itse 1f , i.e., not as object."nb
This somewhat obscure passage intends to pinpoint the precise 
character of infinite intuition as in no wise to be understood 
as producing or creating its own "objects." For, "objects," 
strictly speaking, only "exist" for finite intuition: that kind 
of intuition which must have "objects" in order itself to exist 
"as such. " 3-5 We might put the matter this way: finite intuition 
is not content with a beifig’s mere " comi ng-i nto-3e i ng ; " it must 
"be" now; it must already be wholly manifest. Is the distinc­
tion here a fine one? For our purposes, it is elucidated most 
easily in "historical" terms. "Coming-into-Being" is a fluid 
concept. The precise "definition" of what is now only "coming- 
into-Being" has not yet been fully revealed. In consequence, it 
cannot now be known "as such," as fully revealed.36 An "object,” 
on the other hand, is "historical" in the sense that its defin­
ition has already been established. It is fully known now.
ilk, p . 36 . 65. p . 36f . 6 6 . p. 38.
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Infinite intuition, therefore, is presentIv-actinc-intuition ; 
it is intuiting now. "What" it is intuiting now, cannot be de­
termined until it has been fully intuited. And when that will 
be is still future.
Kant’s "thing-in-itself" is thus to be understood as only- 
nov/-coming-into-Being and therefore unknowable "as such."37 
Its "appearance," however, is not to be interpreted dynamical­
ly, but in a temporally static way, in terms of "moments," a 
sequence of "now’s." To finite intuition, it "is," in any riven 
moment, an "object" of some sort, and it is distinct, manifest,
and present.38
To be sure, we have introduced "temporal" distinctions into 
this discussion, something neither Kant nor Heidegger has done. 
Without them, however, the obscurity of the passage is such that, 
a reader may find comprehension virtually impossible. Thoughts 
like this, for example, abound: "behind the appearance" is the 
"thinq-in-itse 1f" which is not accessible to finite knowledqe. 
Dare we ask. How, then, is it known to be there? The difficul­
ties such a non-temporal presentation makes are manifold, and, 
to a degree pointless, in view of the fact that time is to plav 
such a major role in the balance of the argument. The "tempor­
al" clue is given anyway in the idea of "coming-into-Being," and 
needs only slight elaboration in order to lay bare the essen­
tial distinctions which we have made.
■ ■ 7 . p. 36. 68. p . 36. Iq9 . p. 30.
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we are approaching by this analysis the "field of origin," 
the dimension of the regression necessary in order to lay bare 
the root of knowledge. It is appropriate to take stock. Em­
phasis has been heavily laid upon that one aspect which charac­
terizes all human knowledge: its finitude. With this aspect 
firmly in mind, we can summarize, or rather, let Kant do it for 
us :
"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the 
mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations 
(receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of 
knowing an object through these Representations (sponteneitv 
in the production of concepts)."
Finite intuition, then, and thought, which serves it, are the
two "fundamental sources."
But what is the origin of these "sources," and of the unity
which they comprise, i.e., finite human knowledge?
"By way of introduction or anticipation we need only say 
that there are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sens i- 
billty and understanding, which perhaps spring from a com­
mon, but to us unknown, root. Through the former, objects 
are given to us; through the latter, they are thoucht."51
Heidegger cites this passage from Kant in order to indicate not 
only the direction to be taken, but also that Kant says that 
the "root" is "to us unknown." Heidegger’s interpretation is 
to be an investigation of all the clues that Kant nevertheless 
gives about this "unknown" root. His findings will carry him 
beyond Kant in bringing out into the open what Kant started tc 
uncover but failed finally to do. Later, Heidegger will char­
acterize Kant’s reaction as a "recoil."52
50. K. A50, 876, p. 30. 51. K. A15, B29, p. 3 1.
52. See pp. I66ff.
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3. The V,'ay in which the "Root" is to be Revealed
It has been stated that the clue from science suggests 
the possibility of founding, or grounding, metaphysics if it 
can be shown that an a priori synthesis makes possible the re­
ception of beings as objects of intuition. But how can finite 
intuition intuit objects before they are given empirica11v , 
without being their creator?^^ This is the question of an 
"ontological" synthesis, of bringing forth the Being of a thing 
prior to its apprehension as being "there. "-8'' It is a question 
of "pre-ontologica1" knowledge, of the knowledge of "Being" 
prior to the knowledge of particular beings.
If this investigation of the possibility of ontological 
knowledge a priori is to be undertaken, then it must concentrât" 
on what Kant terms "pure" reason, i.e., "pure" thought and "pure' 
intuition. Accordingly, this investigation will proceed through 
five stages: "(1) the essential elements of pure knowledge; (2 ) 
the essential unity of pure knowledge; (3 ) the intrinsic possi­
bility of the essential unity of the ontological synthesis; ( )
the ground of the intrinsic possibility of the ontological syn­
thesis; and (5 ) the complete determination of the essence of 
ontological knowledge."35
The character of this investigation is that of an "anal­
ytic," a term which "signifies a ^dissolution' which loosens 
and lays bare the seeds of ontology. It reveals those condition
p. 'l3. 5k. p. 55. p. .
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from which sprincs an ontology as a whole according to its 
intrinsic p o s s i b i l i t y . "36 ''it is that which 'reason produces 
entirely out of itself.'"3f The "way," then, is an analysis 
of "pure" reason.
1|. The First Stage: The Essential Elements of Pure Reason
The question before us is this: "How must the finite beine 
that we call man be in his inmost essence in order that in gen­
eral he can be open to beings that he himself is not, which 
beings must be able to reveal themselves by themselves?""''
First, we must assume that when finite knowledge is cognition 
a priori, it must be "pure" intuition, and that pure intuition 
must therefore be determined by "pure" thought. For, if intu­
ition were to be determined by anything "outside," it would not 
be "pure" but "empirical." Hence, a quest for "pure" intuition. 
Are there "pure" intuitions? Kant claims that space and time 
are.39
Space is accorded this designation because no such thing 
as space exists per se. "Relations of beside, above, and ^n 
back of are not localized 'here' or 'there.'"30 Such spatial 
relations as these can and do apply "here," "there," and "every­
where" within the realm of "things," but are requisite only to 
locating them relative to one another. Space is one; all things 
which exist, do so within this unity of space, yet have no ef­
fect whatever upon it. To say that a thing occupies or takes
). p. h6 . o7. K. Axx, p. L6 pb. p. h7
p. 36. 60. p. 39.
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space in no way limits space. it is limitless and continuous, 
unique and whole, yet is comprised of parts without ever losing 
its essential unity or totality.31 The space that separates an 
electron from its nucleus is the same space that separates the 
galaxies. Distance measures are not determinations of space, 
but of "things" in their inter-relations. A child's nichtcown, 
for example, may burn if ignited, but it is not the distance 
between the cown and a fire that matters, but the flamability 
of the cloth and the relative temperature of the heat to which 
it is exposed - both measures of these "things" themselves.
Given a "flameproof" gown, there would be no ignition even if 
contact with a coal fire were immediate.
If, then, space does not exist "as such," that is, cannot 
itself be isolated and measured, and otherwise limited, if it is 
unique and whole, yet is composed of parts which have no limit­
ing effect on the totality of space, can we not conclude that 
it is niven as a unique whole, at once, and as a whole, in an 
act of representation? An act of "original" representation 
which "creates" space?3k This "original" representation is 
made in such a way that at the time of an empirical intuition, 
the object intuited is intuited as already within a spatial con­
text. That is, space is given a priori.33
But purely "spatial" representations must have an order 
to them. That is, should our flamable ninhtcown come closer 
and closer to a fire, the mere measurement of the proximities
61. p. 50. 62. K. AJ2, p. 30. 6]. p
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involved is not enough. These measurements, if not arranged in 
an order of decreasing distances, would account for little. It 
must be that each succeeding measurement is less than the for­
mer if the "meaning" of the situation is to be grasped. Now, 
unlike spatial determinations, those which are temporal a re not 
to be found "outside." Time, rather, appears to manifest itscl"' 
"as a succession of mental s t a t e s , a  succession of "now's," 
each of which has its own representations, drives, and moods.
As pure succession, however, devoid of thematic representations, 
time "is 'the form of inner sense, that is, of our intuition of 
ourselves and of our inner states.'"33 "Time cannot be a de - 
termination of outer appearances; it has to do neither with 
shape or position."33 As an "inner" sense, then, time, as witt 
space, appears to be an "original" intuition, a "product" of the 
mind. Yet, we have seen how "succession" is requisite to mak­
ing spatial determinations meaningful. Indeed, to speak of 
spatial determinations (the plural) at all, presupposes a suc­
cession of them, so that we begin to see how time is prior to 
space, i.e., it "takes precedence over space." "As universal 
pure intuition, it must be the dominent and essential element 
of pure knowledge" which makes possible a priori each and every 
appearance of anything whatsoever.3?
But once time as the dominent "pure" intuition is shown to 
be an "inner" sense, then the "subjectivity of the subject" 
must be shewn to consist in its being "open," or receptive, 
beings outs id;-. Else, this "transcendental aesthetic" i il
p. 31. 33. K. A3J, 8^9, p. plf. 66. K. A;-.
o7. p. p2.
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accomplished little towards grounding pre-onto 1ogica 1 knowledge. 
If, on the other hand, the subjectivity of the subject can be 
shown to consist precisely in this attitude of openness to ex­
ternal beings, then the more can it be shown to be free from 
external limitations.38 The subjectivity of the subject, then, 
has now to be examined. That is, the role of pure thought in 
finite knowledge, i.e., the "transcendental logic," is to be 
determined.
The other element in finite knowledge is "thought, which 
as determinative representation, is directed toward what is in­
tuited in intuition, and thus is entirely at the service of th.e 
latter."39 As we have said, thought's contribution to cognition 
is that both of relating "single" intuitions to the "manv" ^n', 
by means of "concepts," of determining that which is intuited. 
Pure cognition, then, would mean "general representation" by 
means of "pure" concepts. Now, what are "pure" concepts?
"Unity" is a "pure" concept. All of the things which are 
empirically apprehended in the world are, as such, single units. 
Each is an example of unity when all but its participation as 
sheer "unit" is abstracted from it, and we are left with a math­
ematically pure number: an example of unity. Yet, when taken 
altogether, these unities themselves comprise a larger unity, 
but this "totality" is essentially the same as the least of its 
constituent parts. All are one; each is one. In the case abovr 
(in the transcendental aesthetic), it was precisely thi^ ; char^c-
:>d. p. 33. '9. p. 55*
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teristic of space which led us to conclude that it v/as not an 
external phenomenon which can be apprehended "here," "there," 
and "everywhere," because all spaces are of the same total 
space. It should now be even more apparent how "unity" is al­
ways unity, whether we are considering the least possible unity, 
or the sum of all such units. Unity is unity, pure and simple, 
and cannot be qualified in any way so as to destroy its essen­
tial integrity as both universal and particular. "Conceptual 
representation lets the many come to acreement in this one."
In unity, then, we have all that is required of a pure 
concept. For, if abstracted from whatever phenomena may be in 
question, this abstraction in no way deprives phenomena of their 
content. Yet, if the "unity" of a phenomenon is disallowed, it 
cannot be seen to be phenomenal. "It” does not exist as some­
thing separate and distinct. Its Being, it would seem, con­
sists in its integrity as a unit.
The c t of reflection (thought) is one of Judgment: it is 
the "determination of something as something."7  ^ Each such ac­
tion brings "various representations under one common represen­
tation."'^- But "this act of reflective unification is possible 
only if it is itself guided by a precursory reference to a unit', 
in the light of which all unification becomes possible."^3 By 
such means, each and every "representation of unity ,would) be­
long to the essential structure of the fundamental act of under­
stand inc." 6 ' Is this "d i rec t ive unity" to be found here in
p. 55' 71. p. 57. 72. K. a6 6 , 393, p .
P • 7 7 7a. p. 37.
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thought, or must we look for it elsewhere? A summary of this 
"first stage" will give a preliminary answer to this question 
and prepare us for the second.
Space and time have been seen to be "pure" intuitions. And 
now "unity" has been shown to be a "pure" concept: a representa­
tion of thought. it was earlier disclosed73 that thouoht is al­
ways at the service of intuition, but that pure intuition must 
be determined by thought. Thus, we have a relation between 
thought and intuition of mutual reciprocity. Yet, finitude re­
quires that intuition be "primary." If the unity of the pure 
concept were the sole prerogative of the faculty of thought, 
then its unifying representation would then make possible intu­
ition's "single" intuitions, and thereby reduce it to a subordi­
nate role. No, the "directive unity" docs not have its source 
in thought. Neither thought nor intuition can dominate.
3. The Second Stage: The Essential Unity of Pure Knowledge.
The analysis so far has treated separately the "transcen­
dental aesthetic" and the "transcendental logic." But these 
"cannot be adequately understood even as elements when consid­
ered in isolation; still less can their unity be obtained by a 
supervenient combination of the isolated members."76 perhaps 
we have not stressed enough the mutual dependence which these 
elements manifest. If not, then it should now be made manifest­
ly clear that thought is wholly at the service of intuition i r;
7b. See -hove, p . 61. 76. p. 61.
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virtue of the latter's primacy in finite knowledge, and is, 
therefore, dependent. But to no less a degree is intuition de­
pendent upon thought for its determination of the single intu­
ition, a determination which can arise only in the act of con­
ceptual thought, which act relates the one intuition to the 
many. This mutual dependence "cannot be 'later* than the ele­
ments themselves, but must be established 'earlier' in them and 
serve as their f o u n d a t i o n . " I n  other words, their individual 
unity cannot be prior to their combined unity if, indeed, they 
are essentially dependent. Having already discussed the nature 
of unity under "pure" concepts, we see no reason for reiteration 
relative to the unity here suggested. We can proceed, then, 
directly to the analysis of their peculiar unity.
The characterization of time as the universal intuition de­
rives from the "inner" sense of succession - "a succession 
representations, drives, or m o o d s . N o w ,  a succession of 
units, one after the other, can properly be termed a "synopsis" 
of unities?^ if each is always distinct in and of itself. The 
character of thought, on the other hand, lia s been found to be 
"synthetic:" the gathering together of all unities in mutual 
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n . T ne question before us, then, enquire^ as to 
the nature of that synthesis which precedes the unities of these 
two elements of finite knowledge a priori. In order to be a 
true unity, it must manifest a capacity to yield the forms both 
of synopsis and synthesis, "producing" them, as it were, "in 
T.he act of bringing them to unity. Its fundamental character
7. p. 61. 70. See above, p. 71. 79. p
0 . p . 6’... 01. p. 63.
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therefore, must be that of "representation," as is the case 
with each of the two elements it uni t e s . We are speakinc, 
then, of a synthesis which precedes what it unites. Hence, ve 
are positing a third essential element in the unity of knowledr" 
a priori. This third element is termed the pure synthesis of 
the imagination, "a blind but indispensable function of the soul, 
without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of tne 
existence of which we are scarcely ever conscious.
Now, the imagination "requires a reference to a directive 
unity"^^ vmthin its own structure, because nothing at all pre­
cedes its own unity. That is, unlike the other two elements 
which have been shown to have a "reference to unity" from "a - 
bove," so to speak, because of their mutual dependence, this 
new synthesis (of the imagination) has nothing prior to it which 
can properly be designated a constitutive element in pure know­
ledge. "The pure synthesis must represent in advance and as 
such, i.e., in a general way, the unity which pertains to it."- 
This obscure way of putting the matter simply means that the 
imagination, as pure synthesis, must itself "raise the unity 
which it represents to the level of a concept" and thereby give 
unity to itself.^6 in so doing, it vrould synthesize the modes 
of representation of the two "lower" elements, synoptic intui­
tion and synthetic thought, and do so "consciously." With this 
notion of "consciousness" we anticipate somewhat the progress 
of the arcument - but only somewhat. For, Heidegger finds Fant
dl. p. 66. Ô . K. A78 , 3107, p. 66. 6b. p. 66.63. p . 66. bo. p. 67.
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already giving expression to the complex action here as "estab­
lishing the 'se 1f-sameness' (SeIbi eke it) of the pure svnthesis- ■  
This is explained by saying that "the same function which gives 
unity to the various representations i_n a_ fiudcment also gives 
unity to the mere synthesis of various representations i_n an 
i ntui t i on ; and this unity, in its most general expression, v;e 
entitle the pure concept of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e r e  is 
here a "primordial, rich totality of a complex activity which, 
as intuition and thought, at once unifies and imparts unitv.
Hence, the se 1f-sameness means here an essential structural in­
tegrity ( Zusammencehor i oke it).''^ 9 T o be sure, this explanation 
is still somewhat obscure, but clarity must aw'a i t the next stace 
in the development. We are provided at this point with only 
the barest hint as to the nature of this pure synthesis, a hint 
which lies in these two words SeIbi okeit and Zusammencehor i nkeit. 
Nevertheless, we have definitely established that the mutual de­
pendence of thought and intuition requires a prior element in 
pure knowledge a priori,an element which, in virtue of its fac­
ulty for synthesis, can make possible the actions of the other two
6 . The Third Stage: The Intrinsic Possibility of the Essential 
Unity of the Ontological Synthesis.
In order finally to glimpse the essential unity of pure 
intuition and pure thought, it is necessary to present "the pure 
synthesis in such a way as to reveal how it is able to unify 
time and the notion" (pure concept).9B Kant's effort in this
87. p. 67. 68. K. A79, BlO.Jf., o. 67. ü9. o. 6'
90. p. 7 2 .
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regard is found in his "Transcendental Deduction of the Cate­
gories." But it is the Deduction of the first edition of the 
Critique that Heidegger finds most authentic - authentic in the 
sense of accepting the demands of the original problem, namely, 
the analysis of finite knowledge a priori.
The term "transcendence" is descriptive of that peculiar 
behavior which is requisite for an encounter with beings which 
are not ourselves, v-ith "objects." Now, an object must present 
itself for our intuition. But in order to receive it, wc must 
have "pre-ontoIoGica 1" knowledge, i.e., knowledge of its Beinf 
structure. And we must have this prior to any actual encounter 
v'ith it so that when apprehended, "it" can "be" what it "is." 
This involves a basic orientation towards..., a prior receptiv­
ity, so that when an object does present itself, we can recog­
nize its "beinc-1he re." It is this attitude of openness tc- 
wards..., this anticipation of..., which is termed "transcen­
dence," and which characterizes all behavior relative to being. 
What is involved, then, in determining the essential unity of 
the ontological synthesis, is the elucidation of transcendence 
in terms of the structures already analysed, i.e., the pure 
synthesis of the imagination in its unification of the faculties 
of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (notion, concept).
Because finite knowledge is receptive intuition, it re­
quires determinative thought. Pure thought, then, plays a 
central role in the problem at h^nd. If "our mode of cognition
Vi. p. 73. 92. p. 73f.
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is not ontically creative,"9.3 that is, if we cannot ourselves 
create our own objects, what is it, then, that is created, so 
to speak, in this "anticipative" behavior towards... which must 
precede the actual presence of an object? It cannot be "some­
thing." Therefore, it must be Nothing (Nichts).96 Transcen­
dence, then, is the act of anticipating Nothing so that when 
"something" presents itself, its "difference" will be apparent.
This Nothing is not to be understood as the n ihil a bsolu- 
turr., 9p rather, it is to be construed as the "precursorv resis­
tance of Being,"96 a kind of pressure, as it were, exerted by 
the Nothing itself, a pressure to which transcendence is innate­
ly aware. "Through this constraint all that is encountered is 
in advance forced into an accord (Einstimmickeit)" in virtue ef 
its fundamental difference with what is not in accord, i.e., 
the Nothing. This "accord" is the "precursory and constant draw 
ing together into unity (Zusammenzun auf E inhe i t) and is there­
fore the anticipation of unity.97 And uni tv is, of course, the 
hallmark of the concept. This act of "objectification," then, 
is the primordial concept (Urbeori f f ), and the "product" of the 
active understanding, i.e., thought.96
"The latter as a complete totality contains in itself a di­
versity of modes of unification. Consequently, the pure 
understanding is revealed as the faculty which makes the act 
of objectification possible. The understanding as a total­
ity gives in advance all that is opposed to the haphazard. 
Representing unity originally and precisely as unify!no, the 
understanding presents to itself a form of constraint which 
in advance imposes its rule on all possible modes of lo­
ge t harness."99
97. p. 76. p. 76. 93. p. 77- 9^.
97. p. 7b. 96. p. 78. 99. p. 78.
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The mention here of a "rule'' as regards the unification 
Imposed by pure thought is worth elaboration. Consider the case 
of a concept which is predicative, i.e., has "content" relative 
to empirical perception. The precise nature of its unity may 
well be "imprecise," even obscure, though the person whose it 
is be an "authority" on the subject. Is it not so, that the 
more truly authoritative - in the academic sense - a person be­
comes on a given subject, the more obscure becomes his treat­
ment of it, that is the more complex and difficult it becomes 
for the average layman? What better example could be civcn thar 
this treatment by Kant and Heidegger of that simplest of everv- 
day concepts, Beinc? Nevertheless, for such concepts as com­
prise empirical knowledge, even though obscure, the "rule" of 
unity applies. A four year old child has a grasp of Being which 
for him is adequate in virtue of its integrity, its unity, its 
completeness, however inadequate it might prove to be for his 
elders, and especially for the "experts" whose treatments of th<" 
subject are now "classic."
"Now, the pure concepts (conceptus rcflectentes) are those 
which have such normative unities as their sole content.
As we have already seen, the pure concept of unity has for its 
content only a manifold of units each of which is in no vise 
different from that of the totality of this manifold. For, 
unity is essentially undifferentiabTe when free of all empiri­
cal content. Pure thought, then, can be characterized as the 
’’faculty of ^u 1 es, " ^  ^ and anticipate the rule to be ''unit..
p. 7). 101. K. Alph, p .  yy.
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We might cathcr from this that the understanding is ther: - 
fore to be considered the supreme faculty of the mind, for, its 
representation determines intuition according to its "rule," 
and therefore makers intuition possible. But such would be an 
oversight, a forgetting of the primacy of intuition, the repre­
sentations of which presuppose any "content" for reason to "rul^." 
This will become clear as we proceed with the "transcendental 
deduction," an analysis which will provide the perspective nec­
essary to a proper appreciation of this inter-relation.
Keeping in mind that our task is the elucidation of trans­
cendence as the intrinsic possibility of ontological knowledge, 
we approach the "deduction" from two directions in order better 
to show the mutual a priori dependence of intuition and reason.
The first, way, to follow Kant, is "from above," i.e., from the 
understanding "down" to i n t u i t i o n . B e f o r e  beginning, however, 
an important note: the "deduction" here is not a "logical" pro­
cess so much as it is an analysis which delineates the relations 
between intuition and thought, so as to demonstrate their neces­
sary connection with the pure synthesis of the imagination.
In the act of objectification, there is an anticipative 
attitude towards unity. This representation of unity is itself 
an expression (an outward-pressing) of unity, i.e., of pu^e 
thought. But while it is anticipating unity "outside," it is 
all the while maintaining itself, as it were, in its own uni tv 
as its "self-identity."^83 That is, this act "turns tovs’"dr
132. p. ol. 1('»3. p. 81. lUb. A. A1 16-20, p.
105. A. A T '8, p. 83.
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itself" in the moment that it turns outward in anticipation.-^^ 
Therefore, this act, in terms of "thought," "has the character 
of '1 think,*" or from the standpoint of the pure concept, of 
"I can.""97 However it is put, it matters not (for the moment) 
so long as this character of "consciousness," of self-awareness, 
is captured. For, this reciprocity is not something that "is 
present and operative on certain occasions" only, but is "con­
stant" and "unchangeable." This tra nscendenta1 appercept ion, 
as Kant terms it,-^6 accounts for both the "self" reference and 
that, of "objects," in virtue, as we have seen, of the uniaue re­
lation of unity to unity in the "pure” concept.
Should the way it is put matter, we would have to say that 
the designations "I think" and "I can" are surely interpreted ir 
the above as possessing "content." That is, the "I" must be con 
strued as the self-identification of a concrete person. But 
pure thought is acting in its pro-position of unity "anticipa- 
tively." No being has as yet been given. Therefore, we have a 
condition of live potentiality, which is appropriately designa­
ted, perhaps, as "unity thinks unity" (for pure thought), and 
"unity can unify" (for the pure concept). The "I" can only 
enter in the moment that an ontic being enters this anticipa­
tory realm which is already there a priori, for, at the moment, 
this unity is non-ontic. "As non-ontic, this unity has the es­
sential tendency to unify that which is not yet unified."l"9 
It follows, then, that there is presupposed in "unification"
1 V-'isvnthes is.
10b. K. All-, p. 63 107* p. 83. 106. A. AIO7 , p. 03.
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In the second stage of this analysis, it was established 
that all synthesis is the product of imagination even though 
the character of pure thought has been established as "synthetic. 
That thought's synthetic character derives from the pure syn­
thesis of the imagination becomes very clear once thought is 
shown to be self-reflective in its act of unification. For, 
if the "consciousness" of the transcendental apperception is 
"constant" and "unchanging," then, pure intuition (time) is 
somehow involved in this "duration." And since apperception 
cannot itself supply itself with intuition's "succession of 
now's," then, its dependence upon the mediation of the pure 
synthesis is demonstrated to be a synthesis which is capable of 
forming representations typical of both intuition and thought.'-’
The "second way" of the transcendental deduction start:-- 
from "below^," so to speak, and moves "up" towards pure reason.
Aga i n , we are most intent upon seeing a relation which is "pre­
supposed . "
Pure intuition is receptive, but possesses nothing in it­
self "correspondinc to a connection (Verbundenhei t) between phe­
n o m e n a . S u c h  a connection is necessary, however, if its 
"single" intuitions are ever to be Joined in mutual relation so 
as to reveal "something," i.e., an "object" in its context.
"I think" and "I can" because the "I" presupposes "ontic" 
content. The argument suffers for lack of the insight whi cb 
comes only at the very end of this study, namely, that time 
is "pure self-affection" in knowledge "a priori." The next 
paracraph contains the oroblem and points toward its soluble
111. u p . chf f .
112. D. 87.
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What is required, then, is a faculty for forming relations in 
general. "But this power of 'forming' relations originally is 
the pure imagination itself."^^8 Yet, "the medium wherein 
Joining and forming connections is possible is time as the uni­
versal pure intuition."11^ Thus, we readily find that both 
intuition and imagination "presuppose" the "unchanging and per­
manent" ego of transcendental apperception with its potential 
of self-reflecting u n i t y . gut we also are enabled to see 
that the mediation of the pure synthesis is required to bridge 
the gap between the synoptic manifold of time and the pure con­
cept of unity before either the manifold is furnished with the 
"connecting" power of the pure concept, or the pure concept is 
given the necessary temporal flux that will "enable" it to func­
tion "synthetically." Thus, we move "up" from intuition to 
pure reason "through" the pure synthesis.
At this point, it should be clear that both "ways" of the 
deduction lead to the same conclusion via the necessary "media­
tion" of the i m a g i n a t i o n . A  certain ambiguity, however, has 
persisted throughout the argument because the direction taken 
has been from the "two" e 1ements of pure reason the third. 
The synoptic character of primary intuition and the synthetic 
character of apperception, once these have been established, 
cause a certain difficulty in conceiving the pure synthesis of 
the imagination as actually prior to either of these. In addi­
tion, the explication of the natures of these two faculties h-s 
necessarily involved "relations" which have presupposed the
11?. p. 67. 113. p. 67. 113. p. 88.
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"syn-" character of the imagination. In consequence, the way 
has led through an already "dynamic" intuition (succession) and 
an already "dynamic" apperception (concept), but both of these 
are quite impossible "dynamically" except the "syn-" character 
of pure imagination "enables," or empowers, both the "syn-op- 
sis" and the "syn-thesis." Heidegger, indeed, stresses this 
structural relation,11? but so early in the arcument that we 
failed to attach the significance it deserves.
Yet, once this "syn-" character of imagination is seen, 
and its "dynamic" impact on the tvfo lesser faculties is apprec­
iated, another problem arises: the imagination has become sig­
nificantly dominant. If we are intent upon an analysis of trans­
cendence as the a priori faculty of finite knowledge, can intu­
ition lose its primacy? In order to answer this question, ve 
must retrace our steps to some degree, and enter upon a more 
detailed regression into the question of the nature of the "con­
cept." This "return" is required because, in order to eluci­
date to a degree even greater than either Kant or Heidegger did, 
we have, in this interpretation, anticipated certain results 
which are yielded only upon a closer scrutiny of concepts. Jus­
tice is done to the work of these men only if we follow them 
into the terribly obscure regions of the "schematism."
7 . The Fourth Stage: The Ground of the Intrinsic 
Possibility of Ontological Knowledge
Once the pre-eminence of the imagination is established,
117. p. 67.
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we have the problem of the finitude of ontological knowledge. 
The answer to it must lie in the establishment of the essential 
unity of transcendence, or, in other terms, in the essential 
unity of this tri-parti te structure now shown to be dominated 
by imagination. Heidegger sees the "Schematism of the Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding," which is the discussion of this 
relation, to be the very "heart" of Kant's Critique. And
we will recall that it was the "Schematism" which Heidegger 
ter me d ,in his Introduction to Being and Time, one of the "de­
cisive stages" in the history of onto 1ogy.  ^^ ha
The act of objectification, in virtue of its "anticipa- 
t ive" attitude, has about it an "offering-character" (A n c e b o t s- 
cha ra ckter).  ^^ 9 gut a s a priori, that which is offered cannot 
be said to have concrete content. It is an open anticipation 
towards.... At the same time, this act must have about it some 
thing that is "perceptible" in the sense that it can be "immed­
iately received by i n t u i t i o n . " ^ ^ 9  i n  other words, there must 
be a "consciousness" of this "open" attitude towards.... Thu^, 
the act of objectification must involve an "intuitive" under­
standing: a pure understanding based on and guided by pure 
intui t ion.
The character of the "horizon" offered is that of "pure 
aspect:" "the aspect of that which is capable of offering itsel 
But, in virtue of the combined action of intuition and under­
standing, imagination "forms" this horizon in such a wav +h-t
:l8. p. 98. I l8a . Be ing a nd Time , u. l])j . lU'. p
120. p. 9- 121. p. 9 b .
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it "provides for 'he possibility of an 'image * (B iId) in gen­
e r a l . "1^2 The offering of an image "is to make the horizon 
sensible. This horizon of transcendence can be formed only in
a sensibilization."1^3
Now, from the point of view of the pure understanding 
whose mode of action is that of representing unities which reg­
ulate unification, "transccndence is formed in the sensibiliza­
tion of pure c o n c e p t s . T h a t  is, the images formed by the 
imagination must be "pure :" without any "content," "sensible" 
(intuitive), and "conceptual."
At this point we interrupt this analysis to ask if this 
notorious obscurity can be made lucid. Can we illustrate? The 
pure, sensible images formed by the pure imagination might be 
likened to the "pictures" which w^culd result if a strip of novi 
film were developed after the whole of it had been cross Iv over 
exposed to light. The result would be a series of frames of 
absolutely nothing. That is, these "empty" frames might be 
said to be analogous to the "pure images" offered a priori.
Let us see what happens.
Since the intuition is fundamentally receptive, it cannot 
create that which it intuits. But in the "offering-character" 
of the act of objectification, we have something that can be 
received by the intuition: the pure image which is formed bv 
the imagination in intimate relation with the regulative action
122. p. 93. 123. p. 96. 128. p. 96. 12p. c. 9%.
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of the pure concept.^-3 What, however, is the nature of this 
pure image when it is under the regulation of the pure con­
cept? We have tried to suggest the answer to this by analogy.
But the analogy must be expanded because each "frame" of a 
movie film, when properly exposed, yields but a single intuition, 
so to speak, whereas the "image" of a concept cannot be ade­
quately represented by "single" intuitions. "A concept by its 
yery essence cannot be put into an i m a g e . " Rather, the con­
cept is better represented in our analogy by the whole "strip" 
of pictures, each of which is related, but incapable of com­
municating what the whole strip does. The problem of the "schcr:- 
ptism" is focused right here in this relation between the "sin­
gle" intuition (the sine le f rame)of a movie film) and the "con­
cept" (the whole movie). The argument advanced is that the pure 
image must be a "schema-image." That is, it must be "conceptual" 
rather than pictorial, i.e., single. And the "conceptual" must 
be "pure," i.e., without empirical content.
Kant sees the concept as having an "image" and entitles 
this latter "the schema of this c o n c e p t . And Heidegger in­
terprets him to be saying:
"The formation of a schema insofar as it is accomplished as 
a mode of sensibilization is called schema tism. To oe sure, 
the schema is to be distinguished from the image, but it is 
also related to the latter, i.e., the schema necessarily pos­
sess the character of an image. This character has its own 
na ture."126
The problem is also put in terms which were used in the earlier 
discussions of the concept:
123. p. 9b. 12o. p. 99. 127. K. AluO, 5179f.,
I2Ô. p. 1C If.
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"To be sure, the empirical image contains everything in the 
concept, if not more. But the image does not contain its 
object in the manner in which the concept represents it, i.e 
as the one which applies to the many. The content of the 
empirical image is presented as being one thing among manv, 
i.e., as particularized by that which is thematically repre­
sented as such." 129
Or, to cast it again in terms of our movie film: the to­
tality of the movie, itself a unity, has a reference to th;e in­
dividual frames which make it up that is wholly different fror 
that which the single frame iias to the totality. The former 
is the "one which applies to the many," while the individual 
frame is "the one among many." From these formulations it shcul 
be clear that so long as the problem is cast in empirical terms, 
a great deal of difficulty is to be encountered - difficulty 
that begins to lock like impossibility. It. is only after an 
agonizing effort to move from the particular intuition of,say, 
a dog to the concept "dog," and back again,^3^ that Heidegger 
reaches this conclusion:
"The sensibilization of concepts is a completely specific 
operation which yields images of a particular kind. Sensi­
bilization, as productive of schemata, can neither be under­
stood by analogy with the usual 'putting into an image' no^ 
can it be traced back to this idea. Such a reduction is so 
little feasible that, on the contrary, sensibilization in 
the sense first described - the immediate, empirical percep­
tion of things and the formation of empirical reproductions 
of these thinns - can take place only on the basis of a pos­
sible sensibilization of concepts in the manner in which this 
is accomplished in schematism.I3 I.
And according to Kant, "this schematism ... is an art concealed 
in the depths of the human soul. "^-^2 go goes our effort to il­
lustrate.
129. p. i02f. 130. pp. 102-03. 131. u. lObf.
132, K. A 1,141, 3180, p. 106.
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A clue, however, has been discovered in the progress of 
the argument. Although the concept "doc" met with failure, 
that of mathematical forms, e.g., the "triangle," came closer 
to meeting the need.^33 Will mathematics afford a final break­
through?
For the sake of clarity, it is worth repeating that the 
term "schematism" is descriptive of the alleged active sensi­
bilization of the schema-images of the schemata of pure concept" 
as these are formed by the pure imagination and offered s th^ 
horizon of objectification prior to empirical intuition. The 
problem now is to "prove" that this is what happens.^3h "The 
function of the mode of sensibilization, which forms schemata, 
is to procure an image for a given c o n c e p t . 33 The particular' 
schema "puts itself, i.e., puts the concept, into an image."- 
This means, to take the point of view of the understanding, that 
the pure concepts "w^ hi ch are thought as the pure *I think'" mu s t 
be intui table if this whole matter of objectification is going 
to take place.
But "the schema of a pu re concept ... can never be reduced 
to any image whatsoever,"^3f unless the expression "imace" is 
understood to "signify a definite type of image to the exclusion 
of all others."^38 The peculiar signification intended here is 
to apply in virtue of a relation co pure intuition, i.e., time.’ 9 
"Pure concepts, through the mediation of the pure synthesis oi‘ 
the transcendental imagination, are essentially related to pure
p. lolif. 138. p. iOhf. 13p. p. 107- 1? n.
;i7. A. AI.L2 , 8161, p. 107. 138. P* 107. 13?. P*
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intuition (time), and this relation is reciprocal."^
As pure intuition, time can be said to furnish an "imace,” 
namely, "the pure succession of the now-sequence,"l^d i.e., the 
synopsis. But to speak of it in this general way is to lose 
sight of the essential mode of intuition as "single." But 
since "different times are but parts of one and the same time,"^*' 
every "single" intuition of time is indistinguishable, as a pur--* 
intuition, from the totality of time. "Hence, time is not only 
the necessarily pure image of the schemata of pure concepts,... 
but also their only possibility of | presenting' a pure image.
Yet, if the schemata of the pure concepts "derive their im­
age from time, taken as a pure image, by introducing them to 
time in the form of rules," then, we have the case of a multi­
plicity of pure images developing from a single one.^'* - Thus, 
the pure understanding "determines" time (as a sequence of ten,- 
poral units), and the intuition, in turn, provides the "i ma ce" 
("single," i.e., unity) for the schemata of the pure concepts.
But as we have seen in the "transcendental deduction," these 
inter-relations are made possible only through the mediation of 
the transcendental imagination with its "syn-" character. The 
schemata, therefore, are "transcendental determinations of time."^ 
"This schematism forms transcendence a priori and, therefore, is 
termed 'transcendental schemat ism. »"
180. p. 108. 18 i
183. p. 109. 11118.6 . p. 109.
, p. 108. 182. i\. Allf. , B87, p. 10',.
. p. 10 . 185. K. AI36, p. 109.
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The crux of the arcument here presented lies in the --ouble 
transitions: "from onc[t.o many," and "from many to one," The 
pure concept is "tempora1ized" by being introduced to the pure 
intuition of time, the concept's rule making possible the sin­
gular character of intuition's mode of intuition. This is x 
case of the "many" determining the "one." But on the other hand, 
time as the primary intuition is always "single" and provides 
the "image" for the pure concept, the character of which is de­
scribed as the "rule" of "the one which applies to the manv."
In this latter case, because every moment is but a part of time 
which is "one and the same," this "particular" moment can be the 
one which applies to the many.
Or, to put it even more precisely, the rule of the one vhicn 
applies to the many is such that it singles out a unity from 
the many and makes it "unique." But the reciprocity of the re­
lation also begins with this unique one, and offers it to the 
multiplicity of the many as the "one" which "rules" over them, 
thereby making them "units."
This latter formulation sets the matter out solely in terms 
of "mathematical" unity even though the arcument specifically 
introduces time as the crucially determini ng factor. We could, 
however, have framed it in terms of time as follows: The intu­
ition of time is single. Therefore, this "unique" moment is 
provided as the "schema-image" for the schemata of the pure 
concepts which are characterized by the "rule" of this unioue 
moment as it applies to the many moments which const!'ute tin. . 
9'tiis " ru 1 cy, " however, when applied to intuition, " do t r’- : n ■ ‘
93
time in the sense that it specifies that this intuition be 
"unique” and therefore the moment which is representative of 
ail moments, i.e., the one "among” many.
Not only have we juxtaposed these formulations, but v--e have 
tried also to demonstrate their interchanreability. Whether n 
uses time or unity makes no difference. This being the case, 
then the transition required to reduce the transcendental ima g - 
ination tc a place of equality with primary intuition is accom­
plished. But more than this: The relation of uni ty to tenpor- 
a 1ity is likewise demonstrated. But of this latter, more later.
Once time is shown to be interchangeable with unity, then 
any pre-eminance the imagination may have been thought to have 
is shattered and its sensibilization established. No less are 
the syntheses of the transcendental imagination shown to be fi­
nite in character.
We can summarize. The act of objectification involves an 
’’offering” of an "horizon” a priori within whi c h , and on account 
of which, objects, should they "present" themselves, can be in­
tuited "as sucn." The transcendental schematism has proved to 
be the structure of pure transcendence which discloses not only 
the la tier's finitude, but the structure of ontological know­
ledge as such.-u7 Intuition is saved its primacy but not at 
the expense of transcendence. It should now be clear that 
transcendence is primary insofar as its "action” is require^
I'l?. p. 113.
9U
to an extent no less than intuition's. Hence, the unity of 
transcendence is established in a way that demonstrates its 
finitude. But does transcendence account for "knowledge”?
"Pure" thought is not knowledge; it has no concrete "con­
tent." At the most, it is but an essential element of know­
ledge; that which makes knowledge of the object possible. Sojt.c 
thing more is required, then, to bind pure thought, i.e., trans­
cendence, to the empirical object in order to account for finit 
knowledoe as such.^^^
8. The Fifth Stage: The Complete Oetermination of 
the essence of Cntolonical Knowledoe
So far, we have taken every precaution to keep the struc­
ture of pure thought "pure,” that is, free of any empirical ob­
ject. But now the connection must be made with that which is 
wholly "different:” the "predicate," But this is not a matter 
of the predicate's relation to the subject (the apophantic-pro- 
dicative synthesis). Rather, it is this whole latter's rela­
tion to "something altogether different,” 1^9 namely, the Jbject 
itself. This latter relation as judicative requires an "accord
Therefore, it is the ”\/cr i ta t i ve” synthesis which is here to be
cons idered.
The way, however, by whi ch this synthesis is to be ap­
proached is in terms of its possibility: "the possibîlltv
exper i ence . ”  ^ The "trip! ici tv” of the elements in the
1^8. p. 119. 1^9. K. Al\ , B193f., p. 120.
180. p. ICO. If.l . K. A! Off., BlOb^f., p. 121.
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tural unity of transcendence provides, as we have seen, the 
"med ium" within which the "totally different" (over which the 
knowing beinc is not master) "can be e n c o u n t e r e d . gut un­
til this encounter is made, knowledge must remain merely a pos­
sibility and not a reality. In order that it may become a re­
ality, the essential unity of the structure of transcendence 
must he demonstrated precisely in its relation to that which is 
''totally different" so that the distinct possibility of finit- 
knowledge emerges in all possible clarity. Once this is dem­
onstrated, v/e shall have the basis for "objective reality in 
all our a priori modes of k n o w l e d g e . 4 We would emphasize 
that our approach is in terms of "possibility," and not "reai’t.
Experience has already been made possible on one level: in 
the act of orientation towards.... But unless the experience 
thereby made possible is "true," it hardly serves the purpose. 
"Truth, however, means 'agreement with the object.'"^9" What 
is the standard by which truth is defined and how is this stan­
dard regulated? Surprisingly enough, Kant declares that the 
conditions v/hich govern the possibility of experience are, at 
the same time, those which regulate the possibility of the ob­
jects of experience. This proposition, says Kant, is va lie for 
all "judgments;" it is what he terms "the highest principle cf 
all synthetic judgment s."^^9 Heidegger sees the heart of this 
principle to reside in the phrase, "at the same time." For,
"it expresses the essential unity of the complete structure c
112. D. 120. lo3. K. AloC, B19p, u. 122.138. K. A137, B196f., p. 122. 133. K. A13o. BI9n. p.
Qtranscendence." "The act of orientation which Jets something 
take up a position opposite to... forms as such the horizon 
objectivity in oeneral."^36 That is, the movement towards... 
which provides the a priori realm within which objectification 
can take place is a movement outwards. It is a removal, an e:- 
position, an Ek-stasis or ecstatic ex~sistence,^37 a position 
"beyond," which "fc'rmis and pro-poses to itself an horizon.
Transcendence is i n  itself e c s t a t i c - h o r i z o n t a 1 . " ^38
The criterion for "truth," then, is found to be transcen­
dence itself. This does not mean that the conditions set forth 
(which govern both the possibility of experience and the possi­
bility of the objects of experience) "always occur together" or 
are inevitably thoucht-of together, or even thoucht-cf at all."- 
Rather, it is that this expression "at the same time," relative 
to these conditions, "is the expression of the original phenom­
enological knowledge of the intrinsically unitary structure of 
transcendence. " For this reason, Heidegger agrees vâth Kant 
that this is indeed the "highest of all synthetic judgments."^8-
That principle which discloses the intrinsic possibility 
of the essence of the ontological synthesis, once it has been 
found, constitutes the basis or the foundation of metaphvsica 
ceneralis. The foundation has been laid; "ontological knowledc-
136. p. 123.
157. This particular formulation appears in some of Heidecger’s 
later works. It is not posed here specifically, but the 
context v; i t hou t question intends it.
Ipd. p. 123. 139. p. 12h. 160. p. 128. I't^ . p. 12
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has proved to be that which forms t r a n s c e n d e n c e ^^‘7 It must 
be kept in mind, however, that that which is "created” by tran­
scendence is not the "object," but merely the "realm" or "hori­
zon" within which an object, should it present itself "there" 
can be known as "object." The precise nature of that which is 
created, i.e., the "realm" or "horizon," rather than being a 
"somethinr" is a " N o t h i n g . K a n t  speaks of it as an "object' 
but calls it "X. " ^ Hciderr.er prefers "Not hi nr . "
Kant, as is virtually common knowledge, took the positif! 
that "appearances" are all we can know, that the " t hi nr-i r.-i *- 
self" hides, as it were, behind the appearances which seem to 
present themselves to intuit ion.^^3 take this formulation
to be Kant's attempt to express the "relative" character of 
knowledge. That is, this present generation of men sees the 
thincs-that-are-prescnt in a way wholly different from ihat o ’ 
pre-SCientific generations. Yet, there has been a continuity 
throughout. Docs are still dogs even though their car'-' nowaday: 
may bear little semblance to the practise of many years ago. 
Today, dogs have orbited the earth, are "curbed" and otherwise 
"broken" to the ways of a modern technological age. But what 
will their care be like tomorrow? To be sure, we do not know.
In order, then, to allow for the full evolution of knowledge, 
"appearances" are sugoested as the various stages along the w-y 
tov/ards full and final knowledoe.
:62. D. If. 16?. p. 123. 16].. K, AlCbf., u. '
I6f. K. ABjpff., B298ff., p. 126.
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Kant's "X" is this "transcendental object," this object 
which may ultimately be known ultimately, but which now is 
known only partially. It is the fulness of the knowledoe of 
the transcendental object which we do not have. Therefore, we 
do not "know/" as such.^^8 Yet, we have in transcendence 
this "horizon" which somehow discloses this "transcendental 
object" - not as something known, but merely revealed as "hor­
izon," i.e., a limit beyond which it is impossible to go. O r , 
more abstractly, what is known is "that which in advance consti­
tutes the surpassing (Uber schla.q ) of all possible objects qua 
ob-jective, the horizon of an ob-jectification." ^^7 gut more 
precisely: That which is known is not a "something" but a Nothin^ 
because "ontological" knowledge is not the knowledge of beings 
"as such," but is the knowledge of Seine.
It was said that "ontological" knowledge could onlv prop­
erly be termed "knowledge" if it attained the "truth," and tru\ 
implies "accord" with its object. If "ontological knowledcc
'forms' transcendence, and this formation is nothinn but the 
holding open of the horizon within which the Being of be inos ir 
perceptible in advance," then, "provided that truth means the 
unconcealment (iJnverborcenhe i t. ) of ..., transcendence is orig­
inal truth."'^9
But truth may also be understood as the disclosure of the 
"overtness" of beings, that is, their being "there" as such.
"If onto 1 or i ca 1 knowledge discloses the horizon, then, it'; truth
r. p. 12bf. 167. p. 127. 168. p. 128. 16^^ p
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lies in letting beings be encountered within this horizon.
That is to say, ontological knowledge is practical; it has an 
empirical use. Such a conclusion, however, is predisposed to­
v/ards objects (as presently conceived) as the criterion of truth. 
That is, there is a tendencev to sway here at the end of this 
fifth stage of the argument either toward ontological truth or 
toward ontical truth. Kant, in saying that it has only "empir­
ical use," reverts to ontical truth, while Heidegger keeps the
1 7 Iquestion open. Or, so it appears. Yet, in point of fact,
it is too early to draw definitive conclusions either way.
The argument here at tlie last of this fifth stage has been 
terse and inconclusive. The réintroduction of the term "KothinX' 
and the introduction of "overtness," "unconcealment," and the 
"truth" of Beinc - not to mention their inter-relation - demands 
fuller treatment if they are supposed to "round off" the arcu- 
ment. To he sure, Heidegger does treat these terms more fully, 
and our later chapters will expound their meaning and relation, 
but for the moment v/e must be satisfied with but a hint o^ theii' 
efficacy as inevitable conclusions on the grounds of consistency
Nevertheless, we do begin to see with this last stage in 
the laying of the foundation of ontology that the traditional 
structures of metaphys i ca cene ralis, and more especially, those 
of metaphys i ca special is (the knowledge of Man, Nature and God) 
begin to totter. Kant's has been a transformation, a virtual 
r e v o l u t i o n . ^72 Pu1 why has this not been generally seen -
170. p. 120. 171. K. Allb, B165, p. 126. 172. p. 1: .
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at least to the extent here indicated? Heidegger v/i11 answer 
this question as he proceeds to explicate Kant's discovery more 
originally. This v/ould indicate that Kant has not been proper­
ly understood, that tradtional interpretations are wantino.
But more, it indicates that Heidegger intends to go beyond Kant, 
to interpret his intentions as veil as his deeds, i.e., liis 
Critique.
9. The Transcendental Imagination as the "Root"
of the Two Stems
In the third section of his "Kantbook," Heidegger attempts 
to explicate the originality of the Kantian Critique in a m.orc 
original way yet than Kant himself did. This means necessar­
ily that "interpretation" in this section is going to ruz: the 
risk of "violence" because what is to be drawn out of the t-xt 
of the Critique will go beyond what Kant explicitly says. But 
it does not intend to go beyond what is implicit. Heide-gcr is 
here only attempting to articulate what Kant "intended" to s p” 
but was never quite able to do for various reasons.
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to summarize what has
been gained, i.e., the "laying of the foundation of me ta phy sica
neneralis" or "the essential unity of ontological knowledge and
the basis of its possibility."^?-
"Ontological knowledge 'forms' transcendence, i.e., it holds 
open the horizon which is made perceptible in advance by the
17 . Sae "Author's Preface to the Second Edition," p. xxv, -n 
the Translator's Introduction, p. xix.
17-: • p. 1 ; 7 .
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by the pure schemata. These schemata 'arise' as the 'tran­
scendental product'175 of the transcendental imagination.
The latter as the original, pure synthesis forms the essen­
tial unity of pure intuition (time) and pure thought (apper- 
cept ion)."176
It is not, however, only in the "schematism" that the 
imagination occupies a central position. \ve found it, ther • in 
the Deduction (stage 3 ) ^s well. Moreover, it was necessary to 
mention it in our ^irst "characterization of the essential on- 
i ty of ontological knowledge" (stage 2), so that almost from 
the first the imagination has been centra 1.'^' It has been 
found to be a faculty v/hicii, because it is yoked with pure in­
tuition in pure synthesis, it can intuit what needs not to be 
"there," i.e., a Nothing. And the horizon of this Nothing, be­
ing fundamentally temporal in character, is that peculiar "on­
tological knowledge a priori," i.e., the knowledge of "Seing," 
which, given in advance, makes possible the intuition of ob­
jects as beings "totally different" from the knowing being, and 
"thei’e," i.e., "ob^jec t ive. " Hence, the imagination "enjioys a 
peculiar independence with respect to beings."!?^
This notion of "independence" from objects is found in 
Kant's Anthropoloci e and not in the Critique's first edition, 
but its basis, if not its specific formulation, is to be foun-i 
in the Cr itique's discussion of the " s c h e m a t i s m . gqt, de­
spite a considerable treatment of the imagination in the Anth- 
ropo100ie. this latter never discusses transcendence in partic­
ular, and therefore fails to measure up as a "source" from : -hie.
175. K. A l ’j.2, 51U1, o. 138. 176. p. l?j. 177.i78. p. 135. :7v. p. 13b.
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to glean further data for this "more original" exposition of 
the "formative center of ontological k n o w l e d g e ^^8 jn conse­
quence, the source for this further study will continue to be, 
by and large, the first edition of the Critique.
Heideoger sees his first task to be to set out the iinac- 
ination as the "fundamental faculty" of transcendence. And by 
"faculty" he means "potential"(Vermogen) both in the sense of 
"possibility" and capacity to act ( verma c: ) .  ^  ^ This involves
pointing out the discrepancies in Kant's exposition as it var­
ies from the first to the second e d i t i o n s . T h e  argujnent 
yields Kant's own acknowledgment of the "third" faculty as oc­
cupying a central place, providing one uses the "text" as the 
criterion for Judgment and not publication dates. For, it is 
apparent that the second cdtion has undergone radical revision 
at the expense, of consistency.
Kant's mode of presentation is such that intuition nd 
apperception are characterized as the two "stems" from which 
arise ontological knowledge, and these stems appear to receive 
by far the greater emphasis. Heidegger intends, however, to 
disclose the "root" of these stems, the root which has already 
been discerned, however darkly.
In order to establish the imagination as the root of the 
two stems, Heidegger must reduce pure intuition and pure thou'^h' 
to products of the imagination.^^? Docs this mean that know-
1('0. pp. 1 ?L-'' 1 ; see esp. p. IkO. loi. p. 11’1
Id?. P. Iff.
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ledçe shall then be reduced to the status, say, of imaginary 
figment? The answer to this has already been given to the ex­
tent that transcendence has been shown to be the condition for 
the possibility of all knowledge whatsoever: both knowledge a_- 
priori, i.e., ontological knowledge, and "objective knowledge."
If such a conclusion were drawn (that all knowledge is "imagin­
ary"), this judgment would itself have to be so interpreted: 
plainly a circuitous argument, and one from which no escape is 
possible. The need to make judgments, to constitute knowledge, 
as we shall see in due course, is irresistible and accounts fo-. 
indeed, illustrates, the "transcendental" character of the hu­
man Dascin for which we are not altogether responsible. Dasein 
i s finite.
Though Heidegger does not answer the question posed above 
precisely as we have, he nevertheless reaches the same conclu­
sion in proposing, because the transcendental imagination is 
"finite," that it has an "untruth" (Unvahrhe i t ) corresponding 
to its "truth. " ' 8!.! Bu t he fails to dwell on it, choosing in­
stead to treat the matter more fully e l s e w h e r e because such 
a discussion would ultimately rest upon the "essence" of the 
transcendental imagination: the project now underway.
If, then, the imagination does not make knowledge imaginary, 
neither does it constitute a "'fundamental power' in the soul.’’  ^
At. the very most, "this regression to the essential origin of
1Ô1'. p. lg.6. ]'3p. See below. Chapter VI. l8o. p. ’
187. p. I’yb.
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transcendence ... moves in the dimension of 'possibilities,' 
i.e., in the dimension of that which makes p o s s i b l e . i \ | o -  
thing here is to be understood as a "monistic-empirical" ex - 
pianation."^9 in other words, we are not positing the "facts" 
of the case, but are examinino rather its possibilities for 
what they may be worth.
The procedure to be followed in this effort to reveal the 
root of the two stems will continue to be oriented according tc 
the "stages" already laid down, but without specific reference 
to them. First to be considered is the relation of the transcen­
dental imagination to pure intuition.190 The pure intuitions 
of space and time are "original" in the sense that they "sprinc 
forth" as "representations" which "pro-pose" (vor-stel 1er.) in 
advance the image of space and time as "multiple totalities in 
themselves."^91 This means that they are "formative" in the 
sense that they "receive" what they themselves "give." Hence, 
they are "originative" and are born, so tc speak, of pure im­
agination. ^ 92
The specific nature of these intuitions as "multiple total­
ities," however, is to be distinguished from the "concepts."
The "parts" of these intuitive totalities, "always but limita­
tions of themselves," are alone what is "clear," whereas the 
totalities themselves are "generally indistinct." What and '-here 
are the boundaries of space and time? Hence, these unities are 
appropriately designated as "synop*ic" rather than "synthetic."
1ÜÜ. D. i ; -7 .  189. p.  1Ù7. 190. 00.  1Ù8-52 .
191. p .  18 8. 192. p .  188.
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They "cannot arise from the 'synthesis of the understanding.'" 
Their "formative" aspects must derive their "svn-" character 
from the imagination.19? And as these formations cannot be saie 
to have any "form" in the ontic sense, then it should be clear 
that they can be none other than the "products" of imagination, 
i.e., "pure" images.198 But, again, these pure images of space 
and time are not nothing in the sense of nihi1 abs olutum. Their 
nature is ontological rather than ontic; as such they are some­
thing "positive," i.e.. Nothing. "They are never intuited” in 
the sense that something ontic is, but "are intuited according 
to the modality of an act which is originally form-giving."19^ 
Should v/e attempt to make this more intelligible, we would say 
that when an ontical object is intuited, its "form" presupposes 
delimitation by space and time. These presuppositions, then, 
give "form" to the object, yet themselves have not been intuited 
"as such," nor have they been pre-ficured as a kind of advance 
calculation which cuts the object loose from the unity of its 
context in order that it may then be grasped as "object."
Rather, they are products of the imagination which are requisite 
to " o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . "196 such, they are no doubt arbitrary'^
and therefore "imaginative."
193* p. 189. 198. p. 190. 195. p. 151.196. A more detailed analysis of this obscure relation is giv­
en be 1ow in Section 10.
197. It is common knowledge that units of spatial (linear) meas­
ure are not universally standardized. Nor is time. A sci­
entist. from Cornell University, U.S.A., was interviewed on 
BBC TV early in 1968, and he disclosed that investigations 
of "time" are underwmy because the "second" has not as vet 
neen sufficiently determined to assure the accuracy neces­
sary in space-age technology. The arbitrary character cf 
cur temporal distinctions should be clear if for no other 
reason than that they ^re based on the rhythm of our so’' 
system. CAher syseems would have other rhythms.
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The next step takes us into an evaluation of the relation 
between imagination and theoretical reason.193 Having just 
shown that "sensibility" arises in the imagination, it might 
appear at first sight improbable that pure reason can "arise" 
from a "sensible," i.e., intuitive, source without itself being 
also sensible. "But thought and intuition, though distinct, 
are not separated from one another like two totally different 
things. ... Both are modes of representation of...."199
It will be recalled that reason is "dependent" upon intui­
tion and that this dependent structure "is how it is and what it 
is in the pure synthesis of the pure imagination."700 Yet, docs 
not pure reason enjoy a certain autonomy? Certainly "tradition­
al logic" presupposes this autonomous character. But Kant, even 
in the second edition, subordinates logic to the "synthetic 
unity of apperception,"701 s structure already disclosed to pos­
sess the "synthetic" character of the pure synthesis.
The characterization of thought as the "faculty of rules" 
defines its e s s e n c e . 732 This faculty represents, i.e., pro­
poses, in advance "those unities" which regulate "all possible 
modes of unification." These unities (notions or categories) 
arc not only "disposed in accordance with their proper affinity 
but must also be included in advance in an abiding unity ... 
even more primordial."733 In the act of objectification, pure 
thought represents "itself" in an attitude towards.... and this
198. pp. 151-62 .  199. p .  158. 200. p .  158.
201. K. B158, f n . ,  p.  156. 202. K. A l 2 o ,  p. 156.
201. p. Ip6.
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"self" is consequently "taken outside" itself towards.... In 
this "primordial" act, this "abiding" unity, i.e., this "I," is 
made manifest.^On "inasmuch as this *1' is what it is only in 
the *1 think,' the essence of pure thought as well as that cf 
the 'I* lies in 'pure self-consciousness.'" And this "conscious­
ness" can only be explained in terms of the Being of the -elf. 
"not conversely." That is, the "ego" is the "vehicle" of the 
"faculty of rules" "inasmuch as in its precursory act of orien­
tation it puts them in a position wherein, as represented, they 
can be regulative, unifying unities, "'-f'y Consequently, the pur 
understanding is itself a "pre-formation" of unity, a "formativ 
sponteneity which occurs in the 'transcendental schema t i sm.'"
The pure schemata, however, "form a 'transcendental product of 
i m a g i n a t i o n . '"^36 They are not produced by the understanding, 
but merely "employed" by it, and not Just occasionally, but con­
tinually. Since the pure schematism is "grounded in the t.ran- 
scendenta1 imagination," pure thought, then, must be so ground­
ed as well.737
As if this were not enough, Heidegger further adduces this 
connection by pointing out that this "I think..." orientation is 
not judgment, for there is as yet no predicate. Rather, this 
attitude is more a "free, but not arbitrary, 'envisioning' of 
something, ... an act of pure imaginât ion."206
Both "sponteneity" and "receptivity" are also to be discern^ 
a s native to pure reason, traits vdiich have previousIv been
208. p. 157. 205. p. 157. 206. K. A182, 8161, p. 1;7
207. p. Ifb. 2JO. o. 156.
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associated vitli i n t u i t  i o n . 739 Insofar, then, as pure thoucht 
can thus be reduced to transcendents 3 imagination, it, along 
v;ith pure intuition, must share subordinate roles in ontologi­
es 1 knowledge.
Heidegger now turns to "transcendental imagination and 
practical r e a s o n . "7^3 Although "logical deduction" might well 
ground "practical" reason in the imagination, the better course 
is "through an elucidation of the 'practical self. *"7^" ''In 
considering this practical, i.e., moral, self-consciousness, we 
must seek to determine the respect in which its essential struc­
ture refers back to the transcendental imagination as its oriclr,."
"The moral ego, the self, the true essence of man" as "p' 
son," that is,"personality," is the "idea of the moral lav and 
the respect which is inseparable from it.’^ ^^d "Respect" is the 
essence of the person as a "moral" self. But respect is a "f^ei- 
ing" and "belongs to sensibility." Insofar, however, a? sensi­
bility can be "pure, respect as a feeling might also be the 
"product" of the subject himself.
An analysis of "feelings" in general reveals that feelings 
are always feelings for..., "and as such are also ways of feel­
ing o n e s e l f . "71d This basic formula has been employed elsewhere 
as appropriate to the "attitude" or the "behavior" characteristic 
of objectification. It epitomizes an "openness" towards..., an 
ex-DOS it ion into the horizon within which something ontic c^n
109.
'12. P-D .
I60f.
1 o ? « 210. pp. 1 62-'d;6.
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appear. Apar^ from the open attitude towards..., the "moral 
law" could never be met, so that this basic openness itself is 
a "respect for...," and, as constitutive of the "self," i ^ self- 
respect. "Respect in its specific mode of manifestation, has
p  ^  f'reference to the person."
But "what, or more precisely who, is the self manifested 
to myself in this feeling of respect? ... In submitting to the 
law, 1 submit myself to myself qua pure reason. In submitting 
to rr.yself, I raise myself to myself as a free being capable of 
self-determination," thereby revealing the ego in its "dignity.” 
"Respect is the mode of being responsible for the Beinc of the 
self; it is the authentic being-as-se 1f."^^^ This "projection" 
of the self in submission to the "possibility of authentic exis­
tence," as this possibility is given by the law, is the "essence 
of the self, i.e., practical reason.71? As "self-submission" i 
surrender to..., it is pure receptivity; and as "free self-im­
position," it is sponteneity. Hence, the practical reason's 
grounding in the synthesis of the transcendental imagination.-'
From this brief analysis of the relations which pure intui­
tion, theoretical and practical reason have in the transc^nden- 
ta 1 imagination, it becomes increasingly clear that the latter 
is indeed the root from which the two primary stems arise. This 
analysis also reveals, then, the significance of the "hi chest 
principle of all synthetic Judgments," a principle which "speakv 
of the essential constitution of human beings in genera' insofar
2 1 5 . p .  1 6 $ .  2 1 6 . p .  1 6 5 . 2 1 ? .  p .  2 1 6 .  p .  16- .
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as it is defined as finite pure r e a s o n ,  "719 j_f t he essence of 
nan as finite pure reason is indeed "rooted" in the transcen­
dental imagination, then, the "unknown root" of which Kant spoke 
is now revealed, and this, by means of clues which Kant himself 
cave. According to Heidegger, Kant "recoiled" from this "un­
known r o o t . " 7 7 0
But why did he recoil? It wasn't because "he failed to 
see the possiblity of a more primordial laying of the founda­
tion." Rather, it was that such an investigation, although it 
was "of great importance" to his "chief purpose," neverLheless 
did not "form an essential part of it." The prime question ha : 
always been for him "Wha t and how much can the understanding a no 
reason know apart from all experience? And not. How is the fac­
ulty of thou gilt itself p o s s i b l e ?  7 7 1
Vj i thout going into the obscurity requisite to disclosing 
the "possibility" of the "faculty of thought," then, Kant was 
in no position to sec how the traditional Judgments of "higher’’ 
and "lower" were not really appropriate evaluations of "pure 
thought" and "pure intuition." But being aware that the way a: 
pointing ever more clearly to an equation of these, be revised 
his first edition, when the second came due, in favor of the 
"traditional" Judgment so that the ratio and logos should con­
tinue in their central r o l e . 722
One of the most important consequences of this choice is
219. p. 166. 220. p. 167* 221. K. Axvii, p. 171.222. p. 172f.
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that Kant's analysis never rose above the objective-subjective 
dichotomy. Ind.ed, even in the first edition the analysis of 
pure intuition is given as the "subjective" aspect, and that of 
pure thoucht is given as the " object ive. "'"73 in consequence, 
'-'hen seen from the point of viev; of the Heidegger ian critique, 
subjectivism becomes the greater the more emphasis is pl^^ced on 
pure thoucht. For, this latter is "dependent" upon intuition. 
Once "transcendence,” however, becomes the essence of finite 
pure reason, the subject-object dichotomy is transcended and 
objectivity and subjectivity become assured.72q Such a claim, 
however, should give cause to wonder if this exposition of trrr;- 
scendence has now, in virtue of its transcendence of the sub- 
ject-object relation, also transcended "finitude." Is this "tni- 
man" nature of which Heidegger speaks? If so, in what does the 
"subjectivity" of the subject consist when transcendent?
10. The Subjectivity of the Subject.
Throughout this analysis, "finitude" has been a dominant 
theme, but with the emergence of transcendence as the essence 
of human pure reason, the question of "sensibility" again comes 
to the fore. In what way is human pure reason as it is now 
formulated "sensible," i.e., finite?
Time, as the universal intuition, i.e., pure sensibility, 
must here be shown to "form a primordial unity with the "Î - r.i n' 
and this, "on the basis of the transcendental imagination.”
2 . K. Axviff.. p. 171. 22^. p. <2?. p. .
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In A word, we must show how the latter is related to time.
The previous discussion of pure intuition's relation to 
the imacinat ion''-*-^  was brief and to a decree obscure. It is 
time now to give "a specific, analytical explication of the 
precise manner in which time is based upon the transcendental 
imagina t ion. "‘^77
The constant flux of time is apparent in the synopsis, 
i.e., "the pure succession of the now-series." Pure intuition 
"intuits" this succession, that is, it receives "that which of­
fers i t s e l f . "778 gut how is a "sequence" to be received? 
"Strictly speaking, the simple act of receiving something actu­
ally present" cannot apply to the act of receiving a now, "since 
eac.h now has an essentially continuous extension" which pene­
trates to that now which has just now past, and to that which 
is just now coming. That is, with every now there is always  ^
reference both forward and backward. Hence, "the receptive act 
of pure intuition must in itself give the aspect of the now." 
an aspect which contains this dual reference.779 This dual ref - 
erence, for Heidegger, explains why "pure" intuition, "which is 
the subject of the transcendental aesthetic, cannot be the re­
ception of something 'present.' Pure intuition v/hich, as re­
ceptive, gives Itself its object is by nature not relative to
the presence of something, least of all to Ahe presence ofj 
beings actually g i v e n . "7-33 Pure intuition, as a constitutive 
element of pure imagination "receives" from the latter what It
22b. See above, d . 108f. 227- P . 1?8. 228. p. 17' ■
229. p. 279. 230. p. 179.
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transforms according to its "temporal’’ image, and then "gives” 
to any being which is "present." In so doing, it provides what 
is "present" v/ith an "historical" context, if you will; it puts 
it into the flux or sequence of t i me ; it puts it. into perspec­
tive. Sut how is this done?
That which pure intuition "receives," it must be clear, is 
not already in the "form" of time. The strictly temporal "imr.ge” 
is provided by intuition itself. Nevertheless, what has been 
said plainly points to the act of pure intuition as arising f-om 
pure imagination in virtue of its "receptive" character. The 
"formative" aspect of intuition's contribution to the total set 
of objectification is seen most clearly in this dual reference 
back and ahead in the moment of objectification, i.e., in "lock­
ing at."732 For, we have a "threefold way in which the act of 
imagination is formative" in virtue of the "image" of time pro­
vided by intuition. It "produces representations relative to 
the present, the past, or the future."732 That is, it forms 
images the representations of which are present; it reproduces, 
images the representations of which are of the past; and it sji- 
ticipates images, the representations of which are of the fu­
ture.^33 These modes of imagination will be treated in some 
detail forthwith, but first the ground just covered must ]?e secure
It is difficult tc "picture" clearly In one's mind the ac­
tion which has here been suggested. In the first place, when 
V'C speak of an "objject" as being "present," "it" has already
2 3 1 . p .  1 7 ; .  2 ] 2 . p .  1 6 0 . 2 3 3 . p .  1 8 2 .
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been "cut out" of its context. Therefore, we need to recall 
that what is now "there" has not always been there because there 
was a time when v^ e were not yet aware of its "presence." So im­
perceptibly immersed was it in the "background" which encompas­
ses all that is "there" (which background is not itself a "thine" 
of which we are conscious except when we speak of the "world," 
or of "everything" or "everywhere"), that it is true to say that 
ijor us_ it was not "there." The history of discovery illustrate? 
this plainly. Marconi, for example, "cut out" from this back­
ground "radio waves," and made "wire less" communication possible. 
One could j_n retrospect say that sucii had always been possible, 
but until Marconi excised radio waves from this background, 
wireless communication was a practical impossibility.
Secondly, as regards "excision," this act, in the terms we 
have been using, involves the "formation" of "objects" only to 
the extent that a temporal-spatial cloak is thrown around them 
so that they can emerge from their hiding place in the background. 
The "cloak" surrounds them, but has nothing whatever to do with 
their nature or composition. It simply makes them "present" or 
"past" or "future" depending upon whether the action is formative, 
reproductive, or anticipâtive. The nature or composition of the 
objects themselves is, rather, the concern of "conceptual" 
thought which unifies them according to its "rule." The fact 
that "objects" are simultaneously isolated spa t i o-tempora 1 ly ? nci 
qualified conceptually in one unified action supports Hcide-- 
ger's thesis: that the imagination is the seat of transc^nd-nc^ 
nd makes objectification possible a priori.
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From this, it should be clear that the imagination, since 
all its images are spontaneously "temporal," "is i_n itself rel­
ative to time," Not only this, but it can be said to consti­
tute (form) time originally.7?8 For, as we have just shown, 
"time as pure intuition is neither only what is intuited in the 
pure act of intuition nor this act deprived of its 'object,'"'--' 
The temporal-spatial cloak which intuition throws around "ob­
jects" and thereby rescues them from oblivion in the background 
is, to be sure, never "thrown" without reference to an "object.” 
But this latter is never what "pure" intuition intuits. "Time 
as pure intuition is i_n one the formative act of intuition and 
what is intuited there in, "*^36 What is intuited "therein" is 
time. Time is the throwing (the act) of a "temporal" cloak 
which is either present, past, or future (what is intuited). 
"Such is the complete concept of time."73?
The "pure succession of the now-sequence," then, is always 
and only imaginative formation, reproduction, or anticipation; 
each determination having a reference to now, i.e., to itself.
If the act is formative, then, the imagination is presently
23I1. p. I8ü. 235. p. 180. 236. p. 180.
237. p. 180. We must say here that this "complete concept" of 
time is just that: transcendent Dasein's concept of the 
"phenomenon of time," to which Heidegger alludes in his 
Introduction to Being and Time (p. 55) when he says that 
phenomenology penetrates even to space and time. That 
transcendence which has been expounded is the transcen­
dence of all possible "objects;" it does not transcend 
finitude. As finite, i.e., receptive, Dasein is always 
open to that Time which transcends all existence and ail 
ex-sistencc, and renders these "finite." This Time is 
identical with Being ana Nothing, and, as the "horizon 
of all possible unity," is not only ontically future, it 
is, relative to all phenomena, even-future, eternal Iv "fu­
ture. For more on this, see below Chapters V onward^.
116
forming; if it is reproductive, then, it is presently reproduc­
ing; and if it is anticipâtive, then, it is presently antici­
pating. The "now" of the now-sequence adheres to each action 
(determination) because all actions are oriented relative to the 
actor. This will become clear as we proceed. The point to hold 
in mind now is that the imagination, which has been demonstrate: 
to be the essence of transcendence and the root of the two ele­
ments it unites in pure synthesis, "constitutes primordial 
time,"738 i.e., "phenomenal" time.
The three elements of pure knowledge, intuition, imagina­
tion, and reflection, are essentially three modes of synthesis
which, in view of the temporality of all representations, are
o o qtherefore apprehension, reproduction, and recognition.^^- These 
variants of the terms we have just been using (formation, repro­
duction, and anticipation) arise as variants precisely because 
some distinction is required between the imaginative acts of 
intuitjqmu the discussion of which introduced the latter terms, 
and the imaginative acts of imagination and reflection. The dis
cussion is now to center upon the pure synthesis, the root of
/the two stems. Its behavior is characterized by "apprehension," 
"reproduction," and "recognition." Confusion is almost impos­
sible to avoid in what follows unless we realize that what we 
are doing is demonstrating the "cross-reference" which must ap­
ply if the pure synthesis is indeed the "root" and unification 
of the other two elements. That is, the pure synthesis must be
2 3 8 . p . 1 6 1 . 2 3 9 . p p . 181-8I1.
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shown to be pure intuition when acting as pure apprehension, 
pure imagination when acting as pure reproduction, and pure 
thought when acting as pure recognition. We begin with the 
pure synthesis as pure intuition: apprehension.
Pure intuition has been characterized as time as this Istte 
is manifest in the "synopsis" of the "riow-scqucnce. " Thi . man­
ifold, in virtue of the now's dual reference backward and for­
ward, is "synthetic" in the sense that it is a mani-fold v h i c:. 
is intuited, all aspects of which are riven at once.'^?'- This 
immediate formation of a manifold "image" gathers within its 
purview "now this," "now that," and "now all this at once." ear- 
"now..." being one of a continuing "succession of now's." Int-r- 
it ion of this manifold is the "apprehension" of the present n_2:_ 
in its backward or forward relation to other now's v/i thin the 
purview of this now-sequence. Thus, all three dimensions of ti^ 
can be said to be intuited immediately when apprehension "sin­
gles out" this present now. That is, time is intuited in all 
its aspects when the present now is apprehended in the spontan­
eous act of forming the now. Apprehension, then, creates or 
"produces at each instant the aspect of the actual present as
s u c h ."7 1^  Therefore, it is "time-forming," an act of pure im­
agination, i.e., pure synthesis.
All of the now's in the now-sequence which have cither a 
backward or forward relation to the present now (Just apprehend­
ed) have their validity in terms either of reproduction or reco
p. Idbf. 21:1. p. lC)b.
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nition. VJe consider next the pure synthesis A s reproduction.
The memory is such that the "imnçe” of somethine once per­
ceived can be ''recalled" in its absence providinc that it has 
not been dropped from thought altogether, i.e., forcotten. -  
A recalled image has all of the validity that it did when it 
was originally intuited. Recalling, then, as an act, is the 
"reproduction" of an image in the mode of immediate perception 
even though the thing it represents in its reproduction is no 
longer present. As such, it is an act of unification, thet is. 
its representation is united with "presence" even in absence. 
This means that such temporal determinations as "earlier" or 
"in the past" must be distinguished by the mind as essentialIv 
different from actual presence, else reproduction would differ 
in no v/ay from apprehension. Apprehension, as we have seen, ap­
prehends the present, all other now *s being either earlier or 
later. If an image is recalled in a reproduction, then, this 
 ^ct must be "apprehended" as "reproducing." Reproduction, then, 
has the temporal distinction of "the presence of the past" be­
cause, as an apprehension, it is now-reproducing, as distinct 
from now-apprehending.
Apprehension was seen to be primarily intuitive. It shoul ' 
be apparent that the imagination plays the central role in re­
production with its capacity to make "as present" v-ha t is in 
fact absent. "Pure synthesis in the mode of reproduction forrm 
the past as such .  ^ And in unification with '» pprehen c i or;, i-
' 2 , p . 166 . 2.'j 1. p . 16?.
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brines about the temporal orientation requisite to object ifica- 
tion. "if this original unity of both modes of synthesis did 
not exist, ’not even the purest and most elementary represents-
I Itions of space and time could arise. ’ -h
But what of the mode of synthesis which " f orms " the future'; 
Or, as Heidegger puts it, "How is pure thought, the ego of pure
O' I .apperception, to have a temporal character...?"  ^ The ansv?er 
to this has already been implicit in the explanations of borh 
apprehension and reproduction. For, unification as such r.a s 
figured in a major way. In the case of apprehension, we saw 
the unity of the manifold as a "single" intuition w i t h it:: con- 
stitutivc elements (earlier and later now’s), the present appr '- 
hens ion of now being that which orients the others.
And, in reproduction we saw the unification of a -former 
image, that is, its validation as "present." And further’icre, 
we sav/ both these moments in unity wmtri each other (as the app- 
hension of the now in now-reproducing). It is important to scr 
how "recognition" plays its part in both these " t ime-f ormi nr, " a ^
In the first action, apprehension of the now presupposes 
that each now is precisely as the former vas. That is, it must 
have about it the unique quality of "presence." In every deter 
mination of the now, there is recognition of the former’s uniou 
qua 1 i ty. And this "recognition" is the rule of unity -’ith..
an instance of conceptual "rule:" the one which applies to ma no
)jh. p. 186 (K. A102). 2hp. p. 169. 2J6. p. 19:
i ;2f)
In the second, reproduction presupposes recognition in the 
relation between the recalled image and its actual presence - 
again, the rule of unity. Then, in the relation between appre­
hension and reproduction, we also encountered unity: that of 
the two modes of time-forming synthesis, each in its own way 
relative to the one unique present now. Since conceptual rule 
is "self-conscious" apperception, "this unitarv consciousness 
is what combines the manifold, successively intuited and t’ter -- 
upon also reproduced, into one representation."-"- Tnc '^ule '.t: 
unity, operative throughout, effects a "closed field" vitnin 
which these two modes of synthesis "can fix and recci're bein 
that which they bring back or encounter.
The "identification" of the now as now, and of a reproduc­
tion as true, requires the rule of unity as that which "recoc- 
nizcs" itself in the way that pure thought has been explicated 
as pure apperception: "1 think...." In order for "identifica­
tion," however, to function throughout the whole thought proc^?' 
the unity with which it is to govern must be provided sooner 
than these functions which presuppose it. This means prior be:,, 
to the now and the now-past. Recognition, then, is based upoi 
the self-identification of the who 1e horizon of unity in ccner- 
a 1, i.e., upon the future as the horizon of all poss i ble unity*
It is this horizon of all possible unity which is recocniZ' 
and apprehended as now, and which is recognized and reproduced 
as now-past. Recocnition of, or identification with, the horir
2Ù7. K. A 1 0), p. 391. 2'-6 . p. 191. 2u9. p, 19I.
of possible unity, i.e., with the future, i.e., with the per­
spective of the pro-position which is always "in advance," i.e., 
v:i th the constant, ever-renewing source from whi ch all else 
arises - unity with this possibility of unity, of objectifica­
tion, of truth - is the only possible mode of unification v.hich 
has built-in resistance to contamination or distortion by the 
variety of what-is or v/hat-has-been. The future is one, '*r)J 
common to all; whereas we are many. Hence, the number of now’s 
is equal to our number, and the number of then’s (now’s-prst) 
is beyond number. The one whi ch rules the many, then, cart onlv 
be "future."
It should now be apparent that...
"Although it first appeared fruitless, even absurd, to attempt 
to explain the internal formation of pure concepts by consid­
ering them as being essentially determined by time, ve lave 
now not only brought to light the temporal character of the 
third mode of synthesis but have also shown that this r.ode as 
pure pre-formation, insofar as its internal structure is con­
cerned, enjoys a priority over the other two, v’ith which last, 
nevertheless, it is essentially connected. Is it not evident, 
then, that the ... analysis of pure synthesis in concepts 
reveals the most primordial essence of time, that is, that it 
temporalizes itself out of the future?"2hO
Because pure sensibility, i.e., time, has now been reveale' 
to penetrate every aspect of pure reason - even to the extent 
of enabling conceptual thought - the transcendental imagination 
in turn has been revealed to be "capable of forming and sustain­
ing the unity and primordial totality of the specific finitude 
of the human subject, which last has been presented as pure, 
sensible reason. But, do not time and pure reason "remain
?0. p. lylf. 251. P.
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absolutely heterogeneous"? Is not the concept of pure, sensible 
reason self-contradictory? Until the selfhood of the self is 
shown to be intrinsically temporal, i.e., "not limited in its 
temporal character to the way in which it is empirically appre­
hended," tinie and pure reason will remain hei erocenecus. '
Heidegger choses to demonstrate the intrinsic unity : 
these two not by way of a proof that the self is temporal, but 
quite the reverse; by showing that time has lis,, character 
selfhood. That is, the subjectivity of the subject v ! 1 ! be s “ 
to be pure self-affeet ion, and this latter to be time. - - - T no 
key to this analysis has been provided in the citation a cove., 
namely, th^t "selfhood ... is ... not limited in its t^mpor^l 
character to the way in which it is empirically apprehended."
We begin with "objectification,"the act which has been 
shown to be necessarily affected by time. If this "ac.u" is
affected by time, then we, whose act it is, arc ourselves 
ted by it. But how? Rather than atten.pt to recapitulate Held 
ger’s very abstruse explanation, we vU 11 use formulas already 
civen in order to effect the same end.
If the self is the actor in the act of objectification, * h ' 
this act and its agent, should they be objectified, w i 11 always 
be "objects" - never subjects. The act of objectification al­
ways implies the subject whose act it is; subject who tran­
scends wh^t is objectified to the extent that lie makes possible
La priori this act. A Iv/ays he i s prior to whs t he object ifies. 
Therefore, when the self is objectified, another self is pre­
supposed. This "other" self, the a cent himself, is always prior 
to, i.e., shead, or out in "front" of, what he "looks at."
now, if what tie "looks at" is said to be "present.," then, 
where is the agent who is prior to this "presence" unless he is 
in its future? Certainly he is not in its past. The se I^-af­
fection which we saw in our analysis of pure thought iviz., whe- 
unity, because of its peculiar ambiguity, recocnizes itself in 
the rule of th'^  one which applies to many), once this struc'urr 
is seen to be "temporal," can then be said to derive from the 
future as the horizon of all possible unity. It follows that 
if unity is future and fundamental to self-affeet ion, then, th^ 
self-affection which constitutes the subject, and which is al­
ways prior to its act of knowledge, is "of" this horizon a 1' 
possible unity. That is, the self i s i u tu re ; it is always ah'' 
of "itself" (this latter being the objectified self). further­
more , if the self is a unity, and the kej to conceptual though.t 
is the unity wliich governs all "possible" unities, then, the 
self is future and time is its pure self-affection."^^
265* From this conclusion we can go beyond Heidegger and show 
how it necessarily applies to "objects" as well. If "ob­
jects" are considered to be unitary, i.e., to exist "as 
such," then are not they "of" the future too? This argu­
ment harks back to Kant’s distinction between "appearance^" 
and the "thinc-in-itself" which we earlier suggested was ^n 
attempt to come to grips with "relativity." Fverv appre­
hension of "unity" in the "worId," in the light of the a - 
bove argument, is necessarily an apprehension of tie "pos­
sibility" of unity which is future. Trie re f ore. ev^ry sio'^ ' 
"object," vhen a pp re trended "singly," is relative a r. ' tner-'"- 
fore ’"Ot fully defined "as such," All that can b^-- ""ij i '
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Vv'e cannot rpeak, therefore, of the "temporality" of the 
"self," i.e., we cannot discuss whe the r it is temporal or eter­
nal, if, as it turns out, the self, as pure self-affection, is 
itself time, and "only as sucii in its very essence is it possible 
a 11."^^^ Nor is it proper to speak of the "temporality” or 
"a temporality" of time. "The primordial essence of time as pure, 
self-affection must be taken as our ou i de. Thus, when we
see that "the self originally and in its inmost essence 1' - i:
itself," then, '•■’e can conclude finally that " p u r r  sensibility 
(time) and pure reason are not only homogeneous, they hcl:'nr 
gether in the unity of the same essence which maker possible 
the flnitude of human subjectivity."^^^
11. Me ta ph\si c s , Da sein, a nd Fundamen ta I On t o 1ogy.
Thus we come to the end of our course: the laying c ' tee
foundation of metaphysics in its basic originality. Heidc--rr’
interpretation of Kant has gone beyond what Kant himscl^ cxpll -
tly specifies, but stays, nevertheless, vuithin the limits of
the implications contained in the text of the Critique. In trii'
interpretation we have seen how...
"Kant’s laying of the foundation of metaphysics leatis to the 
transcendental imagination. This is the common root of both 
stems, sensibility and understanding. As such, it makes pos­
that its essence is being gradually revealed in history.
It is "coming-to-be" in the same way that the self (not 
the empirical self) is always ahead of itself in a pro-pc- 
sition, i.e., in tlie future, which latter is the horizon o 
all possible unity, and always is not yet...
266. p. 196 257.' p. 19v.. kb. p. 201. This statement confirms our contention that "t irm"
for ''e i (1er per is Itself "phenomenal" in the sense of b i i
" i n t e . "
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rible the oricinai unity of the ontological synthesis. This 
root itself, however, is implanted in primordial time. The 
primordial grcui.d which is revealed ... is t i m e . " 2:-9
Since Kant’s Critiaue "begins vith me taphysica General is 
and so beconics a question as to the possibility of ontology in 
general," it necessarily "concerns, the essence of the ontoloci- 
ca 1 constitution of beings, i.e., Seine in ..ene ra 1 .  ^ur c o:
■: 1 us i on , t he n , s e o on t i me , jux t a pose s 3e i. n e and time:  ^i : n i t ■ 
ic:---ntiy enouch, t, h-^ title of Heidenoer’s "û.-yior" work. ^h:a 
' - or'-: presupposes the '>bove analysis, at least in its general 
conformations, and is set out as a "repetition" of i t . ' By
"repetition," Heidegger means: "the disclosure of the prir.ordi' 
possibilities concealed" in this probleio. "The development of 
these possibilities has the effect of transforming the problem 
and thus preserving it in its import as a problem."'-'""
Now, the establishment of the ground of metaphysics is, 
we have fourid, "an interrogation of man, i.e., it is ^ntnropol- 
cgy."^63 And carried out in this way, this anthropology is. t ' 
be considered "pure anthropology" because it is ba^ed net on
empirical criteria, but on those criteria which are a p r i :r' .
Hence, it is "philosophical a n t hr opo .1 ogy . " ' The term "philo­
sophical anthropology," in contexts apart from this one, has ' 
manifest ambiguity. Indeed, Heidegger concludes that the his­
tory of anthropological investigation is so spotted with inher­
ent ambiguity that if the science of man is to be clarified, 
someone must set his mind to do it; the task reiaa, ins to b- : or
259. p. 2G7. 260. p. 207. 261. p. 208.
2 o 3 . p . 213. 2 oli . pp. 2} 3 f f .
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His own investigations have revealed that finitude is the de­
cisive characteristic of man and there-ore of anthropology. 
There remains, then, only the problem of determininc this fin­
itude anthropologically, i.e., in an analysis o^ ' D a  sein,
"The proplem of the laying of the foundation of ineta pnys i cs 
is rooted in the question of the Da sein in ina n , i.e., in the
question of his ultimate c round , which is the c ompreh-ns i or; 
of Seine as essentially existent finitude. ... Insofar ' -a 
the Seine of this being lies in existence, the ouest ion a ^ 
to the < •'sence of pasein is an existential one. Every e a c -  
t i on re ] s- T, i y e t o the Be i "it. of be i n c ... is me ta p a v ^ ic . "
We have before us, then, the question of the me ta p h 
of Da se In which is philosophical 'anthropology, i.e., *'un 'ccr;- 
ca 1 ontology. If this latter is explicated in such a %'a ' tnat 
the finitude of man is revealed to be "temporality," then ihi: 
anthropology squares with the results of the laying of thu ’'oo:: 
dation of me ta p a y i  cs in its basic originality, .and the vital 
relations between these three heretofore diverge discipline': 
will have been shown to be that of un icy.
12. Remarks.
Only in a very summary way, and therefore inadéquat 1 v , 
have we suggested the nature of the "repetition" of f he I'-yinc 
of the foundation of metaphysics in its basic originality, hut 
sufficiently, nonetheless, to indicate what, at bottom, i- in­
volved in Be i ng a nd Time in terms of its relation 1o this an­
alysis. for our part, only the ba re s t hint is sufficient, for 
there have been allusions all along the way, not only t, 
and T ime but to other v’0"'ks a s well which, c r;, thi' ” . r : r ^ T' -
eh . 2 1;-26. 266. p. 238.
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tation" was written, were yet to be fully articulated. These 
illusions, AS we shall see, arc expanded by Heidegger, a no to­
gether with this analysis come to constitute a frame of though/ 
whicn contains within it the seeds, so to speak, of all the 
ramifications of philosophy a s can appropriately be enterta in'-’d -
V-e should point out again that in the course of tiiis anal­
ysis we have ourselves " i n te r p r e t ed " in an effort to na k. : ore
of the apparent obscurity less opaque. in so doing, ■ ■ - ' v
i I troduced an empha sis which docs not appear a s sucn ir i-'i j r - 
ger: the emphasis upon unity. It woulo be a gross mis repress- - 
tat ion to say that "unity" is not of great significance in hi 
analysis, but he has not utilized it to the same extent: that 
its relati on to time is made more explicit. This, hcv/e ve r. 
rather than being a misrepresentation, is but to makr exp lie:' 
what is imp licit, and to close the circle, as it were, yet me -- 
tightly. With unity more in the center of things, the analys 
comes closer to realizing the aim entertainea by Kant, no lew- 
than by Heidegger, that me ta phy sica cene ra lis should utilize 
the analytic procedures appropriate to mathematics, a discipJin- 
devoid for the most part of emotional overtones, and prone there 
fore to be subjective.^^?
If this emphasis upon unity and its relation to time can 
be accepted s a legitimate interpretation of this important 
work, then we are content, indeed, happy to endorse it vith trie 
one qua lificati on wh i c h we s u gee sted earlier ( f' n . 2 j '• , ro- • ,
the: the "timv.r" which Heidegger here expounds is " pr j. -o. r .
yi.,e" onl- in the sense that it is the primordial o: -no- \
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of time. The "subjectivity of the subject” he has rightly 
shown to he "the self-affection of t ime," but this f in iIe sub­
ject’s "future" stance relative to all that he "objectifies" 
points to a futurity which is i_n advanee yet this finitude 
and "determines" it to be finite. Tli i r Future *we will later V 
suggesting is "always future," "ever-^utur^." It. is 'hi'- Tin 
which is#truly "primordial" and whicn "grounds" the "phenomen 
f this Time, however, we know nothinc beyond t ne fact th^t i 
is "revealed" by means of this phenomenon of time i tit in the 
"subjectivity of the subject" as self-affection. This snsiysi 
then, has its validity and importance in demonstrating v’hat 
could be termed "natural revelation" in the sense that Ti’i.e i: 
perceived by the "subject," i.e., Dasein, and, in consequence, 
all men are aware of T i me’s priority, and bear w i tnes s to it i' 
their "concern"  ^nd "respect" for the "phenomenon" cf time. 1 
this connection, Heidegger’s analysis of "Beinc-towares-Jeath" 
in Beinc a nd T ime is - n apt illustration o+' jus t "how" ^oth t ' 
concept of unity and that of time (as a "stretch” ) contribute 
to the "historica1ity" of Dasein ^nd of the "world" which it 
"projects."
We proceed now to expound Heidegger’s little book, The 
sence of Or ound, and to disclose in a formal way what we have 
suggested here only in passing.
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Chapter IV 
"The Essence of Ground"
1. In t roduc t i on
Both this essay and "What is Metaphysics?" first nppeare- 
p s public lectures in 1928. The Essence o f Ground w^s pub­
lished the following year. The Preface to its unaltered thir 
edition of 1989 explains briefly its relation to the famous ir- 
"urural lecture. "The Essence of Grouni" considers th: " r.'• - 
logical difference," that is, the "not" (Wicht) "between be' ri 
and Being."'- Being is not a being, nor is any bein i t , 1 ' « -
ing, not even the totality of beings. This negative identity, 
indeed, tliis instance of non-identity occasions in the ir.aurur­
al lecture consideration of the Nothing (Nichts) as co-crigirr 
with Being. That is to say, all beings have their ultimate 
ground in Being, but this latter is "differentiated" from its 
dIs-eS33nee, i.e., Nothing. Yet, because Being is prior to be­
ings, and Nothing is prior to things, all beings can be said 'o 
have their ultimate origin both in Being and Nothing. Nov, the 
Nothing is not the nihil nena t i vum: ra thcr, it is the positive
source from which all content derives. Its seeming "negative" 
character arises from our finite human propensity to award ul­
timate meaning to ontical, i.e., "historical," truth. fet it 
is precisely the problem of the "relativity" of all ontic know­
ledge that makes ontology so fundamental a concern for He idee- e 
If ontic beings are seen to be manifest, i.e., "there," Ina t is
' 'c:\ e e n  des Grundes , Vittorio Klos te rmann , Frankfu: ' , 
'.V--'-e' T  r- •■'or roc to in *his chapter simply by pa s- ' :
• • P ' P ' '
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if selfhood is deemed to be "here and now" and this "presence" 
is a correlative of the "there and then," i.e., history, then 
this "positive" affirmation of ontic phenomena requires that 
"negation" characterize that which is not ontic. If, as we 
shall see, primacy should belong to Seine and to its dls-essenc' 
which is Nothing, that is, to the futuT’e, then Beinc and Nothin 
should be accorded the positive value as "proving" all ont i c • -
in:s including the "self." The question of "the ontolocic-I
difference" cains ascendency as that discussion which pa \n s t 
way for an ultimate reorientation towards..., or an opennes: ' 
wards..., a re-evaluation of that whiCih aefines human Dasein 
"fin ite"  ^nd therefore problematic, namely, freedom, transcen­
dence; the truth of Being (which is its "oblivion" in "dis-es­
sence ," i.e.. Nothing.
Heidegger begins his discussion of the essence of cround
with an allusion to Aristotle’s analysis of the meaning of thz
word .V f'\ >1 , origin, basis. Here we find disclosed what Hcider •.?
terms "grounds" (Gr unde ) . They are: 1. "essence" (V. a s - sc i n ) ,
wha t beings in fact "are;" 2. "existence" (Dass-se in) , the fact
that beincs "are;" and 3 . "truth" (Wahr-sein ) , the truth of
their beinc as they in fact "are." This tri-parti te rendering
of however, appears along side another attempt to disclose
{'
"ground." But Aristotle finds four basic "causes," and these 
fairly dominate the ensuing history of "metaphysics" and "locic. 
The relation between, these two efforts at crounding, however, 
remain obscure. Moreover, what is common to thorn, the on
7 .
1 •>, 1
around from which these seven arise, is not apparent.
Leibniz de^ls with the "problem of ground" in his "principl 
of sufficient reason."3 Crusius and Schopenhauer, in turn, al­
so grapple w i th it, the former, in nis dissertation of 1783, 
actually calling it "the principle of ground” ( der Sa t z y_om 
Grunde), perhaps for the first time.^ But it is only vith Kant 
that the problem is raised to the prominence Heidegge’" believe^ 
it deserves, but then, in an ambiguous way- It lies 1 th- \-‘W  
heart of his "Critique of Pure Reason" but is of genuine int^.r- 
est in the whole of his philosophy only at the beginning nd 
end.^ On the other hand, Schellinc does not treat the problem 
as such at all. There is, then, some question as to whether 
the "problem of ground" is ever adequately treated at all, nn~ 
especially in the "principle of ground."^ in that case, it : î" 
no doubt appropriate to raise the question of ground, especia’ . 
if new insight should result from a more thoroughgoing analysis, 
one that takes into account dis-essence (Unwesen) as well as 
essence.9 For, is not the knowledge of essence made possible
by a corresponding knowledge of what it is not?
"The ’principle of ground* from the outset appears to de­
fend something like a problem of ground as a ’supreme prin­
ciple.’ Does, then, the 'principle of ground’ assert some­
thing a bou t the ground as such? Does it, indeed, illumin­
ate the 'ssence of ground as the highest princip 1e?"10
Not so! It asserts, rather, concerning "beings:" that <^acn in' <
romethinc like " g r o u n d . "  But is the e s s e n c e  of this "crou:;'"
itself ever specified?
. p . 7. 6. p. ?/. T . p . o .  d
9. p. 8. 10. p . 9.
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Leibniz contends that the “princiole of sufficient reason" has 
its origin in "natural t r u t h . B u t  Heidegger finds that Leibniz'
I understanding of "natural truth" is that of "prepositional truth."
The relation of subject to predicate is one of identity, not in the 
'i sense of sameness, but rather in the sense of a union of those things 
which belong together, are homogenous or correlative. Therefore, 
"•'truths' - true assertions - take their nature from a relation to
sfXTie thing on the basis of whi ch (euf Grund wovon ) this uninimity is
gbss i b 1 e . " ^ ^  The problems of gjaund and truth are therefore related. 
But both problems presuppose, as it were, the accessibility of
t^ ie beings about which assertions are made and alleged to be true, 
ilthey assume that these beings are already manifest. These problems 
\can, therefore, be said to be "rooted in a truth more primordial" 
fhan that ontic or propositiona1 truth which assumes "unconcealment" 
^ U n v e r b o r g e n h e i t ).^^ That is, they are "rooted" in "concealment" or
n
^ontological truth. For, "... the illumination of Being first makes
11.possible the manifestation of beings."'*^ If beings are said to be
-t.
already manifest, then Being is not; it is concealed.
Now, the term "ontology" is ambiguous. Pre-ontological under­
standing appears to be common to all men as an jmpli c i t knowledge 
of Being, whereas ontological knowledge, the explicit knowledge of 
Being, is gained, if at all, only after considerable effort. Onlyj*
,ontologists endeavor to explicate Being. Natural scientists, on the 
ither hand, presuppose a knowledge of Being without ever bringing it
11. P. l O f .
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to express determiner ion. ' Therefore, tne b^sis for all of their 
calculations and measurements is an implicit "grasp of Being" (Se » ns- 
vers tëndni s ). Thus, pre-ontological knowledge has its express d e ­
termination in ontical knowledge. For, ontical truth is concerned 
with beings (their Being merely implied) whereas o n toio g i c a l truth 
is concerned to expli ca te that Being which is implied in beings.
Thus, ontic and ontological truth are correlative in virtue of the 
"distinction between Being and beings (ontological difference )."^^
Tihis "difference" must possess, or be possessed by, the ground of 
tihis difference. "This ground of the ontological difference we an- 
 ^t ici pate to he the transcendence of Dasein.
Thus Heidegger finds that Leibniz' principle of sufficient 
reason betrays both a definite idea of Being which he does not expli-
cate, and a reliance upon the common, almost vulgar, notion of truth
1
as "propositional truth." Nor does he ground these notions sufficient
ly. Indeed, Kant is the first to demonstrate the connection between
[{ground" and "Being." Heidegger himself summarizes for us;
"The short statement of the Leibnizian deduction of the principle 
of ground from the essence of truth should make clear the connec- 
tion of the problem of ground with the question of the inner p o s ­
sibility of the ontological truth which issues in the yet more 
primordial and therefore all-encompassing question of the essence
of transcendence."18
Transcendence, then, is to be shown to be the domain (Bezirk) of the
est ion as to the essence of ground.
IS. p. I4f. This distinction is crucial for our temporal analysis.
Pre-ontological knowledge contains an implicit knowledge of Being 
a 11 the while that it endeavors to gain ontical knowledge, i.e., 
a knowledge of beings. Ontological knowledge, on the other hand, 
is an explicit knowledge of Being a 11 the while presupposing the 
the implicit relation of beings t o Be i n g . These two disciplines
(continued on p. 1339)
w
ere mutually exclusive in terms of time. when ontical knowledge 
is sought, pre-ontological knowledge (of Being) is presupposed. 
And when ontological knowledge is sought, ontical knowledge (of 
be i n g s ) i s taken for granted. Neither can be considered without 
the other serving as an implicit reference. W h e n , however, one 
attempts to gain a perspective transcending both of these d i s c i ­
plines so as to see their relation to each other as we have don% 
yet another position has been taken j_n advance of them, so to 
s p e a k . This pos it ion is the ex-pos it ion which thought achieves 
thereby indicating something of the transcendent position of the 
thinker himself, viz., in ex-si sting existence, that is, in a 
realm in advance of all objectification. These latter remarks, 
however, are anticipatory and should be viewed in the light of 
the "reversal" discussed in Chanter VI below,
16. p. I 5•
17. p. 15.
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2. T r a n s c e n d e n c e
H o w  ca n  the " q u e s t i o n  of t r a n s c e n d e n c e "  be s h o w n  to be the 
key a p p r o a c h - r o a d  to the e s s e n c e  of g r o u n d ?  T h e  t e r m  " t r a n s c e n ­
d e n c e "  r e f e r s  to a p h e n o m e n o n  w h i c h  can, for the m o s t  part, 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  as a s p a t i a l  " o v e r - l e a p "  (liber s t i eg ) of s uch b e ­
ings as are e n c o u n t e r e d  a r o u n d  a b o u t .  It b e s p e a k s  "a r e l a t i o n  
w h i c h  e x t e n d s  ’ f r o m ’ s o m e t h i n g  ’t o ’ somcthinc,. " ^ 9 H e nce, that 
v;hich is o v e r - l e a p e d  r i g h t l y  b e l o n g s  to the r e l a t i o n  -s its 
" t e r m i n u s "  (w o r a u f z u ).^^ But the c l e a r e s t  a nd m o s t  d e c i s i v e  
a s p e c t  of t r a n s c e n d e n c e  as a r e l a t i o n  is not its " t e r m i n u s ” but 
its source, i.e., the p e r s o n  w h o  i n i t i a t e s  this o v e r - l e a p ,  the 
one w h o  h i m s e l f  doe s  the leaping, n a m e l y ,  h u m a n  D a s e i n .  T r a n ­
s c e n d e n c e  is the " f u n d a m e n t a l  d i s p o s i t i o n "  (Grurtdver fa s s u n c  ) 
h u m a n  D a s e i n ;  that is, it is the f u n d a m e n t a l  m o d e  of all the 
D a s e i n ’s r e l a t i o n s ;  it e v e n  m a k e s  p o s s i b l e  its own e x i s t e n c e  
a " s e l f . " ^ "  T h e r e f o r e ,  it is not a p p r o p r i a t e  to s p e a k  of a "su.b- 
ject" w h o  b e c o m e s  t r a n s c e n d e n t  in an  o v e r - l e a p  to " o b j e c t s , "  
for, " s u b j e c t i v i t y "  i t s e l f  p r e s u p p o s e s  this o v e r - l e a p .  T r a n ­
s c e n d e n c e  is p r i o r  b o t h  to s u b j e c t i v i t y  and o b j e c t i v i t y ,  s u b ­
ject and o b j e c t ;  it m a k e s  b o t h  p o s s i b l e  as such,
" In the o v e r - l e a p ,  the D a s e i n  first e n c o u n t e r s  s u c h  b e i n c s  
as is; that is, it f i r s t  e n c o u n t e r s  its o wn ’s e l f . ’ T r a n ­
s c e n d e n c e  c o n s t i t u t e s  s e l f h o o d . A n d  in so d o i n g ,  it e n a b l e s  
the D a s e i n  at the s a m e  time to m e e t  w h a t  it is n o t . for, " d i f ­
f e r e n c e "  is i n h e r e n t  in the r e c o g n i t i o n  of the " s e l f "  a - self.
1 - . c. IV. 20. p. 17. 21 . p. IV. 7 . .
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Now, it is i m p e r a t i v e  to n o t e  that w h e n  the s e l f  is c o n ­
s t i t u t e d ,  it is as a t o t a l i t y ,  a unit y ,  a w h o l e  b e i n c :  the s e l f  
"as such." It f o l l o w s ,  then, that the o v e r - l e a p  a l w a y s  h a p p e n s  
in w h o l e n e s s ,  an d  n o t  just o c c a s i o n a l l y ,  but all of the time.'-
A l s o  to be n o t e d  is that the D a s e i n  is not t h a t  w h e r e u p o n  
the leap s u c c e e d s ;  it is not the "self" that is e n c o u n t e r e d  in 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n  of the self.-'* The self tha t  is e n c o u n t e r e d ,  
as w e l l  as ''11 o t h e r  " ob jec t s " w h i c h  " d i f f e r "  f r o m  it, is "otr: ’ 
t h a n  the D a s e i n  whi c h , in t r a n s c e n d e n c e ,  leaps over to.,, t he s 
t e r m i n a e .  T h e  " s elf" is " o b j e c t i f i e d "  to an e x t e n t  no less than 
o t h e r  " o b j e c t s . "
T h i r d l y ,  it is e s s e n t i a l  that the e x i s t e n c e  of that a; hi ch 
is e n c o u n t e r e d  in t r a n s c e n d e n c e  be u n d e r s t o o d  as p r e c e d i n g  thr 
leap.*'--'’ T h a t  is, n o t h i n g  c a n  be met in the leap w h i c h  is r;ot 
a l r e a d y  " t h e r e , "  i.e., m a n i f e s t ,  or, m o r e  p r e c i s e l y ,  is c. i 1- 
a b l e  to the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  i n e v i t a b l y  o c c u r s  in t r a n s c e n ­
d e n c e  .
If t h e s e  p o i n t s  a r e  c l e a r ,  then the q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s  as to 
the n a t u r e  of the " t e r m i n u s "  w h e r e u p o n  the D a s e i n  t r a n s c e n d s .
A l l  of the b e i n g s  o v e r - l e a p e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  the " s e l f , "  are triem- 
s e l v e s  u n i t i e s ;  but, is t h e r e  a s i n g l e  t e r m i n u s  w h i c h  will 
ga t h e r  up all i n d i v i d u a l  u n i t i e s  into one? H e i d e g g e r  m a i n t a i n s  
that this s i n g l e  t e r m i n u s  is the "v/orld," t h a t  t r a n s c e n d e n c e  is 
best c h a r a c t e r i z e d  as " b e i n c. - i n - 1 he -v/o r 1 d " ( I n - d e r - W e l t - s e i n ) , 
r nd that this t e r m  is t h e r e f o r e  a " transcend.-n ta 1 . he inten
23 * P • 1 9. w'l . p . 19. 25 • P * 19. 2b, p. 1
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by " t r a n s c e n d e n t s  1 " - as Kan.t did - that an e s s e n t i a l l y  '’c r i t i c a l "  
o r i e n t a t i o n  be u n d e r s t o o d ,  one t h a t  t r a n s c e n d s  the r e l a t i v i t i e s  
of h i s t o r y ,  one t hat is " o p e n "  to the v e r y  last, i.e., is n e v e r  
ever -fully d e t e r m i n e d  "as s u c h . "  It is t h e r e f o r e  oriente;' t owa r - 
" p o s s i b i l i t i e s "  as w e l l  as to " f a c t s . "  " B e i n c - i n - t h e - v o r 1d" is 
i n t e n d e d  to be l a r g e r - t h a n - l i f e ,  to o v e r - l e a p  all exp'»rience.
In c o n s e q u e n c e  of the " d i f f e r e n c e , "  then, t ra n s c e n d e n c e  as be .i nr - 
i n - t h e - w o r  1 d e n a b l e s  t he D a s e i n  to iiave o n t i c  hnowl edge , i . ,
k n o w l e d g e  of w h a t  is not t r a n s c e n d e n t ,  k n o w l e d g e  cf "v/ii^t" is 
t r a n s c e n d e d .
W h e n  " b ^ i n g - i n - t h e - w o r 1d" is c o n s t r u e d  as the m e a n i n g  of 
t r a n s c e n d e n c e ,  D a s e i n  is a l w a y s  implied. But w h e n  the o b j e c t i ­
fied D a s e i n  is u n d e r s t o o d  her e  - as one v ho t a k e s  refuce, ^ 
speak, w i t h  all the b e i n g s  w h i c h  c o n s t i t u t e  the t o t a l i t y  o'~ : -
ings, i.e., the o n t i c  w o r l d  - t h e n  this o b j e c t i f i e d  D a s e i n  is 
m e r e l y  a b e i n g  a m o n g  b e i n c s  a n d  not " t r a n s c e n d e n c e . "  A s  "cnc 
a m o n g  m a n y , "  the D a s e i n  m a y  or m a y  not e x i s t  "as s u c h , "  .i.e., il 
is m o r t a l ,  f i n i t e ,  c a n  d ie and no longer be " a m o n g s t "  the beings. 
S t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g ,  this " o b j e c t i f i e d "  D a s e i n  is n o t  D a s e i n .
W h e n  r i g h t l y  u n d e r s t o o d ,  D a s e i n  i_s^  t r a n s c e n d e n c e ;  it t r a n s c e n d s  
e v e n  this o b j e c t i f i e d  " s e l f . " 2 8  As  t r a n s c e n d e n c e ,  D a s e i n  is r_i_- 
wa vs e x i s t i n g  p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  it a b i d e s  in the r e a l m  of p o s s  i -
27. p. 19.
28. In his later w r i t i n g s ,  H e i d e g g e r  c l e a r s  up this a m b i g u i t y
by d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  b e t w e e n  the t r a n s c e n d i n g ,  e x i s t i n g  D a s e i r  
and that o n t i c a l  ’)asein w h i c h  m a y  or may n ot be " a l i v e "  h" 
d es ionat i n c t h e f o r m e r  as D a -sein. T h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  -ill a l ­
ready hav e  I- a k c n p l a c e  ty the t i aie the rev i sed lectur.-, ,
e s s e n c e  of T r u t h . "  is pu!>iish.ed in 19''  ^ ( s e C h a p  1 2 r VI h -
1 ow) . spi te tin ^  ar hi u i ty , we f o 2 i He i d e g ccr ' ■' :
in t h text ? 'j i is c e x p o u n  d e d .
b i l U y  as a " t r antscendem a 1 . ' In conséquence, the concept of Oasein 
is both ontological and ontical. when so conceived, be 1ng- in-the- 
world, as inferiny this trcnscendenta 1 Dasein, is likewise transcen­
dental, i.e., ontological. Hence, "world" is to be understood onto- 
logically.^^ But what doesj this nean?
At this point Heidegger presents a brief history of the word 
"wOrld" in order to show how, with the pre-Socratic philosophers at 
least, the term Kocrpos had what he considers to be an "ontological" 
character. That is, if gathered within its compass more than the mere 
totality of ontical beings of which these Greeks were aware. He begins 
with Parmenides, and moves very quickly to Heraclei t u s . When he comes 
to the New Testament writers, however, he finds an appreciable change 
in its meaning. He continues to trace its meaning down through the 
years, touching on the early church fathers, Augustine, the medieval 
scholastics, Aquinas, the "school" metaphysicians, and finally Kant 
who he sees as wresting frofn it something of its original "transcen- 
jdental," i.e., ontological, character.
A glimpse at this history of the word "world" may be useful.
/i th Parmenides, KQ(T|j o< referred to the way the beings were related, 
i.e., in t o t a l i t y . Y e t ,  it was not the sum of them, but a more 
libomprehensive idea altogether, one that extended beyond the then known 
actual world. Hence, it was somewhat "ontological." The same can 
le said of HeracIe i t u s ' use of the term. But usage had yet to fix a 
definite meaning for "world." • When Christianity got hold of the 
\ term, a definite interpretation finally adhered. It came in Paul 
and John to mean not a cosmic condition, but rather the attitude of
29. D. 20f. 
33. p. 22.
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m e n Those who l o ve  m e  w o r l d  coonot a l s o  l ove  God.  " Kc^MOS odTos
intends the nur^an Dc-sein in a definite 'historical' existence in 
contradistinction to another w^ich is already dawning {**■ iwv o u€AAtov ) ^
As an "anthropological" conception, tsocyos came to nean the antithesis
 ^*of Jesus, the Son of God, who for his part functioned as life wf^') , 
truth »pC ), and light (^ w s ) .
This biblical interpretation of "world" is unmistakable in 
Augustine and Aquinas. Augustine occasionally intends the whole 
"created" universe, but at other times, the inhabitants of the 
w o r l d . A n d  to this latter interpretation adhered "the specifici \ 3). D. 23 32. o. 23. 13. n. 23f.
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e x i s t e n t i e l  1 s e n s e  of û i l e c t u r e s  luund i , i m p i i , c a r n p l e s . "- ’
In conse quence, the history of v e s t e r n  thought (g n e n u 1r n u i r c h e 
GeIs te sqeshc i c h t e ) vps effected by this biblical construct. Irv 
d e e d , Aquinas, c o n t i n u i n g  this distinction, introduced le m e  
uh i c h  are still current: "secular" and " sr^  c r e c " ( spirituales ) .
The " s c h o o  1 " rre ta phy s i c i n s  , e.g.. Be uinga r ten a nd C rus ; .
i d e n t i f i e d  " w o r 1d " w i t h  the t o t a l i t y  of " c r e a t e d  b e i n c s , "  tut 
^ a d e  this t o t a l i t y  c o n t i n g e n t  u p o n  " t h.- u n d e r ^ t ^ n d i n r  u : : fu
e s s e n c e  and p o s s i b i l i t y  of the p r o o f  of G o d ." T h a t  i' . t 
S'or Id w a s  set over a g a i n s t  God h i m s e l ^ .  •' '/hen the " c r c" t i or " 
is thus t a k e n  to be n e c e s s a r y , then it is to be e x p e c t e d  that 
tne " ’d o c t r i n e  of w o r l d ’ in the w h o l e  of s u b s e q u e n t  metapuvslL^' 
is s u b o r d i n a t e d  in b o t h  o n t o l o g y  (the doctru't-; of the esse n c r 
a nd the m o s t  n n i v e r s a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  of thirr'r in r o n e r a 1 ' on 
’t h e o r e t i c a l  N a t u r a l  T h e o l o g y . ’” '^
■ÜV e r a ga i n s t t h i s t r adt i on , K ant a t t e m p t e d  t o "la v t
r ou nda t i o n ," i.e., to " g r o u n d " the w h o  1u o f me ta physic- in h i '
C r i t i q u e . H is a p p r o a c h  t u r n e d  on the p r e m i s e  tna t . ..
" ... the f i n i t u d e  of the things at hand is n o t  to be ■: ter- 
m i n e d  on t ne b a s i s  of an o n t i c a l  p r o o f  of t h e i r  cr e a t i r r  hv 
G o d ,  but is r a t h e r  to be e x p l i c a t e d  f r o m  the p o i n t  of v i , w  
that they m u s t  f i r s t  of all be g i v e n  as a l r e a d y  presec.t if 
they are to be c o n s i d e r e d  as p o s s i b l e  o b j e c t s  of fi ni t ( o - 
n i t i o n . " 3 b
T h a t  w h i c h  f i n i t e  c o g n i t i o n  i n t u i t s  is te I'med " a p p e a r a n c e "  i r. 
c o n t r a s t  to the n o n - r e l a t i v e ,  i.e., a b s o l u t e ,  " t h i n c - i n - i t s e 1•: 
the o b j e c t  of a b s o l u t e  i n t u i t i o n .  The u n i t y  of the i n t e r - r e l ^ -  
ted " a p p e a r a n c e s , "  i.e., the o n t i c a l  "^-orld," is jet-'rr.'n c
. . . «C f . P * 23 * 3 -O • p . ^ «
p . "7.
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m e a n s  of s y n t h e t i c  c o g n i t i o n  a p r i o r i . A nd this lett e r  is m a d e  
p o s s i b l e  as we have seen, by tne i n t u i t i o n  of "time.''-'' In 
c o n s e q u e n c e ,  we find a b l e n d i n g ,  if y o u  w i l l ,  of the o n t i c  and 
o n t o l o g i c a l  in the c o n c e p t  "’w o r l d . "  F r, r , t h o u g h  its "ir-s'-^ C' " : 
that of " t o t a l i t y "  or " c o m p l e t i o n , "  an " o n t o l o g i c a l "  c o n c e p t i w  
w h i c h  a l w a y s  e x c e e d s  our best e f f o r t s  \o r e a l i z e  p r a c t i c - l l v ,  
its " c o n t e n t "  c a n n o t  fail to i n c l u d e  all s u c h  o n t l c a l l y  p T ce i ve 
b e i n c s  as v/e a w ont to d e t e r m i n e  by m e a n s  o ^ f i n i t e  intuitic: . 
The t e r m  " w o r l d , "  then., is s v n u n y m o u s  v-ith '-hat H e i d e g g e -  e a r ­
lier' t e rmed the " o n t o l o g i e s  I d i f f e r e n c e , "  but is at once m ore 
c o n c r e t e  and t h e r e f o r e  m o r e  L r a n s c e n d e n ta 1 ; h e n c e ,  m o r e  a p p r o p ­
ria te. He s u m m a r i z e s  the m a t t e r  in this wav :
"The c o n c e p t  " w o r l d "  is ... a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  ( o n t o l o g i c a l )  
a g g r e g a t e  ( Inbec r i f f ) of t h i n g s  as a p p e a r a n c e s .  In it ... 
is r e p r e s e n t e d  a s u b o r d i n a t i o n  of the c o n d i t i o n e d  '‘units' 
the s y n i n e s  is 'in an o r d e r  a s c e n d i n g ’ to the u n c o n e i t i o r m  1.
It ... is an Idea, i.e., it. is defin.ed as  ^ p ure, sy n : ne t i c 
c o n c e p t  of r e a s o n  in d i s t i n c t i o n  f r o m  the c o n c e p t s  of the c . - 
u e r s t a n d i n g ."b 0
In o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a s idea, the c o n c e p t  r e p r e s e n t s  .^n uncor. i i t i on- 
t o t a l i t y ,  but it d o e s  not do so in the s e n s e  of a n  h y p o t h e t i c ^  
" a b s o l u t e "  b e c a u s e  the t o t a l i t y  it r e p r e s e n t s  is that o*‘ ’’a p ­
p e a r a n c e s , "  i.e., the p o s s i b l e  o b j e c t s  of a f i n i t e  i n t u i t i o n .
"A o r 1d , as idea, is t r a n s c e n d e n t ;  it o v e r - l e a p s  a p p e a r a n c e s  in 
s u c h  a w a y  that it r e f e r s  b a c k  to t h e m  p r e c i s e l y  as their i o ­
ta 1 i t y . ^
When " w o r l d "  is c o n c e i v e d  in tnese terms, it then b e c ome^  
a p p a r e n t  that " w o r l d  b e l o n g s  to a re 1? t i ons hip ( 3e z u c ha f t ' 
w h i c h  c l r r a c t e r i z e s  tfic s t r u c t u r e  of Ta sein a? sue'' a, n .] .i
y. p. 27. jo. p. 3 0 . hi. p. g, 1.
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b e  i ng - i n-t h e - w o r  1 d . "^ *-2 But n ow H e i d e g g e r  w i s h e s  to det.-rmine 
this w o r l d  p h e n o m e n o n  m o r e  " c o n c r e t e l y , "  and he does sc by t a k ­
ing up the n o t i o n  of " t o t a l i t y "  w h i c h  so c h a r a c t e r i z e s  it.
As a t o t a l i t y ,  the w o r l d  c a n n o t  be said to "be" a n y t h i n g  
ontic, but n e v e r t h e l e s s  is that " f r o m  w h i c h  the Da se in d e r i v e  
me a nine ( s i c h zu b e d e u  ten p. i b t ) a n d  t^ o w h i c h  b e i n c s  can be m e a n ­
i n g f u l l y  r e l a t e d . "  T h a t  is, in this e n c o u n t e r  (a u f - e s - z u k o m m e n  
w i t h  t o t a l i t y ,  "the C a s e i n  t e m p o r a l i z e ^  (z e i t i g t ) itself ' a 
s e l f , i.e., as a b e i n g  w h i c h  is s u g g e s t e d  (a n h e I m g e  ce ben ' ^  _
b e . In the B e i n g  of this b e i n g  there i s its ow n a p i 1 i t y i o b e 
(peht e s urn d e s s e n  Se i n k o n n e n ) . " T h a t  is, the C a s e i n  " ex i s ts 
for the s ake of e x i s t e n c e  ( e s umwi lien s e i n e r  e x i s t i e r t ) ,
W h e n  put in t e rms of " e x i s t e n c e  for its own s a k e . "  the - 
sein is p r o t e c t e d  fro m  the a c c u s a t i o n  that it is e s s e n t i a l l y  
" e g o t i s t i c a l . "  On the c o n t r a r y ,  it is " o n t o l o g i c a l "  in the sen' 
that it leaves u n d e c i d e d  w h e t h e r  a p a r t i c u l a r  C a s e i n  is f a c t u ­
a l l y  e i t h e r  e g o t i s t i c  or a l t r u i s t i c .  T h i s  f o r m u l a  i ^  o n t i c a l l v
" n e u t r a  1. ''hh
The key t e r m  "u m w i 11 e n " is d e s c r i p t i v e  of the fundamental 
b e h a v i o r  of the C a s e i n .  It is r e m i n i s c e n t  of the " a t t i t u d e  o'" 
o p e n n e s s  t o w a r d s . . . "  w h i c h  w as p i v o t a l  in the " K a n t b o o k , "  and 
r e p r e s e n t s  the " p r o j e c t i o n "  by the C a s e i n  of all possibilities 
r e l a t i v e  to i t s e l f  and the o t h e r  b e i n g s  in the m i d s t  of w h i c h
it f i nds i t s e l f  (b e f i n d l i c h l . As such, the u m w  illen is tee
... • . i . p .  ^c *  ^y .
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totality of possibilities which, for its own sake a % existence, 
the Da se in brings before itself, i.e., before the "self" which 
is found in this very project i o n . ^9 Insofar, then as the "se 1 
and the other beincs are discovered only after the projection 
has been instituted, this "for-the-sake-of..." has no concrete 
object for the sake of which the projection is made - net ever 
the "self." Hence, the "ontological" character of the uiw. i 1 1 en . 
and the need to discern that the object of this "will— )c t'' is 
not an ontical being as such, but the "world" as a " t ra rw: cenc. n *
Since the uiiiwillen exceeds all concrete possibilities, it 
is an Uberwur f, an all-encompassing, all enclosing mantle whic 
catners up within it all possible concrete phenomena , bofn xno^.n 
and yet to be discovered. Piuch as an overcast sky blanket; th 
earth and all it contains includinc its secrets, the umwi I 1 :n 
exceeds the ontic to the extent that t he une enditioneo evcaed- 
the conditioned.
The umvfillen, then, is a world-projecting, world-consti­
tuting, world-founding, wor1o-imag ing act of the Dasein vnlch 
makes possible the "historical" existence of both the objecti­
fied "self" and all the objectified beincs within the world in 
the midst of which the self is found. The concrete world "hap­
pens," i.e., the ontic beincs are given the opportunity (üelecen 
he i t ) to "enter" the world (l\ el te i nca nc. ) in consequence of this 
primordial, pre-ontic and therefore emp ty "f or-the-sake-o,*'. . . " 
will-act which amounts to a n u neon sc 1 ou " holdinc o!' 11
d'. p. 3 6.
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opposition As we shall see, the umw illen is the act
ot founding or grounding the world as it is ontically consti­
tuted (including the "self"). It is an act of freedom, i.e., 
transcendence, which makes all that is ontic possible both nov , 
in the past, and in the future. In a word, the umwillen is a 
projection of the realm into which can enter all that can 
it is the VJe 1 tentwurf - the projection of an all-encompassing 
world. As the act of the transcendent Dasein, it cons t i to 
the domain of transcendence itself, the dor.ain which c r ocn ' 
or founds all that can possibly "be."3'
3 . The essence of Ground
Discussion of the "principle of ground" led to the "p roh - 
lem of ground" and this latter to the realm of transcendence.
It remains only to illuminate the essence of ground vu’thin thi• 
realm. "To wlia t extent does the inner possibility for somethin 
like the essence of ground in general lie in transcendence?"^' 
"Existence for its own sake," when manifest in Dasein, issues 
in care for the world, i.e., in care for the consequences of 
the umw illen. These consequences of the will-act, however, can 
not in any way characterize the umwi11 en itself. Heidegger 
maintains that the umw illen has its roots in freedom: "The over 
leap to the world is freedom itself. "'^ 9 That is, freedom man­
ifests itself in the umwi lien of the transcendent Daseir.. Ther 
it holds itself in opposition to... (sichontcecenhaIten' and 
thereby makes possible the ontical discoveries of the sel" an
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the things, in the world. Hence, "freedom alone is responsible 
for a world as such when it lets it come to be for the Ossein 
( Pro iheit g- lie in kann dem Dasein e i ne W e 11 wa Iten und we Iten 
1 a s s e n ) . ” h tq dramatize this, Heidegger uses the noun "world" 
as a verb, and says, "The world never is except it is worlded 
(sondern we 1 tet ) ," a quaint expressen, but one which drives nc • 
the point that primordial freedom bears full responsibility for 
finite Dasein and "his" world,. Only insofar as freedom ma k e s 
the transcendent Dasein itself possible by manifesting itself 
as this primordial umwi11en is it possible for the Dasein to 
find an historical self in the midst of an historical world.
Now, it is essential to put aside any notions of "sponten- 
eity," and "first causes" when thinking of freedom. Freedom 
is indifferent to "beginnings" and "that which happens" (Gcsch- - 
hen).9 -
"The selfhood of the self cannot be grounded in sponteneity 
because this latter is itself already grounded. Rather, the 
selfhood of the self lies in transcendence. The proiectinc, 
over-casting, 1etting-come-to-be-as-it-pleases (entwer^end- 
iibe rwe r fende W a 11 e n 1 a s s e n ) of the world is freedom. ... ’free­
dom as transcendence is not Just a particular ’kind’ of 
ground; it is the origin of ground in general. Freedom is 
freedom to qround."H2
Thus does Heidercer come to speak of the "pr irriord ia 1 relation 
of freedom to ground." He calls this relation "grounding" (Qru: 
den), and says that it is "s trewn" in three ways: 1. as "insti­
tuting" (Stiffen) , where there is the sense of "giving," as b\/ 
a "donor"; 2 . as "ga ining-ground" (Boden-nehmen), where there r 
the sense of "receivinc"; and 3 , as "establishing" ( Be c r- n d c-r .
'• 0 . b 1 . r). ho . Sc:
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in which there is the sense of " conf i rmi nc" or "sealing."--'
The first of these is "none other than the projection of 
possibilities in the umwi11 en." But t r. i s f rec act of lettinc 
the world come to be as it pleases for its own sake is an "open' 
stance in opposition to.... As such, it is incomplete. In 
freedom, there is, however, Doth  ^ giving and taking.- The
attitude of open receptivity is neither open to..., nor "recep- 
tive" until something is "there" to be received. Therefore, 
the balancing counter-part of this first mode of grounding is 
the second, or "gaining-ground." Heidegger maintains that thr 
initial act of projecting is always excessive (uberschwinot); ' 
it is open to a 11 possibilities. But only some of them can be 
realized. Hence, there is a withdrawal (dntzus ) of some.b"'
With this withdrawal - and only then - the "self" and the. oth- r 
beincs can become manifest as the beings they "are” - or "ap­
pear" to be.
Although it would seem i.hat these two modes of founding 
are sufficient to ground ontic knowledge, they constitute only 
the "possibility" of grounding, and therefore the possibility 
of ontic truth. As a unified, single action of mutual reci­
procity, these are "enabled" by another "relation," namely, 
"establishing.
Heidegger explains this third relation by means of the 
question Why? The first relation, "instituting," has the ontic 
significance of W as-sein (essence). When hhy? i n ter I'oca tes fro:
ihS
the orientation of this first mode, there is presupposed the 
"ontological difference." In consequence, a question somethinc 
like this evolves: Why this essence and not a n o t h e r T h e  
second mode, "caining-ground," when asking Why? (because it 
represents Da ss-sein or W ie-sein, i.e., existence) yieldr t.i-'i'^ 
question: Why this existence and not another 7^9 Again the on­
tological difference is presupposed.
Both of these fundamenta 1 questions prosuppose ontic t n W r  
i.e., the presence of already existing beings as fullv manifest 
and fully known. As the difference between Being and beincs, 
the ontological difference is the most original, however, in 
the ultimate "Why?" which Heidegger f orrm: la tes as "IV hy in cen- 
era 1 is there something instead of nothing at all?"'’’ Only whe' 
the answer to this latter question has already been riven in 
the form of "primal first to last answers to ^11 questions" 
an ontic nature can one possibly raise anv ontic question at 
all. That is, the raising of an ontic question assumes that it 
can be answered sooner or later. Furthermore, no ultimate bar­
riers are anticipated in this quest. All questions "fromi ""irst. 
to last" are fair game. But all such questions, says Hei degce r 
assume to know already the answer to the ultimate Why?. For 
this reason, the third relation in grounding, rooted in the on­
tological difference as the answer to the ultimate question 
Why? empowers or enables the other two, and therefore stands 
as their u 11 i ma t e ha r. i s . ^  ^ Yet, it cannc t he raid to be u r I o r 
to t hem iu the sense tîvit they are unessential. ".--.stab] is .irr,"
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is truly establishing only when it has somethi no to establish, 
e.g., the ontical beings which constitute the worId. Thercfcre, 
these three modes of grounding are all required simultaneously, 
as it were, before the umwi1 len’s projection cf the world can 
receive any form whatsoever.'-^' Ontic truth presupposes onto­
logical truth, and vice versa; and these tv/o truths are given 
in transcendence which is freedom. Together they const it/te 
the poles of the fundamentai relation wnich is termed the out - 
logical (iifference. And the knowledge of this difference ccr'- 
stitutes ontological truth, or the truth of Being.' - H;o.ce. 
the necessary "proof" that grounds ontic truth.
Thus do we see that when anything is "grounded," it is: 1,
projected in terms ol' possibility; 2 . reduced to reality {Bod en 
and 3 . proven;'^'" all three modes together constituting th - .oc­
currence (Ge sc he hen) of transcendence: the threefold way ‘*re - 
dom brings to ground all that is. Yet, it i.'iust be remembered 
that these three modes of "s trewn" grounds are but the s rve c  ! 
aspects of one relation, namely, that of freedom to ground.
There is hut one grounding process, so to speak; it com.os to 
expression in the Dasein’s Being as "ca.rc" (Soroc ) : care for 
durability (Bes tan cl i eke i t ) and stability ( Be s ta ndes ) . Yet, can 
is only possible as temporality.^5
Now, here v;e find the second^^ mention of an "intentional 
withdrawal from the realm of the problem of temporality.'"-^ But
62. p. h_bf. 03. p. Igb* 6q . p. )i6. 63. p . n?.
•06. In a fn. on. p. b 2, Heidecccr says that the "temporal irGc'- 
p re ta t i or of transcendence" is purooselv avoided in t i  :87. p. a?.
lU.
this time there is the promise of an explanation in terms of
what has been won In this analysis for the "problem of the 'prir
ciple of G r o u n d . ’" The principle asserts that every being
has its Çround. But it is precisely...
"...because Being ’natively’ (von Ha use aus) and cricinallv 
grounds as the understanding of priority T a" 1 s vorcanc 1 s. ver- 
s ta ndenes) that every being in its own way announces ’g r out ’ 
and thereby makc's possible its being measured and constitu­
ted as such. That is, because ’ or ou no ’ is a t ra nsc-. n ,i on • a 
essence of Be i nc i n ce ne rti 1 , the principle of g round ’.'elds 
for be i nn s . But because there is only Beinc (not be in s) i 
transcv ndcnce (when cast in terms of ’-’or 1 d-p ro j e c t i nc , s^I:- 
disclosing Grounding), ground belongs to the essence  ^ Be in
Thus we see that the "origin" (Gebu rtsor L ) of tliis urinciple 
lies neither in the essence of propositions, nor in tlmt of 
prepositional truth, but in ontological truth, i.e., in tran­
scendence itself. "Freedom is the oricin of the principle of 
around.
Now, every attempt to "prove” somethin:: "must move in a 
circle of possibility" because it is n intentional relation 
to beings" and therefore already subject to a grounding nrocesf 
of some sort, whether ontic or ontological. If it moves in 
this circle, then there is always a "realm of open possibility'' 
(Ausschlac:bere iche von Mon lichen) which finds expression i n th-" 
argument in such terms as "prior to," or "on the basis of," etc. 
Hence, there is a movement in the direction of an ultimate pri­
ority: the idea of Being in general. Even the traditionally 
grounding principles of "Identity" and "contradiction" are nec­
essarily rooted in a primordiality mor* hr - ic that "propo^11ion- 
:i 1 character," nar-.clv, "the event of t ra n r CK ride nee as sue
Oil. p. J7. j9. p. p 7. 70. p. he. 71. p.
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which is " t e m p o r a l i t y . "72 This is to ssv that "priority" is
the basis of "locical" proof, and that "priority" as such is 
temporal. That which transcends beincs, then, is temporality, 
i.e., Being, Nothing, Nothingness.^"
The principle of ground, if truly "basic," is rooted in 
temporality and must ultimately expose its own dis-essenct (U?i 
wesen ) in temporality, i.e., in that whicti is "prior” to the 
beings which are brought to around by the principle. Heidcrc< 
contends that "ground has its dis-essence because it arisor in 
freedom,"''^! and we assum.e that freedom, then, is also to b*-’
identified in some way with temporality. And so it is.
"Freedom as the unity of the transcendental strevinc of 
grounds is the non-ground (Ab-grund ) of Da s c i n , " b t
Dasein squarely in the midst of possibilities which open up t'
its finite choice, and enables it to have such a thing as "dec
tiny." Destiny has its "destination" in tlie "distance," that 
is, in the future. But this future must not be of the sort 
that ever actually, i.e., historically, becomes realized. 
"Progress" and "history" are indications of the fact that the 
Dasein is destined, but its destination cannot be achieved in 
history, i.e., "in time," else it is no longer transcendent, 
i.e., free, future. "The dis-essence of ground thus becomes 
in factical existence ’progress’ (uberv’unden) , but is never 
done away with."''^
72. p. ^9. 71. u. qb. 7d. u. b9. 73. p. 39.
76. p. 30.
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"And thus is man as existing transcendence over-extcn :cd 
( ubersc hw ingend ) in possibilities, a_n essence of c i stance ( qe_
an instance of the future which never temporal izcs it­
self "as such" and becomes "history." V.e see here at the erid . 
then, what became so very evident in the "Kantbook," that lim^ 
is the criterion which ultimately enables objectification + ; 
have the assurance of truth. But this, essay, despite its ex­
press intention to avoid a "temporal intorpretation" of tran­
scendence, makes even more explicit the priority of this "t-'-- 
pora1" criterion.
L; . Comment
W e shied a va y f r or mu c h discussi o n a t t h e cl o s e r- f x r 
lengthy study o f Heidegger ’s i n t e r p r c t a t i on o f Ka n t ’ ^  y_r_ : ' i i: 
until such time as we would have more r ea s r,n to comment. ■ .v 
we believe the time has come.
One of the first things that occurs to us is the atrik.in 
parallel between the three modes of grounding and the three 
modes of temporalizing in the "Kantbook." "Apprehension" c* 
tlie now in t he t emp ora 1 i za t i on of the "present" correspond^ *■ n 
this essay, does it not?, to the first mode of grounding, nan.el 
"instituting." And this first mode enjoys a "mutual reciprocil 
with its ontic correlate, "gaining-qround," which seems to us, 
in its "withdrawal," to be analonous to "reproduction’s" -
r*o 1 1 ec t i on. " But. the mes t incisive parallel appears ! e en
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these two intcr-related, mutually dependent, and s imu 1 tar.e ous 
actions and the third which in each case is more basic than 
the other two - though necessarily simultaneous - in that it 
"enables" or "emp owners" the others. And i n each case, this 
third mode is "future."
We are not intent upon "establ ishing, " i.e., "proviix , " 
that this suggested correlation is in fact jgustified. V c sim­
ply observe that there appears to be a pa railr1, and comment 
tnat one ought to appear if the conclusions of each work ' re 
worthy of their intent. For, each attempts to "lay" the "four- 
dation" or "ground" which is without prior. That each end'- in 
positing the future to be that which is without prior is Lneri- 
fore to be expected.
Yet, wc find in this essay a development '-'hich dio not an-* 
pear in the "kantbook.” We sense a decided difference beiveen 
the ontic Dasein and its ontological countcr-part.^^ ontic
finite, and therefore "mortal" Dasein may or may not exi^t 
such." Whereas, the transcendent Dasein is aIwavs existing JJj 
it is transcendent, i.e., free, future. When, ihen, Hei;i'cgcr 
says that "transcendence is the fundamental disposition cf hunn: 
D a s e i n , t h a t  the over-leap a 1ways happens in wholeness (^hic, 
immediately calls to mind "the horizon of all possible unity") 
and not just occasionally, but a 11 of the time, that Dasein 
i s transcendence to the extent that freedom manifest^ i t s e l f  i r 
the umwi lien, which action : r, nrior to the ontical " se 1 ^  " v hi cf.
'C. Sec a bov - . p. I36, ^n. 3''. 79. p. 17. 6').
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is thereby discovered,^'! and finallv, that Dasein is "an es­
sence of distance,"^''- i.e., future time - when he says these 
things,then, surely he is positing something like "life" in 
general, or, that condition which aIways characterizes the 
"existing" imsein. If this is so, then his later formulation". 
Da-sein and ex-sistenca, constitute a ^rsphic exposition of the 
relation between the ontic and ontological (the ontologie: i ci*' 
<erence), a relation which is rooted in a temporal dialectic 
'/'hich "occurs" in existing Dasein as the tension between his­
tory, say, and the always-^uture. a tension wl\ich continually 
"vi brates"^-^ so that "moods" are the fundam.enta 1 cha ra c tor s t : 
of existence, their basic "state" beinc "care.
h'hen, then. Being as the essential or ontical expression 
of t i me (as past, present, and future) is disclosed to ha v e i ^ 
"dis-essence" in Nothing, wc have again a temporal tension, 
this time it is between time and eternity, where this latter 
is defined as the ever-future Future. For, it is this "always- 
future" wfii cli alone a 1 wa y s abides as tlic Nothing from which  ^% ] 
that comes to be comes into Being, yet docs not constitute hr,- 
ing, because this concept itself is the one-word formula for 
the ontological difference in that it reflects both essence a:.’ 
dis-essence. Because of this dialectical character. Being can 
never be said to be "as such," yet is the "ground" of all that 
"is."
1. p. 3-0f. o2. p. pO.3 . A tcr:% r ' ; c c e r uses when analysing the "key moo:"
fee be lew, fhapter V.
. . In a d '3 it ion to Chanter V below, see Be ins and Tin.-’.
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If such thought is consistent vith wlia t Heidegger is say­
ing, and we isaintain that it is, then it is ti;ae that is the 
critical criterion which enables differentiation of every sort. 
That is, ii is the "intuition" of time; it is the coming of 
time t_o man and i_n man that "enables" him to "be" what he "'‘s." 
Time, then, is the "wholly other" that remains "other" v;hl1e 
a t the same t ime coming to meet man where he is, and uni tire 
with him in the vital relation which yields knowledge o^ it" 
existence as both "other" and "here and now."
Theologians have (as poets, to Heidegger’s r.ind) tri^-; t 
"narre" the "holy," but have always ended in '«scribing to God 
"essence" and "existence," and have attested to His "action" : 
"history." That is, they have, as Heidegger has, been forced, 
as it were, to confine their "naming" to a "being" who is "the" 
being (much as Being is to beings). But over against ail "es­
sence," there is always the "difference" which grounds it, 
narre ly, - and for lack of a better term - "die -ess e nee " (or, 
what is fundamentally "other" than "essence"),
va se in’s temporality is temporary. Yet, he senses a tem­
porality which is eternal. But because that which is always 
future to every generation of men, including the first, is v;ha t. 
is common to every generation, this dimension of "phenomenal" 
time has become that upon which all else is based. The ?ver- 
futurc is transcendent and transcendence itself. But its re­
lation to the critical future - which docs com^ - is as primoa- 
: a 1 source, . , cround or basis. They are one, yet ' ■ '
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difference, say, as the Father or God-head is said to differ 
from the Ton. To be sure, if the Son ha d not come, ve would 
have no knowledge of the Father - hicncr , Chr i s tocent r i c theol- 
ocy. And only because the Son came, do we have history, aesthc', 
etc,. The tension, then, is between two futures. The Holy 
Spirit, given to all men by rrace, makes them "sons" too, one 
enables ".fellowship" with Christ who abides in the bosom of f ■ 
Father. /\ 11 me n , too, are the scene, so to speak, of t h e "in­
carnation" (by grace and/or adoption) and anticipate th<' "’“csu"- 
rection" which marks the return of the "visitor" from eternit' 
to eterni tv.
The past, then, as a dimension of time, is robbed of pri­
macy because it is the burial cround, :o to sneak, of "present" 
time, which latter is the meeting of the ever-future witi'i t ' 
ontic future now come. So long as this meeting endures, "li'''"' 
endures. The problem is death, i.e., historv. If for one mo­
ment history becomes the focus of worth-ship, i.e., the ulti­
mate value, then the meeting, i.e., the ”incarnation," is "cru­
cified." But such an "end" does not bring to end the meeting 
because of the unity that pervades futurity. This "present" fu­
ture is one with the ever-future despite the difference. Hcnc>’, 
the former’s "return." Faith consists of this first "tension": 
the one between futures. Doubt, on the other hand, is the ten- 
sion between the ontic future and the past, and is characterise^ 
by the granting of ultimate worth (worship) to history. It con­
sists in failing to "sec" that it is futurit.y and not bis tor'-
lb'll
that is prior, i.e., of ultimate worth, in "life." If faith 
is maintained to the last, even should the last moment be on 
a cross, then history is never the victor, whatever historians 
may say to the contrary.
The "stumbling block" to faith is that history must be ac­
corded value as the testimony, as it were, th(' testament, whicn 
bears witness to the "meeting," For, without confrontinc the 
past (as historv), a man cannot know what is "other” to it.
The past, then, is the focus of man’s attention as "historian" 
in order that he may bring it to end, and thereby assign it i rv: 
proper place as ultimately "different" from, or "other" than, 
that which has prior value. Man "writes history, and therefore 
is "on top" of it, so to speak; whereas, he is at the mere;, of 
the future. As "historian," he enjoys a view of the past whic:. 
is always "eschatologies 1" to it, at its "end." This orienta­
tion is what enables him to be an historian, and to fix the par. i 
"once and for all" - almost out of desparat.ion because he can 
never "fix" the future.
Hence, man is pre-occupied with history, but only that he 
may find there what is not history, i.e., himself and his God. 
i.e., the meeting of the futui'e-nov/-come with the ever-fuLure. 
Dasein, as Heidegger rightly sees, Dasein only when he is 
the essence of distance, i.e., destined.
The criterion, then, for the assessment of history is a f- 
. j'' "O' man in "life" when this latter i " seen to b " th­
ing place’’ the ^'uture v/it.h th^  ^ "/er-fu tu re ( 1- > ' -
15-
I\i i c h t s ) . T h e s e  l a t t e r  b e c a u s e  they a rc "one" - y e t  v i t h  ' 
d i f f e r e n c e  - c o n s t i t u t e  the t e n s i o n  or aribiguity in S e i n  w h i c ^  
b e c o m e s  a p p a r e n t  only w h e n  one a n a l y s e s  the h i s t o r y  of t h o u g h t  
f r o m  the p e r s p e c t i v e  of the r« p r i o r i vdiich is a 1 wa y s fu t u r c .
By this f i x e d  s t a n d a r d ,  all m o v e m e n t  is a s s e s s e d  as "movei i^^nt, " 
a nd a c c o r d i n g l y  r e d u c e d  to its s u b o r d i n a t e  r e l a t i o n  as " h i s t o r v ,  
'when H e i d e g g e r  c l a i m s  to h a v e  b r o u g h t  to end the h i s t o r v  ef 
m e t a p h y s i c s ,  he c l a i m s  no more t han " C h u r c h  h i s t o r i a n s "  hmv e
a l w a y s  c l a i m e d ,  n a m e l y ,  to see " w h o l e . "  It is an  e r r o r  to sav
that C h r i s t  s t a n d s  at the c e n t e r  of h i s t o r y :  he s t a n d s ,  r a t h e r , 
s t the end of all that "has b e en" as its j.udcc, this "en ." be in 
not the e n d  of tim e  (as in e s c h a t o l o g y  and a p o c a l y p s e )  but that 
p o i n t  q_n t ime w h i c h ,  b e c a u s e  of its i d e n t i t y  w i t h  the e v r r - ^ u -  
ture, is n e v e r t h e l e s s  d i f f e r e n t  a nd " b-r-con.es, " h a v i n g  rathe*' 
the s e n s e  of a n  " e t e r n a l  n o w . " T h i s  e v e r - m a v i n c  p o i n t  in time 
w i l l  a l w a y s  be the " j u d g e "  of h i s t o r y .  But is it the r i g h t  tc 
" J u d g e "  tha t  is at s t a k e ,  or the a b i l i t y  to f o r e v e r  r e m a i n  at 
that " p o i n t "  iji time w h i c h  p i n - p o i n t s  e x i s t e n c e ?  We  m a i n t a i n  
t ha t  it is the latter, a n d  that t ime in its f u t u r e  ecstac*' is
" w h a t "  all the " r e l i g i o u s "  f u r o r  is a b o u t .
T h i s  s o j o u r n  i nto s p e c u l a t i o n  a r i s e s ,  as w e  said, a f t e r  
h a v i n g  e x a m i n e d  o n l y  t h r e e  of H e i d e g g e r ’s v-orks (if we  c a n  c o u n t  
his I n t r o d u c t i o n  to Be  i no a nd T i m e ). M u c h  t hat w e  h a v e  ^aii 
b o t h  h e r e  a n d  in our I n t r o d u c t i o n  w i l l  p e r s i s t  as s p e c u l a t i o n  
u n t i l  w e  h a v e  d o c u m e n t e d  it, a n d  this c an be d o n e  o nlv by c o n ­
t i n u i n g  our e x a m i n a t i o n  of o t h e r  works. Wc p r o c e e d , th r:. tc 
" . h a t  is b.et'- .■'.vsics?" a n d  H e i d e g g e r ’s e x p l i c a t i o n  of f. d : a - 
3 s Gn c o f  Bein'-.
1Chapter V 
"IV ha t i s I-ie ta phy sics?" 1
1. Introductory
This rather famous lecture was given on the occasion o" 
Heidegger’s accession in 1929 to the chair of philosophy  ^t th 
University of Freiburg, a post left vacant when ni s teach' r, 
mund Husserl, retired. Because it is a lecture, it is a short 
niece. its length was increased, however, some thirteen '/ear^ 
later by a Postscript which reflects some of the criticism 
which must have been leveled at it. Fveri then, like man;; of 
Heidegger’s works, it is a short and extremely compact utteran 
so crystallized that it might be said to represent only the 
inter-related conclusions which have arisen from an extensive 
and intensive study over many years. Speaking generally of t" 
four essays which he is introducing, one of which is this lec­
ture, Werner Brock says:
"The treatment is not analytic and demonstrative, but cor,- 
densed to the utmost and, though strictly conceptual, larg ■ 
in the way of brief characterizing statements. We mav be 
sure that the thought belli nd any formula ventured is as acu:^. 
and penetrating as in the earlier main work. But the treat­
ment takes this for granted and implicitly expects the sam-'- 
amount of analytic grasp from the reader as was implied in 
the preparation of the extremely concentrated expos it ion.
No doubt Brock's warning should be heeded.
This essay is one of four published in Fnglish translation 
with a lengthy introduction by Werner Brock under the tit It 
Hxis tence and Be ins, Henry Rernary Company, Chicago, 1959. 
Curs has been the paperback Gateway Edition, I960, and is 
hereafter referred to in this chapter only bv pa^^ nu:'ibe r. 
t: . l i b .
1In this l e c t u r e ,  H e i d e g g e r  c h o o s e r  to a p p r o a c h  nis suhjec* 
i n d i r e c t l y .  R a t h e r  t h a n  take up  m e t a p h y s i c s  as a w h o l e  at uhf 
start, he i n t e n d s  to " d i s c u s s  a d e f i n i t e  m e t a p h y s i c a l  q u e s t i o n "  
w h i c h  w i l l  lead into m e t a p h y s i c s .  O n c e  the q u e s t i o n  p o s e d  is 
d e v e l o p e d ,  the n  w e  w i l l  find o u r s e l v e s  in the m i d s t  of m e t a ­
p h y s i c s ,  a nd m ay then m o v e  t o w a r d  a n s w e r i n g  the t i tle q u e s t i o n .  
For, as he s a ys, " e v e r y  m e t a p h y s i c a l  q u e s t i o n  a l w a y s  c o v e r s  t' ' 
w h o l e  ranee of m e t a p h y s i c a l  p r o b l e m s "  if it is t r u l y  " m e t a ­
p h y s i c a l . "  A n d  b e c a u s e  it is a q u e s t i o n  put by m an, it m u s t  
a l w a y s  be " b a s e d  on the e s s e n t i a l  s i t u a t i o n  of e x i s t e n c e , "  i. . 
m a n ’3 e x i s t e n c e . ^
B e g i n n i n g  thus, H e i d e g g e r  a d d r e s s e s  p r i m a r i l y  the plivsic- I 
s c i e n t i s t s  a n d  nil that " s c i e n t i s m "  r e p r e s e n t s ,  i.e., that o r ­
i e n t a t i o n  t o w a r d s  " t h i n g s "  w h i c h  is e x p r e s s e d  in m e a s u r i n c  a n : 
c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e i r  V/as-sein a n d  W i e - s e l n . "V/hat the s c i e n c e s  
a c c o m p l i s h ,  i d e a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  is an  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  to the e s ­
s e n t i a l  n a t u r e  of all t h i n g s . " h  T h a t  is, they e s t a b l i s h  ti.e 
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s  of all " t h i n g s "  in the w o r l d ,  i.e., a "w o r 1d - 
r e l a t i o n . "  But they do this in v i r t u e  of a " f r e e l y  c h o s e n  a l ­
t i t u d e  w h i c h  is c h a r a c t e r i z e d  as " a l l o w i n g  the o b j e c t  i t s e l f  
the first a n d  last w o r d . "  T h i s  a t t i t u d e  of s u b m i s s i o n  to the 
o b j e c t  it s e l f ,  h o w e v e r ,  has p r a c t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  n a m e l y ,  
that s c i e n c e  t h e r e b y  e n j o y s  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of " a c q u i r i n g  a 
l e a d e r s h i p  of its own, a l b e i t  limited, in the w h o l e  f i e l d  of 
b.uman e x i s t e n c e . " ^  H e i d e c c c r  explain'- this in terms of tnc
o . 52p. . p. 325. 5- p. j - C'. p. ;2
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"irruption of rrian" into the world in such a way that the he inc. 
which constitute it emerge "as." and "how" they are. That is, 
the "way" in which this revelation occurs has every thine to do 
with the final decision as to "what" and "how" beings "are." 
Man is the interrogator of beincs and therefore the "measure" 
of all "th i nes."
These three: "world-relation," "attitude," and "irruption' 
share something in common in virtue of their relation to "be­
ings." The "world-relation" refers tc "beings" - and to noth i' 
else; science effects its "irruption" by n'oa ns of "beincs." - 
and nothing else; and every "attitude" is "molded" by "being*^' 
and nothing else. In a word, there is an implicit relation es­
tablished with the opposite of beings when "beings - and not hi: 
else" are interrogated. Yet, science has absolutely no inter­
est in this "nothing else,"''^ It "wishes to know nothing of No 
thing,"b even though it has recourse to tliis Nothing at every 
turn as that which implicitly collaborates in the definition o 
beings: they are thus and so, and not otherwise. Why this 
"schizophrenic" attitude? "What about Nothing?"^
2. The Question of Nothing
Thus is the question put. And to be sure, it fulfills 
the requirements specified by Heidegger at the outset. It in- 
terrocates the whole range of metaphysical problems and does 
so from th 1 p o i t of view of existence.
^ . c .  . r .  :.28f .  y .  o .  j f - .
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First to be s e e n  is that the No t h i n e , t h o u g h  wc s p e a k  of 
"it" as if it w e r e  " s o m e t h i n r ," i? not an e n t i t y ,  a b e i n g . '  ’
Is this e n q u i r y  t h e r e f o r e  a l r e a d y  at an end? O n l y  if t r a d i t i o n -  
a 1 " l o g i c "  r e i g n s  as the s u p r e m e  c r i t e r i o n  for J u d g m e n t .  But 
we h a v e  a l r e a d y  s e e n  that the p o w e r  of " l o g i c "  d w e 11s in its 
i n e x o r a b l e  " o r d e r , "  an o r d e r  w h i c h  " a s c e n d s "  to the u n c o n  itic:.-
a 1 .  ^! As such, it is r o o t e d  in the a p riori , i.e.', in the 1 -
way s-fu tu r e . L n l y  by r e j e c t i n g  " l o g i c "  as the h i o h c s t  court 
of a p p e a l  is it p o s s i b l e  to p u r s u e  the N o t h i n g  a nd sc d i s c o v e r  
whV " l o g i c "  has p r e v a i l e d  r e l a t i v e  to o n t i c  truth. For, it ii 
g r o u n d e d  in the N o t h i n g .  " ’N o t h i n g ’ is m o r e  o r i g i n a l  t h a n  th'-- 
Not a nd n e g a t i o n "  of logical , r a t i o n a l  e n q u i r y . ' -  Vie t h e r e f o r  
s u r p a s s  " l o g i c "  a nd s p e a k  q u i t e  f r e e l y  of the N o t h i n g  as thou-'.. 
it w e r e  " r ome t h i n g , "  all the w h i l e  awart: that it is not.h,
"If N o t b i n c  is still to be e n q u i r e d  into, it f o l l o w s  that 
it m u s t  be ’c i v e n ’ in advance, W c  m u s t  be a b l e  tc e n c o u n t e r
10. p. 129. 11. See above, pp. 1.3^ » II4.8 . 12. p. jpl.
13. For those who fail to equate the Nothing with the evor-mutu^-. 
little sense can be made of this attempt to sav som.cthing 
about Nothing. Though "ontically" nothing, the Nothing is 
nevertheless "something" which grounds everything as their 
prior. Put in theological terms, the Nothing is the "ab­
sence" of God, His transcendence, His eternity. His ever- 
future pre-eminence. Heidegger is attempting in the realm 
cf metaphysics to expose once and for all the abidinc criter­
ion which lias governed all logical thought from the becinni: ,
a criterion which has all the while "shown itself" w i thout 
ever becoming "ontical." Futurity "shows itself" in the D a ­
sein who is the essence of "distance." Pur i no existence, vv 
are aware of that which never comes, nairifTl y , ^tomorrow." J* 
is this simple presence of the. evt.r-future that wholly doin- 
1 nates every effort to think " 1 oq i ca. 1 1 y , " and provides the 
standar.l by v/hich all th'-t docs b-. co/fK; "ontic" is r.ea sur», .
1 this " i n t crp T'-; t a t i o))" of t he N o t h. 1 n 0 i: gra.nt--'i, ‘ :içn i*
s p r 1 n-" s '  .1 i fc , all ill o sic fall! ns a v'a y . And s ome: l : i ' 
a pa rail 1 r seen between the proniem of " ob.jec i f 
Nothinc "r that of "ohjectifyins" God.
I’j. Thi^ - formula we note as hei nr characteristic of b:th /- : ' “
■ i 1 acc. oer ’ s e u a l v t i c a l  a o u r o a c h .
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i t . "^5 But w h e r e  shall it be s o u g h t ?  In e v e r y d a y ,  o f f - h a n d  
lan g u a g e ,  the N o t h i n g  is b a n d i e d  a b o u t  c a r e l e s s l y .  In s u c h  do 
we find our p r e l i m i n a r y  d e f i n i t i o n .  In e v e r y d a y  la n g u a g e ,  " N o ­
thinc is the c o m p l e t e  n e g a t i o n  of the t o t a l i t y  of b e i n g s . " ^
As a " d e f i n i t i o n , "  it is a l s o  a guide, for it i n d i c a t e s  "the
d i r e c t i o n  f r om whi ch  a 1 one i t may m e e t  us . "
" T h e  t o t a l i t y  of b e i n g s  m u s t  be g i v e n  b e f o r e  n a n d  so a c.- to 
s u c c u m b  as s u c h  to the n e c a t i o n  f r o m  w h i c h  N o t h i n g  is then  
f o u n d  to e m e r ge . " 1 7
Now ,  "the t o t a l i t y  of b e i n g s , "  i . e . , the " w o r l d , "  as we  
have seen, is not s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  w e  c a n  k n o w  as such. "Nor h r '  
is a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l .  It f o l l o w s ,  then, that if " w o r l d "  is t r a n ­
s c e n d e n t a l ,  that w h i c h  n e g a t e s  it w i l l  a l s o  be t r a n s c e n d e n t a l .  
But this e x p l a n a t i o n  is only hinted, H e i d e g g e r ' s  e x p o s i t i o n  
the N o t h i n g  u t i l i z e s  a b r i e f  p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s  of "me 
B o r e d o m  an d  Joy, for e x a m p l e ,  r e veal the t o t a l i t y  of b e i n c s  a : 
we r e l a t e  to it. In b o r e d o m ,  the m o od, i.e., r e l a t i o n ,  is one 
of " i n d i f f e r e n c e . "  Joy is q u i t e  the o p p o s i t e .  M o o d s ,  as the 
" G r o u n d - p h e n o m e n o n ,  of our D a s e i n "  not only r e v e a l  the t o t a l i t y
of b e i n g s  as " w o r l d , "  but they s e e m  a l s o  tc " h i d e  the N o t h i n g
we a re s e e k i n g . n lb
Ye t  there is one m o o d ,  "the key m o o d  of d r e a d "  (A n c s t  ) . 
w h i c h  is r e v e l a t o r y  of the N o t h i n g . ! ^  jn c o n t r a s t  to fear, 
d r e a d  has no o b j e c t .  w h e n  we a re a f r a i d ,  v«e a r e  a l w a y s  a f r a i d  
of..., i.e., a f r a i d  of s o m e t h i n g .  W i t h  d r e a d ,  on the o t her ban ,
p. 332. 16. p. 3 3/. 17. p. 332.1':. p. gjN. lY. p. ygy.
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there is a d e f i n i t e  i nd e f i n i t e ne s s of " v.’ha t " the d r d is about.
T h e r e  is s o m e t h i n g  " s i n i s t e r ” ( ui.he im I i ch ) or u n c a n n y  a b o u t  it
in the s e n s e  that the w o r l d  s o m e h o w  bee.ins to w i t h d r a w  f r o m  us
into u n r e a l i t y ,  but in so d o i n g  a c t u a l l y  p r e s s e s  in u p o n  us witli
s i n i s t e r  force. 3 u t...
" . . . t h e r e  is n o t h i n g  to hold on to. Tiie onl y  t h ine that 
r e m a i n s  a n d  o v e r w h e l m s  us w h i l s t  b e i n g s  s l i p  a w a y  is this
* n o t h i n g . ’ Jr e.a d r e v e a l s  N o t h i n g .  "T1
So o v e r w h e l m i n g  is this m o o d  that we a,re s t r u c k  dund , T '
is, w h e n  e v e r y  tiling s h r i n k s  f r o m  us, so a l s o  U'-parts tiio oii ' •
all speech. If we s p e a k  at all v;hi h ’ in the crips of Jrea. , 
we b r e a k  the a w f u l  s i l e n c e  "by w o r d s  s p o k e n  at r a n d o m "  as 
t h o u g h  to b r e a k  its s p ell w i t h  s o und - Just any s o u n d  at all.
A n d  w h e n  c o n f r o n t e d  a f t e r w a r d s  w i t h  W h a t  w a s  w r o n g ? ,  wo a n s w e r .  
N o t h i n g I  "And i n d e e d  N o t h i n c  itself. N o t h i n g  as such, 
t he r e ."
If so, then w h a t  a b o u t  N o t h i n g ?
In a n  e n d e a v o r  to a n s w e r  this q u e s t i o n ,  H e i d e g g e r  insist.^ 
that w e  u n d e r s t a n d  that this key m o o d  of d r e a d  h a p p e n s  "in our 
' J a - s c i n . T h a t  is, w e  h a v e  to r e l i n q u i s h  "rmin" and r e a l i z e  
that it is to the " t r a n s c e n d i n g "  " D a - s c  in" t hat N o t h i n g  is r e ­
v e a l e d . ^3 T h i s  a l l - i m p o r t a n t  r e q u i r e m e n t  m e a n s  that h e n c e f o r t h  
it is not the " o n t i c "  o b j e c t  i f i a b le " s e l f "  that is u n d e r  d i s c u s ­
s i o n  here, but D a - s e i n ,  e x - s i s t e n c e .
If this is u n d e r s t o o d ,  then we car: p r o c e e d  to n ote t lia t 
t.lint w h i c h  ^ e v e a l e d  as N o t h i n c  is not s o m e t h i n g  ov^r "'ca 1:3' :
' T .  p .  . 1 I .  pu 3 3 6 ,  2 ? .  p .  / ; 7 . ; .
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O ' 1the t o t a l i t y  of b e i n g s ,  but r a t h e r  is "at one w i t h  it."'-- As 
e v e r y t h i n g  r e c e d e s  into u n r e a l i t y ,  the o b j e c t i f i e d  "sel f "  goes 
right a l o n g  w i t h  e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e  t o w a r d s  o b l i v i o n ,  i.e., n o ­
thing. But, the N o t h i n g  " d o e s  not a t t r a c t :  its n a t u r e  is to 
r e p e l .  T h u s ,  it r e v e a l s  i t s e l f  to be " n i h i l a t i o n "  (Nichturn /
in the s e n s e  that e v e r y t h i n g  that is, i n c l u d i n g  the " s e l f , ” ir 
n e i t h e r  a n n i h i l a t e d  nor n e g a t e d ,  but s i m p l y  r e v e a l e d  i n all i ': 
p r e v i o u s l y  u n d i s c l o s e d  " s t r a n g e n e s s  as the p u r e  ' O t h e r . ’” 
E v e r y t h i n g  that is, s t a n d s  in c o n t r a  s t to the N o t h i n g  w h i c h ,  i 
the m o m e n t  of drea d ,  a b i d e s ,  as it w e r e ,  in the t r a n s c e n d e n t  
J a - s e i n .
T he t h o u g h t  here is d i f f i c u l t .  T h e r e  is no c o n t r a j îctior 
in w h a t  wc h a v e  said. T h e  p r o b l e m  is one of d i s t i n c u i s h i n r  b e ­
tw e e n  "the t o t a l i t y  of b e i n g s ” w h i c h  is a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ,  and 
" e v e r y t h i n g  that is." T h i s  latter is i n t e n d e d  " o n t i c a i l y "  ans 
the f o r m e r  " o n t o l o g i c a l l y , "  so that the N o t h i n c  is "at one" wit; 
" t o t a l i t y "  a n d  the D a - s e i n  j_n c o n t r a s t  w  i t h e v e r y t h i n g  that "is" 
i n c l u d i n g  the o b j e c t i f i e d  self. "In the c l e a r  n i g h t  of d r e a d ' s  
N o t h i n g n e s s ," e v e r y t h i n g  is r e v e a l e d  in all its o r i g i n a l  " f r a n k ­
n e ss" as " t h e r e "  in u t t e r  a nd s h a r p  d i s t i n c t i o n  to the N o t h i n c .  
Here is the " d i f f e r e n c e "  that is g r o u n d e d  in p r i o r i t y ,  the 
"stranceri'-’ss" of the Da_ to the S e i n , the c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  i m ­
m a n e n c e  an d  t r a n s c e n d e n c e .  f u t u r i t y  is f o r e v e r  s t r a n g e  to and 
e s t r a n g e d  f r o m  w h a t  is so " f r a n k "  and " o p e n . "  "Cnly on the b^ci 
of the o r i g i n a l  m a n i f e s t n e s s  of N o t h i n c  c a n  our h u m a n  Da.-' ■'’in
- - p. 337. 3:. p. 33a. 26. p. 339. p.
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a d v a n c e  t o w a r d s  a n d  e n t e r  into being"^'^ (in the o n t i c a l  sense).
" D a -se in," then, m e a n s  " b e i n g  held into the N o t h i n c "  (H i n - 
ci n c e h a 1tenhe i t i n das N i c h t s ) W h e n  held into the N o t h i n g ,  
the O a - s e i n  is " o t h e r "  t h a n  the b e i n g s  w h i c h  " a r c " ;  it i t r a n -  
s c e n d e n t .*3 W e r e  this not so, the D a - s e in c o u l d  n e v e r  m o v e  t o ­
w a r d s . . .  as in the p r i m a l  u m w i l i e n , and f i n a l l y  c o n n e c t ,  or r e ­
late, w i t h  " o b j e c t s , "  a nd t h e r e b y  d i s - c o v e r  se 1f - r e l a t i o n .h^
Do, e x c e p t  the N o t h i n g  be m a n i f e s t  p r i o r  to the r e v e l a t i o n  of 
b e i n g s  as " t h e r e , "  t h ere c a n  be no o n tic b e i n g s  at all.
T h us, we f i n d  the a n s w e r  to the q u e s t i o n :  W h a t  a b o u t  N o t n i ’ 
It is " n e i t h e r  an o b j e c t  nor a n y t h i n g  that 'is* at a l l . "  A n d  
it " o c c u r s  n e i t h e r  by itsel"' nor 'apart from' w h a t - i s  as a sort 
of a d J u n c t . " J ^
" N o t h i n g  is t h a t  w h i c h  m a k e s  the r e v e l a t i o n  of b e i n g s  as s u e  
p o s s i b l e  for our h u m a n  e x i s t e n c e .  N o t h i n g  not m e r e l y  provi ' 
the c o n c e p t u a l  o p p o s i t e  to b e i n g s  but is ""iso an o r i c i n a t  pa 
of e s s e n c e .  It is in the B e i n g  of b e i n g s  that the nib. il'’, ti- 
by N o t h i n c  (das N i c h t e n  des N i c h t s ) o c c u r s . " 3 3
If this is the case, t h e n  w h y  is it that " d r e a d , "  s the 
m o o d  w h i c h  r e v e a l s  the N o t h i n g ,  is f ea red and, in c o n s e q u e n c e ,  
so r a r e l y  e x p e r i e n c e d ?  It w o u l d  s e e m  f r o m  w h a l  ha? b e e n  said 
that we w o u l d  h a v e  to be in a c o n t i n u a l  s t a t e  oo d r e a d  in crdv-r 
to " r e l a t e "  to things. But this does not a p p e a r  to be the case 
H e i de oner s u g g e s t s  that our p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  thin g s  is of sue: 
i n t e n s i t y  that our r e l a t i o n  to the N o t h i n g  is w h o l l y  d i - s o r t e d  
■'roi its o r i g i n a l  state. W'e o u r s e l v e s  end up  a? " t h i n e  > ' >' *.
W s i W i n c  n i h i ; x r u n c e a s i n g l y ,  e v e n  w i t h o u t  ou r '.now le . ' •
H. 33. p. :;9.p. 3f '. 3 . u. f
16g
Ev i d e n c e for this is a f f o r cî e d in t h e va y we ou r s e 1 ve ? n c - 
gate. As  a b a s i c  c o n s t i t u e n t  of la n g u a c e ,  the " N o t ” is not 
sc If - p r o d u c i n g . It c a n  n e g a t e  only w h e n  t h e r e  is s o m e t h i n g  
" t h e r e "  to n e g a t e  "But h o w  c a n  a thing tfia, t is or o u g h t  to be 
n e g a t e d  be s e e n  as s u c h  u n l e s s  alJ t h i n k i n g  as s u c h  is on she 
l o o k - o u t  for the N o t ? "36 T h e  p r i o r i t y  of the c o n s t a n t  n i h i l a -  
t lon by the N o t h i n g  is thus to be s e e n  as m a k i n g  p o s s i b l e  ttii' 
no e a t i n g  r e l a t i o n  to the t h i n c s  at h a n d . " N o t h :  eg is t lie 
' ourc e o f n ega t  i o n , i ; o t the o t. h e r ' a y a r ou nd . - '
In a d d i t i o n  to l i n g u i s t i c  n e g a t i o n ,  the " h a r s h n e s s  of op- 
p o s i t i o n  and thi. v i o l e n c e  of loathiiig, ... the p a i n  of refusal 
n d the rnc re i I c s s n c s s  of an  i n t e r d i c t , "  not to m e n t i o n  the o p ­
p r e s s i v e  hitternesa of r e n u n c i a t i o n  - these c r uel r e a l i t i e s  
huinan b e h a v i o r  p o i e n a n t l y  i n d i c a t e  the c o n t i n u o u s  par - nt- e ■ ‘ 
the n i h i l a t i o n  of N o t h i n g ,  c o n c e a l e d  t h o u g h  it he.-'
" D r e a d  is there, but s l e e p i n g .  All D a -se i n q u i v e r s  ’-i'f. 
b r e a t h i n g :  the p u l s a t i o n  is s l i g h t e s t  in b e i n g s  that ' tl 
o r ous, a nd is i m p e r c e p t i b l e  in the 'Yea, y e a!' a nd '.la , h' 
of busy p e o p l e ;  it is r e a d i e s t  in the r e s e r v e d ,  and sures- 
all in the c o u r  a g e ou s ."J b
B e c a u s e  our D a - s e i n  is held into N o t h i n g  on the b a s i s  of 
hidden d rea d ,  " m a n  b e c o m e s  the 'sta n d - i n '  (F la tz ha 1 1 e r ) for 
Nothing. "-'9 But as a f i n i t e  " s t a n d - i n , "  he is so i n e x o r a b l y  
tied up w i t h  b e i n g s  and t h i n g s  that he r e s i s t s  w i t h  all tii^ 
m i g h t  c o m i n g  f a c e  to face ’-Ith N o t h i n g ,  He r e s i s t s  at every 
turn J'i na 1 i za t i on ( Ver end 1 i c h u n g  ) of anything - i n c l u d i n g  him -  
'■ e 1 f - a nd c o n s e q u e n t l y  k n o w  little of the m a j e s t y  of ^ re 'do
'. p. . p. ihe. 37 • e * 'vK f
n. 'T .
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i.e., the heights of "profoundcst finality."^^ Ve take this 
to mean that only the Oa-sein is held into the Nothing does 
it abide, as it were, within the "horizon of all possible unity,” 
and taste of that exquisite Unity which alone makes the Or^  
rea1ly " there" "as such," instead of an itinerant transient - 
a 1 wa y s merely r e I a t i v e and o n t he mov c t owa r is sue h u n i t y . th. - 
in" held into the Nothing, i.e., transcendence, enables ’’the 
ove rcomi no'' of heinqs "as such"; it js ta h 1 i slies them i -i c ■ - i n c : 
it constitutes them. ' " V/hen such occur.v* '"'e have an ’’ev>uK,” " 
iatufi; of real history, a sign ofiprogress.
Thus do we r'rive at metaphysics; going beyond, ’'overcoiuin 
( I,^ physics ( r ■ « < ) . From ancient time^ onwards, etaphv- 
sics has expressed itself on the subject of .Nothing in t'l ' hii 
ly ambiguous proposition: egg nihi 1 o n i h i 1 fit - nothinc c ;sjes 
from nothing." Though not discussing Nothing 1 i c i t I > , it 
nevertheless makes implicit that to which the totality f he in 
is opposed.
In classical metaphysics, Nothinc denotes Non-bein. , i.e.,
" u nf orme d matte:' which is powerless to form itself into *'> be in 
and cannot therefore present an appearance (x ' ) . " That which 
is a being presents itself in an image as something seen. .But, 
"the origin, law and limits of this ontological concept -re ais- 
cussed as little as Nothing itself."'-'
In Chm i r t i 'mi doc t r i ne, t he propos i t i on ex n i hi 1o nid' ! fit 
hccomcs es nihi lu fit - ene créa turn. vdh Icjli tea nc that n . : ■ cirn '
■ o . 3h-j . 1. vuh. hd. L'. f. . ; .
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exist except that God created them frori nothing. Thus God be­
comes t'ne sununum cns, the 0 n s i nc rea turn. All of the things that 
"are" stand in contrast and opposition to God- Yet, in tradi­
tional Christian doctrine, neither Being nor Nothing is sou,;ht 
in a sufficiently primordial way even thou on God is said t.- b? 
the summum ens. According iv, God na s no knowledge o^ ' t he Nothi' 
^11 "nullity" is "logically" excluded fror the "Absolute.”
in this brief allusion to the history of thouchit, riel e -
per shows how Nothinc is the "conceptual opposite of v ha t trul
and authentically 'is,' i.e., as the notation of it.''  ^ O n c e
the Nothing is raised to the level of problem, however , and
its solution is sought regardless of adia t it may cost in term-
of t rri d i t i c-na 1 norms , e.g., "logic," "this contrast net •;!
undergoes clearer definition but also arouses the true : : '
tic metaphysical question regarding the Beinc of beings.
"Nothing ceases to be the vague opposite of beings; it now 
reveals itself as integral to the Being of beings. ... Be in 
and Nothing lia nc together, but not because the two - f r or 
the point of view of Hegelian thoinent.qo - are one in tneir 
indefiniteness and immediateness, but because Being it. - If 
is finite in essence and is revealed only in the transcen­
dence of Da-se in as held into Nothing."JV
b ;j . p. 314 b. Li p. p. 3I4.6.
I;6 , "Pure Being and pure Nothing are thus one and the same," 113»r » 1
in "The Science of Logic," i, V/V; 111, p. 7h - as quote] bv
Heidegger, p. 3/46.
I|7 . p. 3I-I-6 . Vve c^ll attention to this statement of the "finitun
of Being" and its "integral" relation to the Nothinc as doc­
umentation for the "speculation" above (pp. lLt9*-p6 , esp. pp.
151 and 135 )• Plainly we have here within the unity cf the.
concept "Being” a dialectic between "essence" and "ui'-essencc 
its unity being that both of identity a nd difference. Du r 
temporal interpretation of this ontolocical construct nos is- 
"identity" in that futurity whicn is common both to tio uv. - 
futur,': r ' to that whict- becomes "x i s t or i ca 1 " time, L'. ; s 
dlot inc. . . constituting theiT ^differ nice." ^or - lu •'
curw'iori o: the identity and d i f fi. r .3 nc,s of this "into '
1 ' t i or , see be 1 ow, c'jiapt^ r VI i .
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Eith this we see how the Nothing, because of its relation 
to Being, embraces the whole of metaphysics in such a wav "hat 
the "origin of negation" is disclosed at the expense of the 
rule of "logic."6 - The Ancient proposition egg n ihi1o nihiI fit, 
therefore acquires a new mesninc: one that more appropriately 
relates to the problem of Being and Not hi rip. it now reas^: egg 
n i hi 1 o omn i a ens qua ens fj_l_' being* gun beings come t r or.
nothing. - ' That is, to the extent that huing:? are reco r izef 
to derive their objective existence from ttie prior action o-*" 
transcendent Da-sein, i.e., from freedom, they are "there" "ar 
such" (qua "beings"). The transcendence of Being as revealed 
in finite Da-se in grounds beings in Being and delivers them, 
it were, from the abyss of Nothing to the solid cround of "ni*-- 
torical" existence. The nothingness of Ua-sein, then. 1 she 
realm from which tne Lotality of beings,  ^< ”tota 11 tv , ” ' me s 
to Being cjua beings, i.e., "there."6
Now, since "scientific" Da-se in relates to beings a nc to 
them alone, it also relates to Nothing, albeit unconsciously. 
Hence, "science proceeds from metaphysics," and only as doing 
so can it accomplish its essential task: "the perpetual dis­
covery of the whole realm of truth, whether of Nature or Hi 
t ory ."31
"Only because Nothing is revealed in the very ground ot our 
Da-se in is it possible for the utter strangeness of beings 
to dawn upon us. Only when the strangeness of beings forces, 
itself upon us does it awaken and invite wonder. Only be­
cause of won de r, that is fo say, the revelation cN' Nothinc 
lues the 'Whvi* spri nr. tu our lips. Only because thi' ' Nhy .' 
is. possible as such' i:a n vs- seek for reasons nd proo's in '
. m . p . 3'x* , •; 9 . 0. 3)16 f . 3 D . i>. r • . : • • • '• .
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definite way. only because we can ask and prove are we 
fated to become enquirers in this life.
The enquiry into Nothing puts us, the enquirers, our­
selves in question. It is a metaphysical one."3,2
Going beyond physics, i.e., the rum of the things that 
"are," is meta-physics. It is also, as an activity of the 
Da-sein, transcendence. Hence, "metaphysics is the grounJ- 
phenomenon of Da-sein. It is Da-se in itself." Tiierefore, it 
:s not to be measured in terms of the "idea of science": ’t 
envoys a priority all its own; hence, n authority une qua Ire. 
"So long as man exists there will be philosophizing of s on.e 
sort"^6; the kind of questioning which asks "Why is there any 
Being at all - why not far rather NothingV"3U
3 . "Postscript"
With this now familiar question, Heidegger conclude: n'^
lecture. Appended to it some thirteen years later, a Post-^r. 
seeks to set the record straight relative to three basic criti­
cisms. But beyond defending the main theses of the lecture, it 
Drings to bear the insight of another thirteen years: insight 
which shows no radical change in the original themes, but chan: 
nevertheless which v/e characterize as a softening of the line!' 
of the sketch, a gentler rendering which occasionally break'- 
over into "religious" métaphore.
Heidegger's title question, "What is metaphysics?," seeks 
to "o beyond metaphysics, to encompass it as from an cber.e d i "
■D. p. 3L b .
’ cuo + e bv Heideccer from Plato: Ph.aedrus, : - . .
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point outside its sphere. As such the lecture sueks to sur­
pass i tself by being that kind of thought whicn. is so ori-.nte 
that the passage of time and the chances that inevitably occur 
in history will not "date" it, or render it obsolete. Thinkiv 
uf the sort that this lecture represents, namelv. thi nk i n' Be­
ing both in its essence and d i s.-es sence, brines to end the 
whole history of metaphysics, and gives it a radically altérés 
c ou rs .bb . ;e v. p i t e- its popu lari ty a nd t he cre^t "'a i t h p 1 '■ 
in it, science cannot serve as the tartine point o'" en * 
tc su’-oass metaphysics because it ha s failed to honor i ' . ' : •
i na 1 :.) : ’ r  p ■ c : 1. o seek t he t r i i  t h . Its a.ode of object ific a ' : c n
is such tb.at beings are so safeguarded a s a means of furt'ou” 
advance, that objectification "gets stuck in beings and :"e ':a - - 
them 'a nothing less than Being" itself.
The history cf science bears witness to its inahilitv 
and of it-el}'" to prove t h " truth of the knowledge of Be i :v . 
Indeed, it doesn't even try. The history of metaphysics ■ 
ogy), on the other hand, "thinks the thought cf Being" by con­
ceptualizing the Being of beings. It roves in the realm of * c 
truth of Being "v/hich truth remains the unknown and unfathoma’: I 
c r ouncl, "b /
"But supposing that not merely beings, come from Being, but 
that, in a manner still more original, Being itself reposes 
in its truth and that the truth of Being is a function cf 
the Being of Truth,36 then v/e must necessarily ask what
33' P* 333f. 3o. p. jpo. 37* p* 331'
'■n. Here is quite obviously a reference to the " r e v e r s a l ” re- 
cTuireJ for the missing third section of the "First ' ;f" . I 
Be ino ar T jme . a reversal in whieh the "essenc^ u f tr-uth' 
i s e n  also the "truth of essence," r re ver'-'’I In
which "Being mid Tire" becomes "Time 'wid Be inc.” ' • '
P . 32 *■. a nd be ) ow , Chapt .r VI.
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metaphysics is in its own cround. Eucr. a juisticn must 
think metaphysically and, at th^ sai,.e t ime. thinx in terms 
of the crouni of metaphysics, i.e., no longer metaphysically. 
All sucn questions must rcir.ain equivocal in an essential 
sense . .s'
If it is difficult to foil ov,' the thought of the lecture, 
it is because "enigmas lurk in this rec ion of th.ouciht" vhich 
'^ 11 too often are insufficiently reflected upon to yield clar- 
it';.'-' The three main criticims of the lecture rei'lcct ti is. 
They are: 1. It sounds like Nihilism: " phi' v ophy of N ul i ; : 
. It paralyses the will to act; a phi I os oph;' of .'"rea d ; . It
i" anti-"logical": a philosophy of pure fe-Ninc.
This philosophy is not, however, a ‘simple matter of 
either/or: either beings as science tr its them, i.e., as al­
ready equivalent to Being, or, the re/u-.ction cf all beings In 
an affirmation of Nothing, as in Nihilism. Rathur, He i de *r 
s s e r t s ,  V..' e n r j  s t. learn. . .
"...to experience in Nothing the va^tness of that which 
gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being iti-u. 1 
V. itiiout Beinc, whose unfathomable anc unnianifest essence i
39. p. jhl. Here is the most concise statement we have f ou nd o 
far of the essential genius of Heidegger's approach: it i î-
essentially equivocal. ".Even the most genuine question is 
never stilled by the answer found" (p. kplf.). Always each 
answer helps only to pose the next question. On and on goes 
the quest in utilization of the moments of time a they ar-c 
given, each succeeded by another, each nev/ one rolling inex­
orably from an eternal source and bearing the distinct marks 
of primordia 1ity. We see the primacy of futurity to be oic 
"voice" in this "equivocal" orientation. It is the "unknc- i, 
and unfathomable ground," the Being which is also Nothin'". 
The other voice is that of beings; together, these voices 
meet in the huma n Da-se in in an essential ambiguity o ■' i^r.- 
sions: one between heincs  ^nd Being, a nc the othe'* •
Bo i n g a n ■' N o t h i n r . Thus, Be i n c s t a n d s i n t h e mi: . ' • .
Da - So ’ r *• * chtc . torn between the two extreme: an:' ' ‘o.
sibl; ' . O’ es c i on i ng: hisLorical _--scin '.'ho
t'^rv, ' ;w’ oy br inning it to onn i nc 1er. r ‘hr«wr - :
its "nroble."
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vouchsafed us by Nothinc in essential dread, everything the: 
'is' v’ould re:nain in Be i ng J essness. But this too, in its 
turn, is not a nugatory Ncthine, ass,nuinc that it is of the
truth of Being that Being may be without bf ings,6 j but never
beings without Be inc."62
The "soundless voice" of Being speaks in essential dread, and
a mood is struck in which wc are "attuned" both to the pririor-
diality and consequent stability cf Being, a nd to the transient
instability of ontic beings. In dread ’’e are suspended, a*' it
were, in virtue of this "cvjui vocal" orientation, over p '■ '-v s .
In dread it is neither one nor the other, but noth a vapor ; us
eternal stability in the oblivion of Be ing , a nd the c cn c r■ * -
presence of beings as "there."
And yet, the métaphore of the "abyss" and "suspension" 
over it is not altogether appropriate, for in d rea d the concr t
61. In 19Lj.9, this Postscript was amended for the fiftt -"fitio:. 
of the essay. Without not, icc, the text was changed her ^ 
read that Being is never without be in us, and beings ■ ve \ • - 
er without Being (W. J. P. i chard son, S.J., He i dearer : Tnr ou 
FhenorricnoI ogy t o Thought, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hacu^ :- , ' ^ s .
p6 362 / . Ri ctia r dson pounces upon this change as terribly i im­
portant, in fact builds 'nis whole considerable book a^r.urw 
this "radical reversal." He even refers to the "ed1 : or" ' 
"Heidegger II." We fail to see what all the fuss is about.
If the original text is translated as Richardson does: "Bein 
indeed comes to be without beings...," then this is a sf.a f ' 
wholly inconsistent with what Heidecger has so far b-cn sav­
ing. Being only "comes to be" in beings - never as Being 
self. The truth of the "d i f fercrice" Is that all beings rd-\'c 
Being but do not themselves constitute Being. Hence, Be i 
is "different" or "other" than, i.e., "without" beings. \ 
see Heidegger's emendation of the original text (above) tc . 
a clarification rather than a reversal in orientation. Cnur 
translators, K. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, do not ta k the 
phrase wohi west quite so literally: as an expression ol pro­
cess, because the context is an explanation of precisely no,' 
Being "without" beings when it is Nothing. Sec also an
p. 166 , fn. 37*
2. !^:f.
-, r-
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thincs at hand recede from us into the realm of the "who 11v 
other" precisely because they become related to Being in ac­
cordance with the truth of Being, That is, in dread they are 
related to authentic Being and thus appear to recede into the 
overwhelmingly vast realm from whence 1 iiey came originally - 
as in a movie run backwards. The awfully wierd reaction horn 
in us in dread arises in the "recollection" of the truth of B r ­
ing as it bears down upon us in this uncanri/ journey backward' 
into the aboriginal truth of Being. hh.olly in terms cf tir. y, - 
and this is our interpretation of what Heidegger is saying - 
dread is a transcendent experience in which the flow of t ir..’ 
is reversed. We seem to move from, the present into the f u t u r e  , 
and from there to its oirthplace in eternal futurity: that spr: 
from which "time” issues without diminishing its inexhau:tib i . 
supply.
We are confident that Heidepeer avoids such an objectifi­
cation of Time because, in the end, it treats it as an entity, 
a "thing" or "being." Though we are seeing all too clearly 
tnat temporality is his criterion for criticism of the history 
of ontology (metaphysics), we should also respect his explicit 
intent to maintain an "ontological" approach, rather than one 
that is, say, temporo1ogica1. For it is impossible for ontic 
beings, e.g., finite human Da-sein, tc escape preoccupation wi; 
"things." If we are tempted to classify his thought as " t. empo- 
^logy," as opposed to "ontology," we misinterpret his int nt,
' V i 1 1 jw " oh ect il'ied" in ■ 'v s'- • v.av th-t
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always objectified. Though "time" may be the one wore that 
most typifies Heidegger's fundamental approach to philosophy, 
it fails altogether to do it Justice i r conceived either as a 
being or Beinc itself. Time, rather, is that which "criticises," 
i.e., Judges, all beings, so that Being itself has its ''prior" 
in "dis-ess^nce," i.e., in Nothinc. This is why Heidegger's 
thought necessarily surpasses "logic" and, indeed, the vhcl. 
history of logical reckoning. His is 'ti "intuicive" approach 
chat bears witness to a profound " 1 nwa r n e s s , "  a u  exquisite 
ensiti v i t. y t  c wha t  religion terms t  ht  " Ho 1 y . " T he ph i I • op h e r* 
cries to articulate Being, while " t ne p oe t nam e s wha t  i s h c 1 y . "
I f we have a ny difficulty w i t li He i d e goer at this point, it is 
in failing to s e e  how he differs from the "poets," beyond the 
obvious point, that the "names" which they oivc to the "hole" 
are different. In any event, courage i s characteristic of the 
man v/hc says "Yes ! " to essential dread, to the "terror of the 
abyss" where dwells "awe. Such men command respect, whe t h^ r
hoses atop the holy mountain, or the philosopher who endure* th 
Nothinc.
"Courage can endure Nothing: it knows ... the all but un­
trodden region of Being, that 'clearing' :Tom whence every­
thing that 'is' re turnsoha into what it is and is able to 
be. Our lecture neither puts forwar; a 'Philosophy of hreac' 
nor seeks to give a false impression of being an 'heroic' 
philosophy. Its sole thought is that which dawned on Nos tern 
thinking from the beginning as the one thine that has to be 
thought - Being. But Seine is not a product of thought. It 
is more likely that thinking is an occurrence of Being."63
Our "animus acain^t 'locjc'" derive'' from the cxoeri ncc
. 360. oq. p. rB'-.'jc und \ y ' this word ""o turns" as evidence for ou r " 
ces tic;, : . iatn.!,' a bcv,- t.hat "the t 1 ow of time i" s - 
VOrsec" in dread.
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in dread of the truth of Beinn, an experience at the furthest 
remove from "exact" thinking as typified in "calculation.” Ai I 
calculation presupposes closed totality, an essential unity al­
ready ivcn: hence, no "mystery" 1 n her es, only temporary un­
known quantities which calculation will soon resolve.
To turn ag'-^ lns "logic" in thi? era of scientific <over i
t y , I. o cour a c vi ou s 1 y prefer th e 1 r  r o r ? o f dread t o t h e c i -
ccncy of calculation, is to ansvier th».’ "demands of Bein»'' < i> '
"suri’cnder" "in the freedom of sacr i f i C' " to the "Need" "to
preserve the truth of Being no matter vdiat may happen tc man
'^ nd everything that i s . " ^  ^ In such sacrifice there is " t ha nk^ -
givincd’ f'or the "grace" with which "Being; has endowed mz n. . .
"...in order that he may take over in his relationship to 
Being the guardianship of Being, ... Original thinking is 
the echo of Being’s favor wherein it clears n space f. r It­
self and causes the unique occurrence: tTia_L beings '_r__. ...
The speechless answer of hi? thanking through sacrifi i' 
the sourcc of tiie human vord, w hich is t he prime ca ur o f 
languaee as the enunciation of the f ord .in words. "6o
IVith these sentiment? Heidegger pleads for some ru'-.imcn- 
tary understanding of his lecture as an expression on behnIf of 
"inwardness" and "essential thinkino" 3^ over against that con­
fident, opportunistic self-assurance which so characterizes tne 
"calculating" orientation to the thincs that "are." He calls 
for "obedience to the voice of Being," for "thought which seei\s 
the VJord through whi ch the truth of Being may be expressed." 
For. when "the language of historical "''.an i < born of th / "dor : ,
' . .'. ' ’ Of.. ]:». 3 he. 67- p. ' d.
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it rings true; it rises up "out of I o n - - g u a r d e d  s p e e c h 1c r s n c s s .”
that is, out of the N o t h i n g  w h e n  this latter is " c o n c e i v e d  ' s
p ure ' Ot her* t ho n wha t - i s , " i.e., t he " s i Î o f B e i n g .  " 69  i -3 it
'101 e v i d e n t  that...
" . . . I n  B e i n c  all that c o m e s  to pass in b e i n g s  is p e r f e c t e d  
f r o m  ever l a s t i n g " 770
L| . I n t e r l u d e
The r e a d e r  no d o u b t  r e c i s t e r s  a m e a s u r e  o* s u r p r i s e  • t- 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  " r e l i g i o u s ” m é t a p h o r e s  are b r o u g h t  to the ser-'-b- 
of p h i l o s o p h y  w hi cl., for its p a r t ,  has e q u a l l y  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
r e j e c t e d  s u c h i :r.p roc i se and i n t u i t i v e  l a n c u a c e .  Bu t wha t e Iscl 
Is not He i .iegcer ’ s u s a g e  of p o e t i c  m é t a p h o r e  a s i n g u l a r  i.»:sti- 
>:onv to the p r iria cy or o r i g i n a l i t y  - in the " p r i m o r d i a l ” - c "i - 
of his i n t e n t ?  M o r e o v e r ,  does it not s n o w  his p r o f  aunt r . 
for t he " p oet " a nd wha t he a 11 e m p  t s to do: to n a m e t he ; ' s 1 ■ I 
The p o e t ' s  k i n s h i p  to the luctaphysici - n - t h o u g h  they " ■ H ’ 
near to one a n o t h e r  on mount-'ins f a r t h e s t  a p a r t " - is w''-1 1 
a t t e s t e d  in H e i d e g g e r ' s  s e v e r a l  t r i b u t e s  to and s t u d i e s  of f.is 
f a v o r i t e  p o et, H o l d e r  1 i n . B u t  here, w i t h i n  a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
w o r k  - indeed, w i t h i n  the c o n t e x t  of t h o u g h t  that bring.- to en; 
the h i s t o r y  of m e t a p h y s i c s  - is the s t r o n c e s t e v i d e n c e  o: their
c o m m u n  i o n .
In a w a y ,  we s h o u l d  a l m o s t  a n t i c i p a t e  H e i d e g g e r ' s  c one lu - 
•iinc this " P o s t s c r i p t "  v/ith. a c l e a r - c u t  r e f e r e n c e  to e t c “nal
oh . p . 3L»' . ( •. » u . 36''.T 1 . Fr O!" r 1 i n ' s "P<a tmcu- " a s cuot c j by He i de er­- , p.
V -1. Sc C two of He i ce c cr ' s e . say sj "Rernemb :rance of t h e !
" -IOl dor I in and th ’ .1ssencc 0f Poe pp. BhJ-c'.
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duration, i.e., "...from everlasting," for, throughout the 
works we have been exami ni ng he consistently criticizes :ae ta - 
physical thought I’roni the point of view of priority, i.e.. frc:- 
the vantage point of futurity. How else can one see "history" 
except he stcn-.i outside it in ek-si stenr ? How else can 'U'u see 
a particular "thing" a 1 s soIches except he see it "whole" ( ir: 
hanze) and from a sufficient "distance" to -nahle an enci^clin . 
all-encompassing perspective ( V/ e  1 ten two r ' ) ? How else c" r ' n 
be objective about that which has happened iyj_ time except nc 
Ihouchtfu 1 1V take His "stance" "outside" ohiectificd time ( h i - 
tory), that is, in its future ( Fe rnc ) ? Jn 1 by revers in'- t lie 
flow of time and moving, so to speak, counter to its natural 
propensity arc we afforded sn "historical" perspective. Is it 
not our common experience to move a hea i ot the present ritu/’ti.'- 
in order to see "wha t" it "is"? And, H'u " o Jcing to p - ; it/ ' 
a "flow" of "events" or situations? Yet, w ; cannot bo ' ?
be responsible for this "moving ahe^^d." For, we cannot -
except we arc first moved, i.e., ’He nab led." V.'e say th'^ t t/. ’ 
future reveals itself as "becoming present," but it is never 
apprehended as " f u tur e , " but only as a 1 rea dy "present." ’Ac., 
as already become, "is" now. In consequence, however, of its 
continuous "be-cominc," we are enabled to move to the next mo­
ment, and to take a prior point of vicv' relative to the "pres-'u 
'’nd to sec "it" as something "ma ni f e^ t , " Just as we see ou r - 
"selves." Hence, there is a Iways presupposed in human activilc.’ 
the prior enablinc power of I he future. I'hc always-futur . is 
therefore t -nich i revealed a ^ making boss idle all :H. ic.
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tempora1-spatia1 phenomena. Hence, tiw notions of finituie y . 
infinitude, time V''. eternity, beings vs. Be i ng, s o m e t i no vs. 
Nothing, etc., etc.. In eacn of these, we have an instance cf 
fundamental "difference." The knowledge this d i f fcr ence is 
simply the "apprehending intuition" of that primordial uni tv '•'* 
which all "units" are named, i.e., tlic "horizon of all pos i i b I u 
unity," which is future (Chapter III. below). Then employed 
in the habitual, vulgar, "pre-ont o 1 or. i c a  .1 " ' - a  v , the prima a v e 
this priority is forgotten along v/ith its raeaning. -a n i r '
can %ccruu only from difference, i.^., "dif*' ’cnl ia t. i cn” : . .
tnoughtfu1 recognition of finitude in the face of infinitu:- , 
for example.
Heideoner's empha sis upon the "ontological difference” is 
an emphasis upon priority and hov; " t emcors I i t y  , " when sivn to 
be fundamentally different f rom a tempera 1 Ity, 1. :. . 'n- a I ' . -
"uture, affords the reclamation of mc.anin' from an otficrwir.' 
meaningless, i.e., inauthentic, existence. As v.e sha I i sc , 
ek-si stenz becomes another single-word expression, for the p r i u' - 
i ty afforded finite human ua-sein in virtue of the "enablirm-d' 
the aIways-future. It gives to ex-sistence an Archenv: : ian po i ni 
outside, and with it, the responsibility lor recalling tr.c trula 
of Being.
Now, always to be understood in such formulations as these, 
is the salutory fact that an'* reference we make to "eternal fu­
turity" i !% alwavs relative t--» a Ira dv existing ija-scin. This 
is vdw D a ’ A  to cm. all He i e e c ■ c r ’ s .h: I i b.’ t i'■'i.
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i'rori his van ta ce-point "outside" "historical" existence, t ha t 
is, from ex-sistence, Heidegger is enabled, as are all nen if 
they wish, to see the transient relativity of the Da^ein as it 
"factually" exists, and to understand it in terms of the eter­
nal truth of Being, that is, in terms of the Uber s tier wh i ch 
enables this viev/. Thus, "meaning" returns to all that he re c 
fore had become meaningless in virtue of the Nihilism inner in 
i n a '-'iew that cannot see "beyond" rela’ivlty’. Insight, A.t. 
relativity and historicity, however, utilize" "priority" ' i ' 
critical criterion, but does not recognize it as futur itv. 
does it perceive that futurity is "one" with the ever-future. 
Relativity as a phenomenon is impossible to recognize apart fr 
a static standard or absolute. Except this absolute be airoad
"oiven,"^H relativity could not he perceived. Heidegccr, then 
has simply disclosed the standard by which ^11 is mcasur.-c, sn 
re-discovered meaning for exist ins Da-sc in so that his life m' 
not be a void.
His, however, is no cosmology. He docs not suggest trn t 
his doctrine has any relevance beyond death. .Indeed, he no n 
holds that "life after death" is a fiction if only because it 
is without that fundamental "dif ferencr" wh i ch characterizes 
every thine of which we have any knowledge. If futurity is ch': 
acteristic of Da-sein, then nil that can be said is that or.ce 
the future fails- to come-to-prescnce, then the differenc- is
. oe note this formula as characteristic of Kant's -n: 
'er's analvtical approach, and observe th-t it ir 
of fun" tn 1 acceptance or affirmation of t ni :
.•'wnt, . ondcr-fu'.l, yet quest ionine, response - in
sens e o f a s r: i n ■ ; V,. ha t s no 11 we do w ith. it? ha t
it calls "prc' ence” into question and, if re spun i .
f r om the "rift " back to the "  ^i ver .
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rone, and Dn-sein dis-"integrate^." And with disintegration 
goes "identity." Beyond Da-sein we can know nothing of S e i n .
V.hatever may lie beyond death is "of the mystery." Can one cc 
beyond the absolute? Suffice it to say, that once ex-sistence 
ceases, as in death, then eternal futurity is of no concern -mce. 
The thought of eternal futurity a s sûmes present cx-si stance 
already given in this moment now. Apart from this " s t a n c e ” f c  
i_s no thi nki no ; hence, onlv Nothinc.
Heidegger's "postscript" has included insight wriich I -
tained only from his understanding of "The Essence of Trot a,” 
a nd has served as something of an introduction t.o it. lit x.ov ,, 
than, quite naturally into the realm whence he t tempts to hrin, 
all we have studied full circle. The "Kantbook" disclose i th- t 
Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception" was rootc’ in tin" 
future, that is, in the "horizon of all possible uni tv." Thus 
wa s it disclosed that T emp o r a 1i ty is the Be ing of Da -s cin. "T - 
Essence of Ground" established that "transcendence" is the 
"realm" of the free act of grounding, and that Da-sein is tran­
scendence, freedom, and future. Nov we have seen in ” .'hat is 
Metaphysics?" that Being has its "dis-essencc" in the Nothinc 
as revealed to the Da-sein in dread. And we have interpreted 
this to mean that Being is "grounded," as it were, in the un- 
fathomable ever-future. We have now to see how the "essence ef 
truth" is at the same time the truth of essence.
However, before proceeding to the essay in cues t i on. -e
c h s e e " ' t>’Ot Heidegger's total pro;'T'=m as laiî own i
. fee af.ove. Chapter II, p. 92f*
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the Introduction to Be i no a n d T i rnc was never completed "as such. 
"Or the projected third section of the First Half n "reverse 1 ' 
was envisaged. Nothing was said about this ’’reversal" until she 
letter to Jean Beaufret wa s. published in 19d 7 * In this ” Hum^ n- 
i smusbr i ef e . " ' " Heidegger states that this tiiird section '-.-a s 
purposefully withheld until the right words could be foun ’ ■’'or 
it. Traditional metaphysics (ontology) had been no he Ip. In - 
deed, after the lecture (in 1910) on "Tiie Essence of Trnth" 
v/iiich this letter indicates was the closest he had come tn : 
to formulating the reversal required ‘''or this third section, 
those portions of it which d^alt specifically with this "r.'/er- 
sal" were rewritten many times before its final publication i ri 
196.3 - thirteen years later. So that sixteen years in a 1 ]
were required after "Be i ng and Time" was published to fo' Î-.
this a 1 1-important third section of the First Half, the "^1 
on to the phenomenological analysis of Da - s r i n . Is it not, ir 
to say, then, that "Being and Time" can hardly be understood 
properly until one has followed a course not unlike th^ one 
are taking: that leads to this pivotal essay?
Also to be especially noted is the fact that the problem 
of truth is treated in considerable detail in "Being and Time" 
at two different places. First, in the Introduction, a treat­
ment we have already considered in detail; and secondly, at tlic 
close of the "preliminary analysis of Da se i n" as "Care,” and 
therefore immediately prior to the final analysis of Baseln aw
. liber den ni smus , Vittorio Hlostermann, Frankfur^. i
. Ibid. .
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*7 VTemporal!tv.' ' It stands, therefore, he tween Parts One an: Tv . 
Thus, had "Time and Being" come to expression nt the time of 
publication, v'c would have had n final discussion of Truth at 
the end of "Being and Time," and therefore a triple emphasis 
on Truth as the "answer" to the original question which precipi­
tated the whole program, namely, the question of the "me^'ninr'' 
of' Being, f
In anticipation of this pivotal essay, we offer a t - n - 
,ive «'uide to its interpretation. Heidegger's prime concert, 
though more often implicit Lnan explicit, is to maintain a con­
stant and equal tension betv/cen Dasein and la -sein, historical 
existence and ex-sistence, beings and Being, somethi ng and No­
thing, etc., throughout his thought. For, it is precisely in 
the maintenance of this difficult tension between opposit  ^
the "ontological difference" becomes - along with "identit;" - 
^n "experience" of ex-sisting Da-sein, and Iherefore. the ■'xp-. r- 
ience both of the "oblivion of Being" a nd "the manifest charac­
ter of beings." Only in this tension does the Tactically evf-- 
t inc '.''a se Î n enter the realm of the ex-sistinc Da-seir wh i ch i •' 
of the essence of freedom, i.e., future, i.e., B"ing, i.e., Tr- 
Yet, he never abides in this, realm for long, but only in "crro" 
Hence, even in this ess^y on the essence of truth, we find "on­
tological difference" reflected in the dis-csscnce of truth am 
"error." If we keep this " c; ifference" as a tension in full 
view, we may be able to navl'-^te these t re - cher ou s wa ter' of
'7 . Heine IP "pxpe, j)p. uP- -. .
'8. See ;.lr !, Ibid, p. 19-
l o 2
HAidcçrcrinn thought without crashing onto rocks at either ?i h.
Heidcccer'a intent is to cround a "fundanenta 11 y new ai- 
tituue to history,"? / an attitude that centers upon the üa-ser:. 
(in contrast tc the Dasein) as alone capable of being "histor­
ical." For the Da-sein "into which we can enter" is of tne 
essence of freedom, i.e., futurity, and in consequence tran­
scends history. In so doing, it "brines it to end," so to 
'’peak, by cha ncinc its course, by divertin' it by r;csns : : 
"new" unders t.and i ng which the Da-sein uncov^'rs or reveal*'rov 
its source in primal concea Ir-ent (original truth).
idow, perhaps, we are prepared to cnc 'unter this c s s a y vDii " 
intends to brine all we have studied full circle so that unltv 
in every way consistant with itself cmerrcs.
P
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Chapter VI 
"The Essence of Truth"
In contrast to our usual procedure, v/e v;ill depart some­
what from straightforward exposition In order tc maintain, if 
possible, a decree of circumspection. For, in this essay, the 
"steps" taken in the argument are fully as significant as the 
argument itself.
"The line of thought follows to all appearances the way ^f 
metaphysics, but at the same time, as regards its decisive 
steps - those leading from truth as rightness to ex-sis ten! 
freedom and from this to untruth as dissimulation and error - 
it effects a change in the direction of the enquiry, r- chang 
vhich properly belongs to the conquest (Uberwindunc) cf meta­
physics . " 1
This helpful hint Heidegger included in a brief "Note" vhich he 
appended when the essay v/as published: a hint vhich cannot be 
ignored.
The essay#5 "subject" is truth: not particular ontical 
truths, but ontological truth, i.e., truth in general: thet one 
truth which covers all particular truths and makes it possible 
for them to be "true." The way of the argument, then, must 
lead from particular truths, that is, from our vacuo, prc-onto- 
logical knowledge of truth as reflected, say, in "cormcon sense.” 
Accordingly, we begin with "the conventional concept of truth." 
This concept employs as synonyms for truth such terms as "real," 
"genuine," and "right" as characteristic of the "correspondance,' 
or "a creement"(Ubere ins timmune) inhering between a "true" state-
i. Existence- and Being, Gatcv/ay Edition, Henry Recnery Co.,
Chicago, ' -d, p. 323 - hereafter referred to in this chaptc
only bv p .0 number.
E. p. ?9Ef.
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ment, or proposition (Satz) , about something and the thine it­
self.6 But there are two levels of "agreement" involved here: 
that between the thing itself and the "idea of it as conceived 
in advance," and that between the thing itself and the state­
ment about it. The traditional definition of truth illustrates 
this double aspect if one admits of its reversibility. Ver i tas 
g_s_t a daequa t i o re 1 et inte 11 ectus can suggest both the approx­
imation of perception to a thing, where the "thing" is deter­
minative, and the approximation of a thing to perception • he n 
the latter is determinative.'^ These t'* o approaches to iruth 
have their roots in history. The former characterizes the 
medieval approach and the latter Kant's revolutionary transcen­
dental conception, Medieval Christian doctrine, presupposing 
"creation," holds that the possiblity of "true" knowledge 1 
grounded in the way that proposition and "thing" equally con­
form with "idea," i.e., K: ' , and therefore abide in the unity
of the divine creative Word.6 The secular equivalent to This 
doctrine, i.e., the one that repudiates "creation" and "divine 
plan," nevertheless retains the notion of "conformity" even 
though it tries to give the impression of being independent of 
any explanation as to the essential nature of beings as such.
It relies instead upon the self-evident intelligibility of the 
"logical."^ These similar doctrines also hold that in contrast 
to "self-evident" truth, there is also untruth as the conse­
quence of non-conformity witli the idea, all ideas together cori-
y. p. 29cf. 6. p. 299. 9. p. 296. 6. p. 2/A
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otituting the world-order, the totality of truth. These doc­
trines have become the predominant notions of truth: truth is 
"proposit1ona1" in essence: the "agreement" of a propostion 
with its object when this latter is reduced to idea.?
Once the conformity theory of truth is seen to be the dom­
inant one, then the typical Heidecgerisn question is put: Khat 
constitutes the inner possibility of there being a conformity 
in the first place? It cannot rest in an "essential" agreement 
comparable to that inhering, say, between two coins of the same 
species. Coins are of metal, round, and are legal tender in 
commerce. Propositions, on the other hand, have absolutely 
nothing in common with coins in this physical sense, yet arc- 
said to conform with them when "true." In what, then, does 
this conformity, or agreement, consist? Here Heidegger contend' 
that the essential relation be tween propositions and their ob­
jects is that of "representation."
"The statement about the coin relates 'itself* to this thine 
by representing it and saying of the thing represented *nov 
it is,* 'what it is like,' in whatever respect is important 
at the moment."6
That is to say, the statement: This coin is benti is considered 
to be true and relevant if a vending machine rejects it. At 
another time, one might also say of it: This coin was minted in 
1901, or. It is worn. All such propositions would be "true" if 
they represented the coin exactly, that is, as it "is." These 
acts of representation, however, require that the person mak­
ing such statements about the coin take up a position relative
7 . p .  2 9 c .  6 .  p .  3 0 0 .
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to it, i.e., in opposition to it. He must let it be ’’there’’ 
as an object in its own right, entirely independent of him.
When this happens, it lies, as it were, over ’’there” - across 
an open space, across an ’’open” realm of ’’relation,”'^ When 
lying ’’there,” it can be said to manifest ”behavior” in the 
sense both of coming across the open area tov'ards the person 
opposite, and of remaining all the while "there.” In the same 
way, the person relating to the coin can be said to "behave” ; 
he traverses the open area to the coin, all the while retain­
ing his position "opposite,” Both modes of behavior are thus 
"overt,” or accessible, "as such." 3y remaining in the opposed 
position, each remains overt, or accessible, to the other so 
that the open area of relation may be traversed again and again, 
thereby enabling a whole series of representations: The coin 
is bent, was minted in 1901, is worn, etc.
Representative statements "right themselves" accordinc to 
the "behavior" of the object in question. it "traverse^” the 
open area of relation and "presents" itself, and so furnishes 
the standard by which a re-presentative statement is to conform 
in rightness or truth.*0 But the Da-sein also traverses the 
openness, so that it can generally be said that "overt” behavior 
itself makes possible the "rightness" of conformity."^ But 
what, then, makes this overt behavior possible? Again, the 
Heideggerian regression in terms of "possibility." Always he 
seeks the more "primordial" ground.
p .  3 0 0 f .  10 .  p .  3 0 1 ,  11 .  p .  3 0 2 .
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Before answering this question, v.-e might pause long enough 
to see that Heidegger has already robbed "propositiona1" truth 
of its sovereignty by shifting priority from the proposition to 
the object which the proposition represents, and upon which it 
is dependent. Thus is it shown that onticaZ beings themselves 
are prior to what may be said about them. That is to say, 
Heidegger’s is the Kantian approach to the extent that the ob­
ject, as "given,” determines what may be said of it.
In trying to determine what makes possible this open or
manifest behavior of things, Heidegger attacks at that point
where a representative statement "receives its command to right
itself" in accord with its object’s se 1f-représentation. "Why.
"...does this accord at the same time determine tne nature 
of truth? How, in fact, can there be such a thing at all 
as approximation to a pre-established criterion, or a direc­
tive enjoining such an accord?"Ij
Because, he answers, there is already manifest a condition whi c: 
releases beings to "manifest" behavior so that their represen­
tations can be bound together in the relation of truth. That 
condition is freedom. Freedom sets beings free to "behave."
In the resulting "manifestation" of their behavior, they stand 
in a "relation" which itself reflects the freedom which orig­
inally released them. That is, when released to manifest 
behavior, they stand, as behaving: actively opposed to each 
other out "there" in the open area of relation. The "fact" of 
their opposition of their approximation, of their accord with
12 .  p .  3 0 2 .  13 .  p .  3 0 2 .  I k .  p .  3 0 3 .
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each other, that is, the fact of their "relation" itself is 
the essence of truth. And this fact is but evidence of freedom. 
Hence, "freedom is the essence of truth itself.
Now, ...
"...•essence* is understood here as the basis of the inner 
poss i bi1i tv of whatever is accepted in the lirst place and 
generally admitted as ’known.*"16
This formula, "the basis of the inner possibility" is by now 
familiar. It figures prominently wherever we go as the "crit­
ical" criterion in Heideggerian thought. It paved the wav in 
the "Kantbook" not only for the laying of the foundation of 
metaphysics a la Kant, but also enabled the laying operation to 
proceed "yet more originally" to the "horizon of all possible 
unity" which, as the "self-affection" of time, is also "of the 
future" and "of the essence of Da-sein," This formula also 
paved the way for the discovery that freedom is the essence of 
"ground" as it is "strewn" by the Da-sein according to a tri­
partite temporalization process which has its roots in futurity, 
And no less in "What is Metaphysics?" did we find this formula 
moving the analysis inexorably towards "dread" as the "essen­
tial mood" of the Da-sein, the mood that reveals the Not hi nc, 
i.e., the "oblivion of Being," in immediate contrast to the 
manifest character of beings. Here too, futurity is the realn 
of the Nichts. Now, with this latest disclosure that "freedom 
is the essence of truth itself," we are faced with a whole ser­
ies of possible correlative elements; Freedom, says Heicegcer,
16- p. 3C\. 16. p. 303 (my italics).
Iü9
is the essence of truth. Now, the essence of Da-sein, Ground, 
Being, Nothing, and the "horizon of ail possible unity" is "of 
the future." In consequence, we begin to suspect that "frecdor." 
and "futurity" are correlates - but more than "suspect," really, 
for, In "The Essence of Ground" we found that transcendence is 
freedom and therefore future. Indeed, we need not have looked 
so far afield for the basis of this correlation. It lies "in 
the inner possibility of whatever is accepted in the first 
place and generally admitted as ’known.*"
Heidegger himself gives us an example of this kind of 
cor re la t i on:
"The crucial question regarding the ’meaning,’ i.e., the 
realm of projection, i.e., the manifest character, i.e., 
the truth, of Be inc..."17
"Though deliberately left undeveloped" in this essay, this for­
mulation of the steps from the "meaning" to the "truth" of Be­
ing Is nc less a relation of accord. The "meaning" of Being 
is the "truth" of Being. Freedom, then, as "the essence of 
truth itself," is the meaning not only of Being, but also of 
Da-sein, ex-sistence, etc., and itself is of the essence c 
futurity. Hence, time appears in every analysis as the a priori 
criterion for criticism and analysis, and issues ultimately in 
that species of time which is always future. To be sure, it 
is still too early to say that Heidegger in this essay states 
that the essence of truth is futurity, and thereby confirms 
this massive correlation, but has he not already shown his hand
17. p. 32; ucluding Note").
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with this explicit reference to "essence" as the "basis of the 
inner possibility of..."7
Heidegger has said, "The essence of truth is freedom it­
self." Before attempting to clarify and explain why this is 
so, he observes that this correlation of truth with freedom 
leaves vide open the possibility that truth is abandoned to the
caprice of man. Especially does this appear to be so when one
17'considers that "guile and dissimulation, lies and decep t i or,, 
fraud and pretence, in short, all manner of untruth, are 
ascribed to But he argues that the human origin of
untruth...
"...merely confirms by contrast the essential nature of 
truth ’as such’ which holds sway ’over’ man and which meta­
physics regard as something imperishable and eternal, some­
thing that can never be founded on the transitorincss and 
fragility of humankind."19
How, then, one might ask, can truth have a stable basis In
human freedom? The answer to this requires an examination of
the essential nature of freedom.
The connection between truth and freedom has been shown to 
be "rightness," i.e., that "approximation" which is constituted 
when the overt behavior of beings becomes manifest in the open 
area of relation in virtue of their being set free to act. The 
directive to "right" a proposition with the manifest behavior
17a. We accept our translator’s choice of "dissimulation" for 
Heidegger’s term Verbercunc and "concealment" for Verber- 
gen. The former’s equation with "dissemblance (Webster ’s 
Collcciate Dicti ona rv ) and our previous discussion of .r-, 
b 1 ance" above, pp. k2ff. ) give this admittedly clu*.;cy
term n- •' vient meaning to warrant its use. 
le. p. 3Ch. 19. p. 30^.
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of its object is enjoined by freedom itself. For, it provides 
the pattern that prepositional truth is to follow: a proposition 
is right, i.e., true, only when it represents its object as it 
"is," i.e., as "free" to "be." It "is" as it "behaves" in the 
"open," a behavior which both traverses the open area of rela­
tion in a se if-presenta tion, and remains "there" all the vhil ■.
It "is" to the extent that it is free.
Heidegger*s concern in this exposition of freedom is pri-
P 1marily from the point of view of the D a - s e i n . S o ,  he speak* 
in terms of the Da-sein*s behavior relative to the "things" 
that "arc," That which is manifest and to which a representa­
tive statement approximates in rightness "is that v'hich obvi­
ously ’is* all of the time and has some manifest form or behav-
pior."'""^  The freedom that allows the revelation of such behavior 
also "lets" whatever is acting "there" what it is. Therefore, 
freedom is manifest in the Da-sein when it "lets" beings 
what they are. Heidegger reduces this formula simply to "let- 
ting-be,"‘~^  a phrase reminiscent of our occasional complaint to 
others: Let me bel Leave me alonel Let me be as 1 ami Don’t
20. pp. 300f. and 30$.
21. It is conceivable that other beings might have an interest
in "truth" as accord with freedom, but we have yet to dis­
cover evidence for same. In relation with other beings whi cf, 
are not Da-sein, we behave "overtly,” i.e., we traverse the 
open and remain in an opposed position. Just as they do, But, 
we are "concerned" for the character of this relation, for 
whether it is perceived truly or not, w h i le they seem to re­
flect no such interest. In the light of this discussion of 
the nature of truth, however, we must leave the matter open, 
fDr, if they are allowed to "be’* as they "are," we t
ribiv discover thr-. t they too are concerned in their o'.T, wp . 
A.'.ü !'"■ r.*; v^hat secrets the future will reveal t. : u tu -
: enera 11 :
D. 70^. P7. D. an-.
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meddle! Such is exactly what Heideccer means, but his emphasis 
is upon the "other," i.e., upon the object about which state­
ments are made. Freedom, as manifest in Da-sein, is lettinc 
the "other" be ^  is.
But this does not mean turning away from it. On the con­
trary, it means turning towards it even more, but in an cttitu *• 
that manifests the freedom to let it be as i s . and not as 
we are wont to pre-conceive it. Hence, freedom as an attitude-; 
of openness to^ A-ards the precise nature of that which is opposed 
in relation. An element of mystery, of that which is yet to be 
revealed, therefore, abides. Such an attitude, Heidegger con­
tends, characterized those who gave birth to Western thought, 
for, they conceived this "openness" as LXOd-Lbb-.* i-Le uncori- 
ccaled.2^ Hence, revealment; letting-be reveals. It...
"...exposes itself to what-is-as-such and brings all behavior 
into the open. ’Lettinc-bc,* i.e., freedom, is in its own 
self *ex-posinc* (aus-se tzend) and *ex-sistent* (ek-s i s tent).”d
Yet, at any given moment, freedom, as "a participation in 
the revealment of what-is-as-such (das Seiende sis e i n  solches) . 
"guarantees" that what is disclosed to ex-sistence is actually 
the "there" of vrhat "is," i.e., its d a - s e i n . T h i s  means that 
Da-sein can have perfect confidence that what is revealed to it 
"at the moment" "is" what is "there," i.e., what is "manifest" 
in the open area of relation. If at another, later, time it 
should be revealed to "be" slightly different, this later revel-
2 2 .  p .  3 0 6 .  2 9 .  p .  3 0 6 f .  2 6 .  p .  j O ? .
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at ion would not detract from what was earlier seen. Rather, 
this later "chance" in appearance depends upon the former. 
Together they disclose a segment of history, the history of
V 'f , revealment, a history that is built upon the tempor­
al character of freedom as fundamentally future.
"Letting-be," then, as an activity of Da-sein, an activi^r 
that is fundamentally historical, not only reveals beings "as 
such," but dis-closes the Da-sein itself to be ex-posing, a n , 
therefore ex-sistent, i.e., free. In Dn-sein is preserved 
"that long un-fathomed and essential basis on which man is a b ' 
to cx-sist" in an "ex-position into the revealed nature of do­
ings as such. ^
"Still unfathomed and not even conscious of the need for an 
deeper fathoming of its essence, the ex-sistence of histor­
ical man begi n.s a t that moment wheri the first thinker to as- 
himself about the revealed nature of beings poses the enac­
tion: V^hat is v;hat-is? With this question unconcea Imcnt an 
revealment are experienced for the firsn time."2D
And this history continues so Icnc as this question is pose^
in its basic originality by each subsequent generation. For,
this question includes within it both a firm notion of wha t
wha t - i 5 j^ s^ ( "wha t-i s" = das Seiende) , and an open attitud e of
genuine questioning (What ijs ...?).
vvc are quick to rise to this significant statement about
the "beginning" of the history of Western thought. For, v’e c-"
oonot over-stress the point made earlier^' that Heidegger, for
all his apparent concentration upon ontology, is nevertheless
p . • ' ' 'd . p . 3 0 ' ( ou r i t a lie 3 ) . f 9 . A o v ■ ,
19Ù
disclosing, so far as the history of metaphysics is concerned, 
"a fundamentally new attitude to history."' Indeed, we would 
put the matter more, strongly: he is working out in terms of 
metaphysics a philosophy of history. He sticks to metaphysics 
because this discipline is tiie only one that is "basically" 
interested in the Being of the beings that arc manifest. This 
interest, because it is ontology, takes infinite pains with 
the particular being "as such," and moves on up the ladder to 
Gather up the "totality" of beings, which includes man. th3 
historian. The problem of "objectification," whether it br a 
phenomenon of Nature or an "event" of history, is, as has been 
shown, a metaphysical problem. And since Heidegger*? method­
ology singles out the relation which Time has v;ith Being, his 
is primarily a concern to solve, as it v,»ere, the problem of 
history, the problem of the inter-relations of all beings as 
these relations arc revealed over a period of time. The his­
tory of metaphysics, beginning with the pre-Socratics. has en'-' 
ed '• ith an explication of relativism and Nictzscbean Nihilism. 
Heideccer seeks the "meaning," i.e., the truth, of Being by 
means of Time so that the meaning, i.e., the truth of history 
may be shown.
To spend so much time in an investigation of "transcen­
dental objectification" as the mode of Da-sein*s existence 
may at first seem to be at the furthest remove from an attempt 
to solve the problem of history, but...
;0. p. 323.
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"Only where das Se i ende Is expressly raised to the power 
of its own revelation and preserved there, only where this 
preservation (as "lettinr-be"] is conceived as the quest 
for das Se i ende a 1 s ein solches,only there does history 
bee În 3 1
History bee ins with the question: What is vhat-is?, a question 
that is the formulation of the "ontological difference." "/.'hat 
is . ..?” implies Se insvers landnls, and "wha t-i s" Implies ontical 
knowledge. Or, in temporal terms, this "basic" question con­
tains a "former" perception (what-is) and a quest for a "later" 
one - one that will be in the former’s future (What iji 
This quest for a later perception is an "historical" que^t, a 
quest for change: a change, perhaps, that ^i 11 approximate that, 
which so characterizes man’s basic experience of himself, a 
cnange, perhaps, which may afford some clue to se 1f-understan- 
cing, i.e., will disclose "meaning," truth, freedom.
"The initial revelation of v.'ha t-is-in-tota 1 i ty (das Seien:!- 
im Ganzen ) . the quest for wha t-i s-a s-such, and the becinnir.. 
of the history of the West, are one and the same thine anJ 
are contemporaneous in a ’time’ which, itself immeasurable 
[eternal futurity?}, alone opens the Manifest to every kind 
of measurement."32
The "new" is sought in preference to the "old" when the primal
question is put. For, the "new" has adhering to It something
of the future, something of that "immeasurable" time which is
the horizon of all possible unity, and which pre-ontologlca1
knowledge pre-supposes without knowing it, but is fascinated
none the less. Freedom adheres to the "new," and the "old"
smacks of servitude.
3 1 .  p .  3 0 8 .  3 2 .  p .  3 0 8 .
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But the connection between the "new" and the "old" must 
be seen to be all-important, for, this "connection" is the 
"difference." It is the "difference" that makes the basic 
question "basic.” The "difference" is the "exposition" of both 
the "old" and the "new." Hence, the Da-sein, as ex-positiop,
"as the lettino-be of what-is, sets man free for his * ^ reed c:n. ’ " 
But man can only choose between actual nossiblities and actual 
necessities. Where "freedom" is associated wi th "possibilities, 
non-freedom, or servitude, is linked v?ith "necessity." Hence, 
man does not possess "freedom," but is possessed by it, and in 
such a manner that it alone - not man - makes possible his re­
lation to v/ha t-is-in-tota 1 ity , and to history whi ch is charac­
terized by this r e l a t i o n . " O n l y  ex-sistent man is historic"!, 
’Nature’ has no history.
When freedom is understood as letting what-is "be," the 
nature of truth is fulfilled and perfected as unconcealment, 
revealment. That is, truth is the revelation of what-is, but 
in the sense that it is the answer to the "basic question."
It must therefore include an element of futurity as well as 
presence. For, there must be an ex-position, a movement away 
from the present "closed" attitude to what-is and into the open 
so that revelation can take place. For revelation to take 
place, something must be dis-covered, dis-closed, revealed. 
Truth, as Heidegger conceives it, is a movement, a process, an 
evolution. In terms of man, truth is "behavior," and not some
33. p. 308:, 3b. p. 709.
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static propositiona1 form that can be written down. And be­
cause all behavior is "overt," or out in the "open," Heideccer 
can say...
"All human behavior is an exposition into that overtness. 
Hence, man i_s_ in virtue of his ex-sistence.
Man’s ability to let things be than they "are" a t
the moment is made possible by freedom, and this "enabling"
by freedom receives its due in the sense that man’s idea? must
conform to freedom’s inner directive to approximate itself,
i.e., f r e e d o m . B u t  man’s propositions accord to what-i^
a t, the moment. and in consequence have become subject to the
"basic question," and are subordinate to those observations
which embody further revelation, and so on and on ad^  infini tu.m,
Thus evolves a "history" of ideas and propositions, i.e., the
history of thought. Indeed, ...
"...history and all its possibilities Care’’ guaranteed ... 
in the revelation of what-is-in-tota 1 ity. The manricr ir. 
which the original nature; of truth comes to be (west} civf- 
rise to the rare and simple decisions of history?^]?
Historical man’s problem, then. Is this: Just what j_s 
what-is? That is to say, the vision of absolute unity that 
abides at the horizon of all possible unity "comes" to e x -s i s- 
ting Da-sein, and hangs as a dense fog over all that "is," ob­
scuring definitive outlines, so that he must look to that "her 
izon" in order to dis-cover what had heretofore remained in 
concealment, mystery. Man cannot let what-is be what it is
3$. p. 309. 36. P" 309. 37. p. 309.
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because futurity, i.e., concealment, adheres to what-is in 
the guise of its own unity "as such." To cx-sistence, vhat-is 
is problematical, and because it is, history evolves as the 
record of man’s "simple decisions" about the precise nature c:' 
what-is, these decisions being "propositions!" and therefore 
"relative," or in "error," But relativity is not the base 
problem. Rather, the root problem arise when "the essential 
negation of truth, its ’dis-essence’ (Unwesen ) makes its ap­
pearance."-'^ Nov;, if truth, i.e., freedom, is not a property 
of man, then it follows that untruth cannot be simply a conse­
quence of man’s inability and negligence. "Truth and untruth 
are not in essence indifferenct to each other. "39 have now
to see how the full explication of truth, according to Heideg­
ger, unfolds so as to reveal untruth to be truth’s dis-esscnce.
"The essence of truth has revealed itself as freedom.
This is the ex-sistent, revelatory ’lettinc-be’ of vhat-is."
In overt behavior, the Da-sein, as we rav; e a r l i e r , i n  order 
to let-be-as-is, projects out over and beyond the objects’s 
presently conceived dimensions of being - out towards the un­
known totality of all that is. For, "...the manifest charac­
ter of what-is-in-totality is not identical with the sum of 
known actualities."^' Indeed, this "in-totality"
"...appears, in the field of vision of our daily calculation* 
and activities, as something incalculable and incomprehen­
sible. It cannot be understood in terms of what manifestly 
’is*’ whether this be a part of nature or of history. Al­
though itself ceaselessIv determining all things, this
38. p. 39. p. 310, UO. Chapter III above, p. '?
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’in-tots lity* ... at the same tin.e ... is not Just nothing ; 
it is a concealment of what-is iji total ity."82
It is precisely here with this "...at the same time..." that a
basic change in emphasis is being introduced. The Da-sein’s
ex-position into the transcendental realm of openness, i.e.,
into Being and Nothing, has been the Ube r s t i e c which is always
"excessive." Now we are to consider its correlate, namely,
i tthe Entzuq, which brings^down to earth, so to speak, and encs 
with the position of vrhat-i^. Or, to put it another way, free­
dom as the essence of truth has to this point in the argument 
been the freedom to let something "other" be itself. Now, ve 
are still speaking of " letting-be," but the emphasis has sv'itched 
from "letting-" to the "-be." In order to let something "be," 
it is not enough simply to project out into the transcendents: 
"incalculable" and "incomprehensible" realm of the totality of 
beings. This particular being "here" has to be narrowed down 
from incomprehensibility to comprehensibility, from transcen­
dence to Immanence. To do so requires the dissimulation of 
the transcendental world, and the simulation of ontic partic­
ularity in the "here and now."
" ’Letting things be’ is at once a concealment (Verberren).
In the ex-sistent freedom of Da-sein there is accomplished 
a dissimulation of what-is in totality and therein lies the 
concea Iment. "1:3
Once "letting-be" lets something "be," concealment of 
what-is in totality is accomplished. The die is cast. Further 
revelation is rendered impossible, for the moment, at least.
32. p .  11 :.. 83* p .  3 1 2 .
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"Concealment denies revelation to - ^, ... it makes its
• ]own specific property the property of v:_lC-LLld.• Thus, con­
cealment is non-revelation, and untruth and concealment become 
"specific of and peculiar to the nature of truth."
The "peculiar" thing about untruth and concealment is 
that they precede truth and revelation; they are prior.''-'
That is, the dissimulation of what-is-in-tcta1ity, i.e., the
"v'orld," which is involved in letting this thine "be" vdia t it
is, is actually the dissimulation of what is alrea dy dissimu­
lated. For, the "world" is a "transcendental." Hence, it is 
a mystery. And, if what-is-in-totality is dissimulated, then, 
so also is what-is-as-such. Unity, whether it is the unity 
the "world," tfie unity of the "many" as a collective, or th~: 
unity of the single unity, is concealed in the "horizon of all
possible unity." Mystery, then, "absolute mystery as such (t):t
dissimulation of the already dissimulated) pervades the whole 
of man’s Da-sein.
"Da-sein, insofar as it cx-sists, reaffirms the first and 
most extreme non-revelation of all: authentic untruth. The 
authentic ’dis-esscnce’ of truth - that is the mystery."87
Nov;, by "dis-essence" is not meant pre-essence, or some­
thing that precedes essence. Rather, "...it means a de-nalur­
ing of that a 1ready reduced essence."^ ' Dis-essence is essen­
tial to - is not indifferent to - essence.
"For those who know, the ’dis-* of the initial dis-essence,
p. 3 1 3 . /jS. p. 3^3* '4‘->. p. 3 1 3 » u7* P*
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A ? also the ’un-* of untruth, point into the still unexolcre: 
region of the truth of Being, and not merely of beings."u9
Perhaps this point should be expanded. Freedom, "under­
stood as the lettinc-be of what-is," is primarily "a relation 
of open resolve." That is, the "resolution" to i*evea 1 wha t-i 
as-such is the Da-sein’s response to the command to be free.
Yet, in turning to what-is in terms of revealing It as it "is," 
the Da-sein conceals the affinity which freedom has with r>'V- 
elation. In consequence, this occupation ,ith "beings," in 
which context the Da-sein finds its own "self," is «t tne same 
time a forgetting of the essential mystery which precedes ail 
that "is."68 Even when turned towards the ultimate mystery, 
such turning is necessarily always in terms of the things that 
"are.” For man there is no immediate turning towards the mys­
tery, i.e., towards Being, in all its primordial purity, for 
one cannot turn towards... Nothing.
"Wherever the dissimulation of what-i^ in totalitv is ad­
mitted only by the way, as a boundary which occasionally 
impinges, dissimulation as the cround-phenomenon of D^-s^in 
is lost in ob1iVion. 1
Heidegger’s point here is that once the priority of Being 
is seen, then this, at first glance, seems to solve many prob­
lems, but in actual fact, when pressed home, a 11 disappears in 
mystery. Net one single solitary being however insignificant 
and simple, not one event of all that have ever happened hov ever 
common and taken for granted, - no "thing" and no "event" has 
ever been exclusive of the all-encompassing craip of Belnr..
p. 3 *8 * eO, p. 3l8f. 31. p. j 1 u -
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All have been subject to dissimulation. For, all have "been." 
Thus, all have been the products, so tc speak, of the dissimu­
lation of the Da-sein: the dissimulation of the already dissim­
ulated Being of beings, i.e., the truth of Being.
This is a very important point! Much has been made so 
far of the "ontological difference" and how this dialectic 
appears to effect a balance between Being and beings, each de­
pendent on the other. But when the balance is des t roved with 
the insight that Being is ultimately prior to all beings, the’, 
there is no balance at all, no Archeinedian point outside this 
"difference" which locates ex-sistent Da-sein in t ranscencenc-. 
For, Da-sein is D^-. Se i n has precedence over Da-sein. Both 
existence and ex-sistence (inauthentic and authentic existence, 
respectively) are forms, as we shall see momentarily, of in­
sistence - in virtue of the Da.
Yet, the obviation of the mystery in dissimulation does 
not get rid of it. it remains, but in a form most unlikely. 
Historical man, forgetting the oblivion of Being, is forc^wd 
in consequence to rely upon himself ana his measures of all 
that "is." He builds up his "world" and records hi? "history" 
"out of whatever intentions and needs happen to be the mo:-t 
immediate, filling | them] out with projects and plans.
Thus, he becomes, and continues to be, the measure of all 
things. And without anything else to cling to, he insists
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upon continuing to do Just this. As ex-slsting, Da-sein is 
also in-si stent.
"But the mystery dwe1 Is also in in-sistence though here 
the mystery Is the forgotten essence of truth now become 
’ i n e s s e n t i a l . ’"of
Thus, we find in ex-sistence a turning sway, a "reversal,"
a turning back - away from the mystery - and in in-sistence,
a turning towards the things of which Da-^ein is the measure.
The Da-sein’s is a kind of back and forth "drifting from the
mystery to the practicable and from one practicability to the
next, always missing the mystery.,."^^ This is erring.
"Man errs. He does not merely fail into error, he lives 
in error always because, by ex-sisting, he in-sists and is 
thus already in error. ... Error is part of the Inncr-strur- 
ture of Da-sein, in which historical man is involved. ... 
Error is the essential counter-essence of the original es­
sence of truth. It opens out as the manifest theatre '^or 
all counter-play to essential truth. Error is .., the bas;- 
of Wrong,"36
And Wrong is not the isolated mistake; It is "the empire, the 
whole history of all the complicated and intricate ways of 
erring." In a v/ord. Wrong "is essentially one with the manl- 
fe.st character of beings."^'
But strangely enough, the way of erring makes possible 
man’s not allowing himself to be led astray. It makes possi­
ble the "experience of error and thus the recalling of the 
mystery of D a - s e i n . "6^ ' This remarkable turn is due to the 
fact that "error always oppresses in one way or another." Man 
suffers in consequence of erring; "he lives in an extremity
,7 . p .  3 ! - .  p .  3 1 6 .p .  3 i 6 f .  3 5 .  p .  3 1 7 .  3 6 .  p .
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of compulsion." Compulsively and impulsively he turns this 
way and that "but always into misery, ... into n e e d . "69 
"Misery" and "need," then, deriving as they do from error, 
make possible man’s turning towards the mystery. For, the 
desperation inhering in misery provokes a turning in every 
direction. The apparent loss of freedom in misery’s "ncces*^-i ty" 
can precipitate a chance turning towards the mystery.
With this, we reach something of a plateau, the heights
of which afford a view of most all that we have been dealing
with in this essay:
"The revelation of beings as such is at the same time the 
concealment of the totality of beings tboth in the individ­
ual and the collective sense]. In this simultaneity of re­
vealing and concealing, error has sway. Both the dissimu­
lation of the already dissimulated mystery^ and error be­
long to the original essence of truth. Freedom, consisting 
in the in-si stent ex-sistence of Da-sein, is the essence of 
truth - in the sense of propositiona1 rightness - only be­
cause freedom itself springs from the original essence of 
truth, from the reign of mystery in error."60
In this condensed formulation we can make out a correlation
which v/e have been anxious to find. When Heidegger says that
"freedom is the essence of truth itself," we interpret "esscnci
in terms of "openness," as analagous to Being’s "presence" in
beings. Truth, so conceived, is "open," apparent; it can be.
discerned to be operative. It makes possible both in-sistence
and ex-sistence. But truth’s "apparent" essence must also be
seen in the light of its "original essence" v;hlch we take tc
be analogous to the Nothing, namely, mystery, dis-essence,
in-1 ruth. "The authentic ’dis-essence’ of truth - that is the
:nvs t e  r y  . ‘
39. p. jib. 60. p. jl9.
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Nov, "error" does not fit into this correlation at ail. 
it, rather, is said to be "the essential counter-essence of 
the original essence of truth."^2 Error is the manifestation 
neither of truth nor freedom in the same way the "beings" are 
the manifestation neither of truth nor freedom. Yet, beings 
are "of" Being and error is "of" truth and freedom.
With this correlation of truth with Being, we are pre­
pared for the "reversal" of which Heidegger spoke in the 
"Humanismusbriefe," the reversal involved in the transition 
from "Being and Time" to "Time and Being." In this essay he 
puts it this way: "...the essence of truth is bound up with the 
truth of e s s e n c e . A n d  in the "Postscript" to "What is 
Metaphysics?," he put it this way: "...supposing that not mere­
ly what-is comes from Being but that, in a manner still more 
original, Being Itself reposes in its truth and that the truth 
of Being is a function of the Being of truth..."^8 We under­
stand this "reversal" to be as follows:
The "meaning" of Being, which is also the "truth" of Be­
ing, has been shown to be "concealed" in "dis-essence," i.e.. 
Nothing, Absolute Mystery. This was shown by means of a 
"temporal" analytic in which the ever-future (our formulation) 
is thought to be time’s dis-essence, and so, eternal, i.e., 
mysterious. That is to say, the analyses have been moved 
along in virtue of a continued deference to temporal priority.
^ 1 ,  p .  3 I 3 .  6 2 .  p .  3 1 7 .  6 3 .  p .  3 1 9 -  6 8 .  p .  7 3 1 .
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"Be i ne and Time," for example, analyzes a particular being 
and ends with the proposition that"Tempera 1ity" is the Being 
of Daseln. Now, the "logical" conclusion that must be dravn 
from this would turn ontology over to a "yet more primordial” 
discipline, say, "temporology," or some such. But the point 
is this: that this way has led to absolute mystery. Nothing, 
dis-essence, an ever- (and therefore, never) future. Time Is 
not an essence, a something. It is Mystery, dis-essence, No­
thing. Rather, we must always turn around and go back to our 
preoccupation with beings (as in these studies), and attempt 
to relate to them in such a w^ ay that Being abides in them.
In this way. Time enters as a constant factor and has Its way. 
Those who see this, realize that metaphysics is the "basic" 
discipline of "historical" man. There is no way to deal with 
Time as an "object," as an entity, in a way appropriately pri­
mordial enough and therefore truly temporal. The eternal, 
ever-future has been our name given to the Mystery, the Holy, 
the Nothing, these latter being Heidegger’s names. All sug­
gest "the absent One" who never appears "as such," yet is 
nearer than hands and feet, closer than breathing. Time per­
vades all as the horizon of all possible unity and discloses 
to Da-sein that it, as well as all other beings, is incomplete, 
and will find fulfillment, or wholeness, or unity, only when 
concerned with the basic question, i.e., when concerned with 
the "place" (Da-) where Time and Being commingle: in Da-seir.
We cannot know pure Time, pure Truth, pure Mystery, purK Be in.;
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these are Nothing when sought for themselves. They are re­
vealed only when the "basic" question is put, e question which 
is ruler-over by Time: "Wha t J_s what-is?" This "reversal," 
this "turning away" from the Mystery which is pure Time, is 
a returning to beings, and brings Heidegger’s analysis "full 
circle." The w^ ay in "Being and Time” let toward Time. The 
proposed third part of the "First Half," to be entitled "Time 
and Being" would have, as in this essay, shown that this way 
is a blind alley; it ends in absolute Mystery. We are forced 
to forego the anticipated pleasure of getting hold of pure 
transcendence, freedom, truth, the Absolute; for, they turn 
out to be Nothing. This is why Heidegger contends that his 
thought brings to end the whole history of Western thought, 
culminating in Hegel and Nietzsche.^6 We must return to beings 
and to history, and do so "historically."
This "reversal," this turning back and away from ahsoiulr 
Mystery, and towards the tension that abides in the Da-^e;'r, 
this resolve for "historical" responsibility is succinctIv 
summed up as "gazing out of error into the mystery" and asking 
"the only question that exists: What is that which is as such 
in totality?"
"This question mediates the essentially confusing and, be­
cause of its multifarious aspects, still unmastered question 
regarding das Se in des Se ienden. The thought of Being, 
which is the original source of all such questioning, has, 
ever since Plato’s day, been conceived as ’Philosophy,’ 
later acquiring the title of ’Metaphysics.’"66
6 3 ,  p .  3 2 3 .  6 6 .  p .  j l 9 f «
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in the feet that this basic question Is still "unmastered," 
there is expressed a fundamental humility, an attitude of 
openness towards the mystery. It is, as it were, a confession 
of error, an admission that freedom and transcendence are still 
future. This philosopher is not the arbiter of truth, but ac­
knowledges, rather, that the essence cf truth Is yet to be re­
vealed. That is, it has not become "historical” in the sense 
of having been formulated propositiona1ly, but nevertheless 
has been revealed in the mystery that adheres fundamentally 
to the Da-sein who, during hi s lifetime, abides, relative to 
all that "is," in the future. Heidegger’s claim to "surpass" 
(Überwindunc) metaphysics is grounded in this reversal in ap­
proach: a turning away from an attempt to grasp the mystery 
as though it had revealed itself "as such" cuite apart from 
what-is, and a turning towards historical man as the scone, 
as it were, of the revelation of mystery, xn-sistinc ex-sis ter: 
Da-sein is the only "place" where the mystery is Immanent,
Except philosophy, i.e., metaphysics, takes as its "subject" 
Da-sein^^fails altogether to look in the right "place." But 
let the author speak for himself...
"The knowledge arrived at in the lecture comes to flower In 
the essential experience that only in and from Da-sein, as 
a thing to which v/e have entry, can any approximation to the 
truth of Being evolve for historical man. Not only is everv 
sort of subjectivity (of man regarded as a subject) abandon­
ed, as was already the case in ’Sein und Ze i t « ’ and the trutf 
of Being pursued as the ’ground’ of a fundamentally new at­
titude to history, but an effort is made in tlie course of the 
lecture to think in terms of this other ’around,’ i.e., Da-sein7?
"rom ended "Note," p. j2j.
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The essay’s last section is given over to a discussion 
of the problem of truth and philosophy. In it Heideccer defend? 
philosophy’s historic preoccupation with Being, but only inso­
far as Being is understood from the perspective of this new 
approach,
"In this thought of Being, man’s freedom for ex-sistence 
(a freedom which is the basis of ail history) is put into 
words. This is not to be understood as the ’expression’ of 
an ’opinion’; rather this word (Being) is the well-preserved 
structure of the truth of das Se i nde Ganzen. "66
Nor does it matter "how many have ears for this word," for, 
"those who hear it determine man’s place in history."69 That 
is to say, "common sense" (Sophism) will no doubt reject out 
of hand the "way" of thought represented here, but such will 
not deter those whose respect is commanded rather by "the hor­
izon of all possible unity," i.e., "the well-preserved struc­
ture of the truth of beings in totality." The " non-pr ob 1 pi^ a t- 
ical" approach to things, both "other" and the "self," sees the: 
as already manifest and not at all infected, as it were, with 
the problematical "in totality." But, though such a view be 
the majority view, the courageous will take up the challenge 
to approximate more truly that ultimate unity which abides in 
the distance.
Because, however, "the complete essence of truth also in­
cludes its dis-essence," the error that is dissimulation will 
constrain philosophy to walk softly, to have the "calm dignity 
of gentleness, not denying the dissimulation." But a_t the same
6 6. p. 320. 69. p. 320.
210
time, its "open resolve" to press on towards the mark, vill 
combine with gentleness in a tension that vill "force its es­
sence whole and Intact into the open, into our understanding, 
and so to reveal its own truth,"^8
What this means for philosophy is this: that it can admit 
of no "outside" authority.7^ That is to say, all authority has 
a 1 ready been invested in In-sisting ex-sistent Da-se in in virtuv. 
of its proximity to 5e in. Being has t^  be t hought , a < ha s 
been, and ever will be. "But Being is not a product of t h ink­
ing. It is more likely that essential thinking is an occurrence 
of B e i n g . " A u t h o r i t y  is "there" in the Da-sein; It is a 
matter of "letting" it "occur" in the "historical" questioninc 
of da s Se i ende Im Ga nzen. In other words, philosophy, a- trulv 
"historical" thinking, is neither held down in servitude t 
history as "tradition," nor frightened by the majesty of tne 
mystery, but sees, rather, that the mystery abides in Da-snin, 
and therefore takes confidence and courage therein.
Now at the end of his enquiry, Heideccer reviews the steps
that it has taken:
"By tracing the inner possibility of a statement’s ’right­
ness* back to the ex-sistent freedom of ’letting-be* as the 
very basis of that statement, and by suggesting that the es­
sential core of this basis is to be found in dissimulation 
and error, we may have indicated that the nature of truth î *■ 
not just the empty, ’general’ character of some ’abstract* 
commonplace, but is something that is unique in history (it­
self unique): the self-dissimulation cf the revelation of 
the ’meaning’ of what we call ’Being’..."73
L. ^2 71, p . 321. 72. From the "Pcs t sc r1p t" t ?
n. ;2 : . "v4hat is Metaph\
p. 3;D7.
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The Da-sein is what is "unique in history," the unity that is 
the tension that abides in both identity and difference. As 
such, it dissimulates (conceals) the revelation of the truth, 
i.e., meaning, of Being, while at the same time revealing it 
in 9 way that is diametrically opposed to "history" with its 
representation and formulation of "historical" truths. That 
may the better see something of the nature of this dialectical 
tension that abides in the Da-sein, let us now venture into 
Heidegcer*s discussion of Identity and. Difference.
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Chapter VII 
1. "The Principle of Identity"
This lecture, as Heidegger puts it in the Forward to 
Identitat und Oifferenz, "looks both fcrv-ard and backward."^
It looks forward into the realm of objectification in the sense 
discussed at length in the "Kantbook," that is, into the reaIn 
of beings as such, as existing factually, i.e., historically.
And it looks backward "Into the realm of the essential advene 
of metaphysics, the dispostion of which is determined through 
the 'Difference.*"' Now, without for the moment going into the 
complexities of these "realms," we nevertheless want to under­
stand these graphic terms "forward" and "backward." We have 
seen how Heidegger has continually pushed by means of a "tempor­
al" analytic the bounds of ontology further and further bark un­
til it spills over, as it were, into the "non-ground, " into tlie
Nothing. That is, he has pressed beyond the ontical future in/-
the "ever-future." But since this latter never cones to be as 
such, it cannot be the basis upon which to found that which d_qe_s_ 
corns to be, i.e., historical beings. Hence, in the essay Just 
studied we have the "reversal"; he turns away from the Nothing 
and faces what-is. Cur stance, then, is face-forward tovrards 
the beings which exist, however historically, i.e., relatively. 
But, as we shall see, Heidegger does not ignore this Nothing 
which he has won at great cost. The "step backwards" will oe a
riovcment in thou g lit which steps back and out of the strfct'y
I. Idcntital _ i f f e renz, Gunther Neskc, Pfu11 ingen, IG 
p . 1 f ; :■ i le r 1 n this chapter referred t o  s im p u  .■ pt
numhe. r .
G . 0 , 10 .
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historical, and into the realm of the future, i.e., into ex - 
sistence, into that orientation which views the totality of 
history - up to that very moment - as a unity. For, it is only 
in this position outside of, i.e., future to and objective to, 
all that "is" that affords insight into the "arrival" of 3einc' 
as beings, as "there."
These two movements, then, forv.’srd and backward, we - ce a <- 
constituting the Difference: the dialectic iji thought '-hie 'i " c - 
cords '■‘ith that temporal Difference given In the experience of 
selfhood as the continuing transition from the future to prescr- 
a flux which endures despite any effort on our part to stay cr 
otherwise alter it by means of thought or technical devices.
Our course will be, as it has been all along, to highlight as 
far as practicable the temporal overtones of Heidegger's ontol­
ogy with an eye to appreciating his constant concern for Time*^ 
prerogat i ve.
"The principle of Identity, according to a familiar fcrr . 
reads: A = A. It is the highest lav oi thought. But should 
we dwell upon the content at either side of the sign of eaua 1 it 
(■-), we will find that, in time, it will change into something 
different. For example, suppose the A to represent a pen. A 
pen in our great-grandfather's day was probably a quill. Today 
it is either a "ball-point" or a "fountain" pen. I_n t ime the 
content of A will change. To focus upon the "content" of this 
formula is to focus upon historical flux. Our task, then, is
J .  r .  13 .
p. Ik
to concentrate upon the s 1 cri between the A's, upon that which 
endures.
This formula for Identity, A = A ,  Is not intended, however, 
to assert equality between different A 's.^ It is not trying to 
say that one pen is equal to another. Ratlier, it asserts some­
thing about the "A" itself - and with this corrinon usage of the 
word "itself," we immediately plunge into the principle of Iden­
tity. The principle has to do v;ith selfhood and the ambiguity 
therein." This ambiguity is most common, not with objects likm 
pens - f o r  we rarely think of them nowadays as "selves" - but 
with persons. It is common to hear someone say of another, "He 
is not himself today." This infers that normally he himself. 
Hence, the better formula for Identity v/ould be "A is A."“
But "A is A" is a tautology. Precisely. Such however cniv 
bears witness to the appropriateness of the "is." The formula 
appears to be tautological because of a double reflection. Th.e 
principle of Identity is so automatic in its claim upon us that 
this formula, when seen to be "tautological," evokes in us re­
flection upon both the "A" and the "is" with the result that it 
says in effect: A itself is A itself: a tautology.
The most concise formula for Identity, precisely because w*> 
know its claim so intimately and automatically, would be simply 
"A." The expanded, so-called tautological form, however, dis­
closes the essential problematic involved in Identity, namely, 
Identity rw of a "connection," a "'r;ed ia t i on , " a "i
. « p  * 1 - 1 .  ^ . p . l.'i* ^ . p .  l , ^ *  ( » p .  »
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It speaks of relation within uni ty itself.
"It comes to this, that Identity throughout the history 
of Western thought appears always in the character of unity. 
But this unity is by no means the insipid vacuity of that 
which is in itself relationless and continuously persists 
in monotony."8
Rather, it is a unity which, within itself, vibrates with an 
inner-relativity, a movement, a tension, between the two poles 
of Being and being, future and presence. We may anticipate, 
then, that the formula for the principle of Identity, A is A, 
is equivalent to the problematic ontological formula; Being is 
being. In this lecture we arc intent upon disclosing just how 
this is so. In the essay to follow, we will concentrate upon 
how it is not so, i.e., upon the "Difference."
Now, is not this thought, that there is "a relation with- 
in unity itself," revolutionary? Does it not sound strange? 
Heidegger maintains, however, that it is implicit in the very 
earliest of Western thought, but that two thousand years have 
been required for its "accomodation."^ And he sees German Ideal 
ism to be the maturing of that accomodation. Since Leibniz, 
Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, it is "forbidden" to repre­
sent the unity of Identity as mere monotony, to ignore the med­
iation holding sway in u n i t y . " W h e r e  such happens. Identity 
is represented only abstractly."
"Identity's claim concerns the Being of beings. Where, 
however, the Being of beings comes to its earliest expression 
in Western thought in Parmenides -- Identity speaks ^  ■
ü . p ,  15 .  9 .  p .  15•  10.  p .  16 .
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in an extreme sense. One of Parmenides* statements reads:
The self is both thinking and Being."!1
That is to say, thought and Being are identical v^ith selfhood. 
Such a notion, Heidegger maintains, is quite foreign to tradi­
tional metaphysical doctrine which asserts that Identity belongs 
to B e i n g . P a r m e n i d e s  seems to be saying that Being beloncs to 
an identity. But what does T t». i- , the self, mean In Parmeni­
des? Parmenides does not answer. All we can say is that:
"In the springtime of thought, long before there was ? ’P r i n ­
ciple of Identity,* Identity itself spoke, and Indeed decreed: 
Thought and Being belong together, both in the self  ^a s con 
stitutinc it' and out of it [as its expression'.
Now, Heidegger takes this expression "belonging together”
^ ' /as an apt explication of Tc_ • » . and defines selfhood a s "be-
longing-togethcrness" (Zusammencehor1 eke i t ) . This comes very 
close to satisfying the requirements of the traditional doctrine, 
viz., Being and beings belong together in an Identity. But thiv 
Is not what Parmenides claims. He says that "Being belongs - 
with thought - to the self.^-^ If Being is determined in an 
Identity as a tension within Identity, but traditional metaphy­
sics conceives identity as a tension in Being, then, we cannot 
obtain help from tradtional metaphysics as to what Parmenides 
i n t e n d e d . H i s  is a tension in the Self, a tension involving 
both Being and Thinking. No doubt we are to anticipate in this 
lecture the explication of what Heidegger suggested earlier, 
that essential thinking as an activity of the self, "is an oc­
curence of Being.
11. p. 17r. 12. p. 18. 13. p. 18.
13. p. 18. Inc . ca der v'ill recall that this term was earlier - 
de red "integrity," I.e., unity.
13. p. 19. 16. p. 19. 17. p. 366* Existence
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If we are to consider "belonging-together" as s fitting 
explication of Lz iGZlL? the Self, we can readily grasp the 
usual interpretation: one that stresses the "together." Here 
the sense is of an initial unity (together) and the "belonging-" 
merely qualifies this unity by suggesting an arrangement and 
classification of the elements within this totality, much as 
those, say, of a system which is governed by a mediating syn­
thesis. "Phi losophy represents this unity as nexus and conne.xic, 
as the necessary connection of one element with another."*^'
Heidegger, however, puts the stress on the "belonging-" 
as determinative for the "-together." That is to say, the 
"union" is discovered in consequence of the peculiar relation 
that exists between the elements involved. Or, put another 
way, the relation is prior to any unity that may be seen to 
i n h e r e . P a r m e n i d e s  has already given us a clue as to what 
is intended here: Being and Thinking belong together because
they first accord with each other; they are the self-same; '__
<■( ,. , i.e., the self.
If man can be characterized as "the thinking essence, who 
is open to Being, is placed before it, remains related to it, 
and thus answers, i.e., accords, to it," then man i_s "this re­
lation of accord, and he is only this."^^ And he is this in 
virtue of the tenacity of this relation: Man is "more than 
suited" ( vibere igne t ) to Being.
18.  p .  2 0 .  19 .  p .  2 0 .  2 0 .  p .  2 2 .
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If we consider Being in "its original sense as presence" 
(Anwesen), then we can say for a certainty that man becomes 
present as "presence" "neither approximately so, nor as an ex­
ception to the rule." But Being, as "presence," endures only 
to the extent that man is approached (an-ceht) by Being and ac­
cepts its claim.2] We infer here an element of radical decision 
on the part of man to accept Being. If he does, he knows, or 
experiences, "presence." If he does not, he is deprived of it. 
"Such presence requires the openness of a clearing and thus rc- 
ma ins in virtue of this need (Brauchen), assigned to hunÆnity 
(Menschenwesen) .
Now, "this is by no means to assert that Being first comes 
to be fixed only through man." Yet it should be clear that 
"man and Being are assigned to each other and belong to each 
other," and that out of this relation has come the whole historv 
of philosophy and its metaphysical conceptions.23 To be sure, 
other beings besides man enjoy presence and therefore are re­
lated to Being. But only man is characterized by history, a 
history in which Being is possibly the prime concern.
Putting the matter in this way, however, still does not 
provide an adequate understanding of this relation as be 1 one i nr 
together. The only way open to a sure grasp requires that we 
forsake the "support of representing thought," i.e., objectify­
ing thought. We must "wean" ourselves away from such by means 
of a leap or vault which breaks the prevailing continuity.
2 1 . p. 2 3. p. 2 3. 2 3. p. 2 3 .
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"It leaps off, or out of the way of, the usual represen­
tation of man as the anima 1 rationa1e , which in modern 
times has become the subject of its objects. The leap away 
at the same time splits off from Being, which since early 
Western thought has been explained as the ground wherein 
being is grounded as a being."2l|
This means that the proposed leap vaults beyond Being into the 
Non-ground (Abqrund) so long as we do this in terms of meta­
physical thought. That is to say, we think our way over the 
"bridge less precipice" and gain entry to that primordial realm 
in which man and Being are first "assigned" to each ether.23 
W'e take this to be another suggestion that we thoughtfully re­
verse the flow of time and gain entry to the future, for it is 
there that the experience of thought is first "tuned" for its 
primordial harmony with Being. Yet, this is where we already 
are when existing authcntica1ly.28 And this, despite the pre­
vailing attitude in the world today with its scientific sophis­
tication.
Notwithstanding the claims of modern technology, man and 
all beings. Nature and History, stand under the claim of Being 
and react against, the vacuous unity of beings v;ith Being -- as 
though there were no abiding tension between them, but only 
empty monotony. Heidegger coins a term for this claim which 
Being makes upon man. He calls it the Ge-Ste11. Quite liter­
ally it is the "placing together" of man and Being in their 
mutual difference. For technology. Being is no problem; Being 
is the beings which "are," pure and simple. It is interesting 
to note that the German noun Geste 11 can mean, among other
2Ù . . p .  2 lq. 2 6 . p .  23  a n d  a l s o  3&T.
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things, " a u t h o r i t y . Heidegger's reaction against the 
authority of modern ”ca leu lative" thought is especially evident 
in this lecture. So that in his term Ge-Ste11 there abides e 
higher authority, if you will: that which is the aggregate of all 
possible individual claims which Being makes upon all beings.
It is the total challenge which Being makes upon beings, not 
merely to b^, but to be ill time. They are placed together in 
a vibrating mutual reciprocity: in Ge-Ste 1 1. 2'^
In the same context, Heidegger uses the German equ i lord 
to the English "constellation," a word which originally connot­
ed the relation (con-) of stars or planets to each other, and
which still retains the idea of grouping together. His Ge-Ste 1 I
is the constellation of Man and Being.
It goes without saying that this Ge-Ste11 does not itself 
approach man in Its challenge, but is splintered into tens of 
thousands- of fragments, each constituting a lesser challenge 
in its own right, and helping, with the others, to "tune" 
in moods. Thus is this over-a 11 challenge by Being "strange" 
man. But this does not mean that Idan and Being arc ill-suited 
(vereicnet). Quite the contrary. Yet there is a legitimate sen e 
in which they can be said not to suit each other. Hence the 
hyphen in Ge-Ste11. There is, despite their suiting, an essen­
tial "difference" between them. But our purpose in this lecture 
is to elucidate how they suit one another.
27. Cassell If German and English Dictionary, Cassell & Co., 
London,
2 0 . p .  2 7 f
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The character of the claim of Being upon Man as "be 1 oneinc" 
together is best seen in the obvious fact that they enter into 
a union in which they are indissoluably united. This union we 
call an "event" (Ereiqnis) . Man and Being are historical, i.e., 
eventful. But as a key word here, "event" is as difficult to 
define "as the Greek J' - and the Chinese Ta o , " "The word 
'event* here intends no more than what we nearly always mean 
by 'happening* (Geschehni s ) , 'occurrence' (Vorkommnis ) . "3'-'
Now, the first thing we notice about the word "event" is 
that it speaks "singulare tantum." That is, an "event" is a closcc 
entity, a totality, and wholly unique. Once an event is sai'i 
to have "occurred," it is complete with a beginning and an end. 
and is ready to be ascribed as such to history. For example, 
we see the second V/orld War as an event; so also the history o: 
modern technology.
But Ge-Ste 11 does not especially connote particular events 
as links in the chain of history. Rather, it contains wâthin 
it the possibility of the most authentic and orginal of all 
events: the event. This primal event Heidegger terms "e-vent"
(Hr-eiqnls) so as to differentiate it from the infinite number 
of so-called historical events. For Heidegger, this primal "e- 
vent" is "Thinking" (Denken). And he arrives at this conclusion 
in virtue of "essential thinking": thought which thinks the 
essence of the domination of technical calculation, thought
9^. p. 2 8. 0^. p. 29.
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which thinks the essence of metaphysics, thought which takes 
the daring leap across the "bridge less" abyss and thinks the 
be 1 oneinq together of Being and Man in their coming together 
in "e-vent."31
"The e-vent is the vibrating (schwingende) realm through 
which Man and Being reach each other in their essence, 
thereby winning their being (Wesendcs) and losing those 
determinations loaned them by metaphysics."32
We are speaking now of the primordial "e-vent," of that 
which is the crystallization of thought, as it were, from out 
of an amorphous (s i ch schwe benden) Jumble of words constitut­
ing language. And j_n the moment that these words come to con­
stitute thought, "there" is thinking; "there" is the coming 
together of Being and Man; "there" is "presence"; "there" is 
the self in selfhood.33 But...
"Language Is the most delicate, the most accidental of 
all behavioral activities (verha1 tende schwincunq) in the 
amorphous structure of events."3d
Thinking uses the raw material of language, i.e., words, to 
erect thought which, when it achieves form, the primal e-vent 
is constituted and from it all events d e r i v e . 33 All of history 
owes its entire structure to those thoughts which, unseen and 
often unarticulated, nevertheless are the ground, as it were, 
of all human activity. Do we misconstrue Heidegger here if we 
include within the purview of e-vent those fuzzy and inartic­
ulate thoughts which occur, say, in infants when, from the
31. p. 29f. 32. p. 30. 33. p. 30. 36.. p. 3033. D. 30.
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sharp spanking they receive at birth, they gasp for air and 
start to cry? Surely by "language" is meant more than the un­
abridged dictionary and the classical grammars.
But the breadth of this horizon of thought does not nec­
essarily include "essential thought", i.e., the thought of the 
belonging-together of Being and Man, which relation is perceived 
only when thought is "metaphysical," i.e., over-leaps the bounds 
imposed by traditional thought and vaults into the realm which 
is prior to the actual coming together of these two in the con­
stitution both of e-vent and event. "Essential" thinking thinks 
"metaphysically"; it reverses the flow of time, so to speak, in 
order that it may grasp something of the abiding mystery which 
energizes and sets to vibrating this realm of the "beyond" 
which continually renews and thereby protects from the abyss of 
history by providing the perspective which "Historians" require 
that Archemedian point outside all events which is in ex-sistenc 
or e-vent.
A problem arises, however, in this: that language, accord­
ing to one view of it, is very well suited to events, but is 
wholly unsuited to e-vent. Since e-vent is a "vibrating" 
clearing in which relation holds sway continuously, thought, 
when once it crystallizes out of this openness and into lin­
guistic form, becomes an event. According to this view, history
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has no future; events are bald facts, pure and simple, fully 
revealed and complete. They are merely "historical," the "ob­
jects" with which the "scientific" historian plays, and from 
which he constructs his rendering of the past. 3ut if Man has 
a future, and because of this is historical in the positive 
sense of abiding for a time in the future, in ex-sistence, 
then only e-vent suits him, and events of this static genus do 
not. They are alien to him -- even those which he himself has 
effected.
A static view of language is wooden. That is, it sees it 
from the standpoint of a grammarian or lexicographer to the ex­
tent that these latter consider language to be fixed in partic­
ular forms. Language which is "alive," however, and takes its 
cue from e-vent, is constantly changing, is in continuous flux. 
Such is Heidegger's understanding■of language when he says that 
it "suits our essence." Indeed, he says, "To the extent- that 
our essence is ill-suited to language, we dwell in events"38 and 
not at all in the e-vent. Language is truly the correlate of 
e-vent only when, like its author, it abides in the flux of 
open relation.
At this point in the argument Heidegger poses an "unavoid­
able" question; "What has event to do with Identity?" and he 
answers, "Nothing." Yet, Identity has everything to do with 
event.37 To explain this, he retraces a few steps. He has
' c. ). p. 10. " 7 . p. 10.
223
already said that "event is ill-suited to man and Being in 
their real u n i o n , "38 i.e., in e-vent. But there are "embarras­
sing flashes of event" in the Ge-Ste 11. For, it sees the mod­
ern technical world, for example, as event, as a fixed reality 
only too plain to see. It would see the two World Wars as to­
tally enclosed entities as obvious as the nose on one's face. 
When we see events so clearly and so authoritatively, we have 
forsaken the realm of vibrating oscillation, the realm of e-vent 
and dwell now as "historians" in the worst sense.
The only alternative to this post ion is one which is not 
yet fully external to the events of history, but rather is close 
to the origen of all events. There we see how all events are 
still in flux in virtue of their genesis in e-vent. The dic­
tum of Parmenides, namely, that "the Self is both Thinking and 
Being," suggests that Thinking and Being belong together in an 
Identity, i.e., to the Self. But where the history of meta­
physics has posited the tension of Identity in Being, we now 
see that the tension of Identity is in e-vent, in that realm 
in which both Thinking and Being "occur originally." That is 
to say. Being comes into being, and Thinking comes into thought, 
i.e., into language, as e-vent. They "occur" simultaneously.
But from the "scientific" point of view, precise definition 
does not characterize e-vent, but only event. And this is’ pre­
cisely the point! All so-called "events," when seen relative 
to their origin in e-vent, retain something of the mystery
8 . p .  " U .
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which inheres in the Aborund , in the amorphous flux of primor- 
iginal e-vent, and are therefore never released whole and com­
plete, finished and served up as over and done with. All of 
history is problematical in virtue of its origin in that realm 
which is "disconnected" from the static, sterile, unity of tra­
ditional metaphysics and technological calculation.
Identity, then, does have "everything to do with event" 
simply because Identity itself is e-vent and not event. If 
events are said to "come to be" i_n time, then the chain of event.-, 
which we call history must be seen to be the product, if vou vill, 
of Time, and must retain something of Time's "original" charac­
ter. This means that the a priori, i.e., the future, adheres 
to all that "happens." The coming together of Being and being, 
and of Thinking and thought, in an Identity is made possible 
by that which will always be mysterious and utterly transcen­
dent: the ever-future, the eternal. We may "speak," as Heideg­
ger does, of event as " letting-be1ong-together" (Zusammencehoren- 
lassen) and so it is: it is an event of essential thinking.
Such thought, however, merely "thinks" the reverse of Time by
thoughtfully crossing the "bridge less" abyss from out of Being 
and into the Abqrund where, in the open clearing of relation, 
in the horizon of all possible unity, Identity abides in e-vent. 
That thought can do this while we, for our part, stay here on
this side of the abyss in existence -- as beings -- is why
Q. p. 31.
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Heidegger suggests that Thought is the "House of 3eing.”“ '^^
For, Thought, conceived in this way, is "made" of Time, as it 
were. Essential thinking "uses its Time" all the v’hile it think- 
of that which makes thought poss1b l e . W h i l e  using Time as it 
is "given," it thinks the reversal of that sequential flow (as 
in logic) and moves back to its origin, and so discovers both 
its finitude and infinitude, i.e., Truth. For, thought is finit 
in the sense of event; any existing person can do as he wills 
with another's thought. He can misrepresent, misinterpret, eve: 
ignore it altogether. But when thought is seen as e-vent, then 
it always retains for its reader an aura of mystery in the sense 
that it cannot be sized-up without question and disposed of as 
so much refuse. All thought thus becomes holy to the degree 
that it bears witness to primordial Time - just by being what 
it is. But that which speaks directly of Time by ackncvHedg1 no 
its sovereignty can be none other than sacred.
The scriptures speak of "Him" who from the beginning (of 
time) maintains a "sleepless" vigil, who dwells "hich and lifted 
up" (in the future?), whose kingdom is everlasting, eternal. He 
is said to "love" all men, indeed, all that he has "created"; 
he "comes" and dwells among men as the Holy "Spirit." This Spir 
it "blows whither it will," nor can anyone say, "Lo, here it is, 
or there it is.” This Spirit knows "when" the sparrow falls, 
and "numbers" the hairs of one's head. He "visits" the down­
trodden, homeless, hungry, naked, etc.: the "least" of his bre­
thren. The: "ime waits for neither man nor beast, nor s.nvthi:
GOa. p. See also the "Humanismusbr5efe." g la, p.
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under the sun, yet each "abides" for a time because of Time's 
initial visitation (in e-vent?) and its abiding "presence,"
And each endures until such time as it is called back to Time's 
own eternity, and ceases to "be" any longer. But even then - 
that is, after it has ceased to "be" any longer - it is not the 
property of objectifying historians, to be served up as wholly 
seen as from the Archemedian point in the eschaton. For, so 
long as men themselves abide in "presence," Time is still sov­
ereign and rules over its children. Therefore, all would-be 
events, including ex-sistence, are hyphenated in the sense that 
discontinuity, or the vibrating, coming-to-be of Being into be­
ing and of Thinking into thought, demands of events and of all 
beings that they be appreciated as e-vents and be-ings: finite 
creatures of Time.
Have we strayed too far from Heidegger's intent? Have we 
thrown up bridges and crossed over out of his thought and into 
our own?
Heidegger says that "the essence of Identity has the qual­
ity of e-vent" and that this investigation into the "Principle 
of Identity," had it found something "durable" (Ha Itbares), 
could never have had the sense of a "leap" or "vault" (Sprunges) 
or movement, which is so n e c e s s a r y . H e n c e ,  the thought of 
this lecture has moved from a static prepositional form to a 
vibrating, dynamic, oscillation "v/hich weans thought away from 
Being as the 'rround of beings, and vaults into the non-ground...
"Yet tG . round is neither the vacuous Nothing nor an
ominous chcv^, but the e-vent. In e-vent vibrates that
. 0 . p .  3 I f .
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essence which speaks as language and has been termed the 
House of Being. The movement [Principle^ of Identity now 
says: If indeed the be longing-together of Man and Being is 
ever to reach the essential light of event, then the essence 
of Identity necessarily requires a discontinuity (£1n Sprun g )
Thus has thinking "changed" from positive assertion to an oscil­
lating movement which looks "forward” to the present and "back­
ward" to the "constellation of Man and Being." That is, it 
"looks out of e-vent." From this vantage point, the way is 
clear "to experience more originally the who le of the modern 
technical world. Nature, and History - all prior to their be- 
_ g g from the foundation of the world.
"Thought has required more than two thousand years in 
order only to grasp the simple relation which is the media­
tion within Identity. Dare w^ suggest that the thinking 
entry into the essential advent of Identity is to be accom­
plished in a day? Precisely because this entry requires a 
discontinuity, it uses its Time, the Time of thinking, which 
is opposed to every sort of calculation which today tugs in 
every way upon our thought. "Iq3
But, however we may seek to think, we can do so only within
the latitude suggested by tradition. Once, however, vc have
focused upon "historical" thought, we may be freed to think
what has yet to be thought - providing our thought is not caI-
culative or of the planning variety.
We fail to sense indiscretion in our elaboration above of 
Heidegger's thought unless it is our wanton insistance upon 
Interpolating Time where it seems obviously to fit. If we dis­
honor his desire to be an "ontclogist," it is only because v;e 
have sensed from the start that he cares more for Time and its
il. p. 1 2. . p. 3 3. 6 3 . p. 3 6 . 6 6 . p. j u ,
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mediatorial effect on all beings, especially "events," than 
for these "beings" themselves. He has rather consistently dis­
avowed any role as a "poet," and therefore hesitates to "name" 
the Holy. Yet, as we are about to see, he well recognizes how 
his thought relates to Theology in the "onto-theo-1ogica1 dis­
position of metaphysics," when this latter is truly "meta-" in 
the sense of being intent only upon the a priori.
But before v;e leave this important lecture, it is essential
to interpolate some more. The theme of this lecture has been 
Identity, and Heidegger has wisely chosen to contrast "belonging'' 
with "together” in this rather fortuitous "definition" of Ident­
ity. But he has failed in our estimation to furnish us with an 
altogether conclusive argument even though its "logic", i.e., 
its futureward progression, is entirely consistent, and he ends 
with the "vibrating" coming-to-be of Identity in e-vent. The 
rightness of his insight derives from his intuitive grasp of 
the indissoluable unity of Time as Time. To be sure, man 
senses, as it were, or experiences, "coming-into-being" as the 
coming together of the future v/ith the present (already "given") 
moment in a continuity. And Heidegger's approach in this lec­
ture is thoughtfully to break away from this continuity, and to
leap into the future so as to arrive at that moment which is Just
prior to this coming-together, so that we can appreciate the 
action here as prior to our own being. This is all well and 
good, but the decisive argument lies in suggesting the temporal­
ity of this r r-1 ( i t y . Time is Time , whether it be future, present, 
or past. Tnu.,-, c i one i nq-t ocethe r simply specifies that th -
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lation here is precisely that of "origins 3" Identity, that of 
Time itself. The Identity here is the Identity of Time as it 
is present both in the future prior to its becoming present, 
and in the present prior to its becoming past. Hence, the 
Identity in future, present, and past; and hence, the reasoning 
that history cannot be seen whole and complete in itself, a 
"thing" to be sized-up and otherwise assesed as fully revealed.
Identity, then, can be understood as the self-identity of 
Time and the model, as it were, for all Identity. The "formula 
for Identity, A is A, when transposed into temporal terms reads: 
Time is Time. As observed above, this is not a tautology but 
a graphic exposition of the relation which abides in unity, i.e., 
Identity. The relation we have cited by means of the step 
backv.^.rds into the realm of e-vent is the relation of Time with 
itself. There is no other Time but that which is becoming in 
e-vent. Our experience of e-vent is of unity in Identity. No 
other Time is open to experience, nor has it ever been. Every 
man who has ever lived has experienced "this" Time ; he has ex­
perienced only "this" oscillation in unity, in Identity. But 
because Thought ran think this "relation," it can put one and 
one together and get two - with the result that we get a chain 
of Identities, a chain of unities, of moments, of events vhic’". 
we call history. Whereas, the Time of Identity is now, and 
has always been this now for every generation, Thought cannot 
comprehend "r^îlation" as a unity; always it has two pole:.
Nevertheless, the confluence of Time vith itself in "presence," 
in the now, i_s_ Identity; this is relation in uni ty ; this, is the 
self-identity of Time; this Is the sbi'-inc e-vent which pro­
tects all so-called events from willful -lestruction by "’'uhc; —  
quent" comers in Time. Time is Time, thon, now, arid ah-'ays.
V.’hat is d i f f e r e n t  a b o u t  d i f f e r e n t  times in h i s t o r y  i n u ' 
the e n d u r i n g  s e l f - i d e n t i t y  of T i n e ,  but I'.an'r e v e r - c h m n r  ! n: 
g r a s p  of b e i n g s ,  of things, as they occur in time, I.e.. in 
history. B e c a u s e  of " t h i n q s , ' ' v; e c e t t c c f e '■> 1 in c o f ch a • : :: i n e
limes. But is it not the "une ha nr i no" c vnt i nu i tv of t r ■. '* 1
v’h i c h  m a k e s  p o s s i b l e ,  i n deec n e c e s s a r y ,  a c o n t i n u i n g  ro 1 r. -t - 
be and f a l l i n q - n w a y  of the " t h i n g s "  w h i c h  arc a p p r o h e n d r  ij\ 
t i m e - lest things b e c o m e  the truly d u r a b h ' ?  B u t  for t'r
s a m e n e s s  of the "se If" in the sc 1 f - i den t i i. y of T i m e ,  a'o c o uld
not r e l a t e  to o u r s e l v e s ,  to e a c h  o t her c i t h e r  as con :e m p o r a r i  ' 
or as " h i s t o r i c a l "  f i g u r e s .  Our g r a s p  of " t h i n g s "  has ch'' r c, 
but has our b a s i c  e x p e r i e n c e  of thie b e - c c m i n c  of T i m e  in 
s i s t e n c e  ?
This leads us to observe, that the Identity of Being vith 
being is fundamentally that of the Identity of Time wi tr. it­
self. Being has liiroughout Heidegger's ontology been " futur .:i . 
whereas "being" has been "historical" or past - already "given. 
A.re we not to see now that the relation between Being and being 
is that which is present in the oscillating Identity of Tim.
'.'itri itself ' "  the Now? And that the ; o n  history -w' r- '  1
has been s truce line, a? has he icier g or .lîrr.self, vith the ''Gi in­
ference"  ^'h i ch is ajt tjhe s a me time an Identity? In the ForyPv 
tu Iden t i ta t un d [Ji f f erenz ileideccer says:
"The extent to which Difference derives from the essence of 
Identity the reader must himself discover upon hee ring the 
harmonv Taccordj vGiich holds sway between event and .iec 1 i on 
Proofs are not permitted in this realm, but many things 
are ^nevertheless] indicated."Go
Proofs may not be permitted, but the a r cument c e r t a i n I y i *"■
enhanced when Time, as such, is interpolated as the model
upon whic h J d c n tity an d '.) i f t' e renc ■ i I s ba s e d .
Vv'e might explain this in different terms. The " s c :-:n:. i : 1
disciplines h a v l o n g  distinguished between Time and Space.
But the "scientific" notion o f  time ir derived from spatial 
phenomena , i.e., "movement." Despite t ht: fact that p h y s i c i ' - i
are not yet agreed whether light, for -xample, is to be une-' r- 
s t ood as " pa r t î cu 1 a r " or a s "v^ a ve s , " i t *■ o pe e d ha s been : ■: u -- 
late d to be about Ibtm 000 miles per second . As we said ^arll- 
scientists are now intent upon measuring the "second" mere pr 
cisely. But if Identity is a function of Time, and Time 1" 
a relation within unity, is it possible to "measure" the "in­
terval" in this essential unity? That is to say, is it pos­
sible to use "iT iovînç" spatial phenomena as standards by vs’i i c h
to assess or otherwise deduce Time when Time has all along
been the standard by which spatial phenomena have been deter­
mined? Time and space may "appear" t o  be irrevocably locked 
in p. mut ua 1 ly.._ rcc i pr oca 1 unity, but our approach all ' Î un
been "materialistic." All "ma te ri? 1 , " i.e., spatial p he ne'e: ne , 
exists i_n lime. Nor is it possible to encounter anything that 
does not so exist. Spatial phenomena • re viquivalent to "heirs., 
and Time is equivalent to Being. Hence, the problem posed 
by the "Space-time Continuum" is that of Identity. It Is " ria t 
of ontology iv'hen ontology is, as Heidegger's is, preoccupied, 
perhaps unconsciously, or quite despite every conscious effor' 
to ^void It, v'ith Tir:ie. V-h.ocver is conce ruv'd with heinc^ 
should also be cor.,,crned 'cith Being because the Bifferenc - 
tween them is temp ora 1. Tiree is unavoidable. To think bo in 
apart from Time is to think "unhistoricslly" - a s  though ”r .- 
ativity" were not n fact to be reckoned •.■'ith.
But most conclusive of all of tlii ? is the fact that the 
problem cW Identity, whether it .be of man or mo 1 ecu 1 s, is 
al-’ay;. at the same time the problem of Time in its self-id n- 
tity, in its relation of unity. For, if unity is a relation,
then we have the case of one plus one imping - s not C'-.m
That we always get t’-o iPieans that the ' b.ole cf history vitr. 
its sub-histories of science, metaphysics, etc., is based on 
an eiupty monotony, whereas, our model for unity is a relation, 
viz., Identity in miffcrenco. It comes to this: that every 
"event" in history is therefore misrepresented: history is 
probiema tic in the highest, he simply cannot under-stand (i n 
trm sense of "objecti fy inc" thought) Time. Every relation -e 
cos.pr "hen a Ways has a t lest t" o uni t 1er within it, so t b' t
" re j a t i or " ' 1' not unity t its s i : .p lust, but : a inm" *
• - û u
' sum of u n i t i e s .  B u t  i f  T i m e  i s  D i f f e r e n c e  i n  
i d e n t i t y ,  a relation within the U a s t  common denominator c f  
unity, t h e n ,  -u; n a v e  a mystery. And  '• c h a v e  it h e r e ,  r i g h t  
now, in Identity, in "presence," in the experience of Selfnood
This means that "me taphys ice 1 " logic - that "locic" ’'’hich 
moves future-ward in order to ground all that is - simply 
moves to’-ard one temper a 1 pole, e.g., the future, and away fro; 
the other -hich is "given" and from which v-e "step hack. " 
here is I i -;nt i ty here? Heidegger's thought t hi nks a dialec­
tic in unity, bui. is is also a Difference, and, as he said, 
it is up to to recognize the "accord" bet^-een them. They 
• , the same , the Sclf, Idcntity.
mil t.nat rams i ns is to sec that the three dimensions of 
time: past, ijrcrcnt, and future, are "identical" because all 
three are Time. This is not to suggest that the unity of iden­
tity is split three ''ays, but, rather, that the cominc-to-he 
of the future in its proximity with presence is a relation of 
unity in ] entity; and the relation of the present '■ith th^ ; 
pa s t I s a r ' 1 a t i on of unity in I uent i ty . This mcanr tha t : 
have two comings-to-be: two lines of separation, as it wcr:, 
shown graphically like this: past/present/future. Both of the 
"lines" are vibrating e-vcnts, and because they arc "temporal" 
a re therefore identical. They are the same area of open rela­
tion in '/'hi ch Tir-ie merges v.;ith Time and thus "occurs." (quanti­
tatively, ’-'c have a trinitarian form and a binary one, both of
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■ 'ûcr. c r bccnusc. they erc L \p L re  i . tocs :.r;is
..Jt surçcLt ill temporel terms a "1 ri o 1 Ly " an ^  an ^incarnation" 
(in the sense o.t ''tvo in o n e ” ), both bcinc e x p ressions of ene 
”uriity” ? Nov.’here else - that is to say, in no spatial p h e n o m ­
ena is this peculi a r i t y  observable. For, v i t h  purely spatial 
phenomena, unity is alv/ays empty monotony. D i f ference is the 
hailmarh of " h i s t o r i c a l ” events.
If v e  vere to summarize this attempt to go Heidegger one 
better, and to make more specific ani conclusive his ar'urent 
for Identity, '>'c mould simply say that v:e have siezed upon the 
”is” between the ”A*s” in nis "improved” formula for Identity, 
and spcilee' it out a little further. Indeed, this "is” stands 
for the relation which abides between the chancing "A’s” and 
therefore links them together into a "history.” This oscilla­
ting relation vrHch is Time leaves its marlv on ail "event:” 
and thus no ops tliem yoked to the unknm-n future. Hence, his tor 
is a problem and must remain so so long as events shall "occur" 
(in c-vent). but all of this is only by ■'■ay of s^v 1 nc that 
;iffcrcnce arises in identity and abides therein fcr.'ver, chus 
bcslo'-’inc both continuity ^nd discontinuity: the myst.ry -hi ch 
is life when this latter is appreciated to be temporality pure 
and simple.^-
-.6. Cf. Part II. Chapter 6 of Be 1 nc n nd T ir.e
>-Tru'o-Lo/-i ca 1 ui % uoc i L i i-a tapa / * i r
b the, b o o k  conta in i n,' this t. i 1 1 i ' ' -
qer e xp 1 a i ns'"t'h4Ur--^u s v s s  the c one lux inc d i s c u s s i o n  in s c o urt . 
of s e m i n a r s  c o n c e r n i n g  H e g e l ’s " S c i e n c e  of L o g i c "  g i v e n  c u r i n g  
the W i n t e r  S e m e s t e r s  of 19p6-37 • As u c h  it has a l i mited 
v a l u e  for us. for i;e a r e  not at the non.ont p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r ­
e s t e d  in a d i a l o g u e  v-ith Hege l .  O u r s  is vitbi H e i d e g g e r .  T h e r . -  
fore, v'c si.a 11 skip o v e r  m u c h  that has to do v'ith He g e 1 anc a t ­
tempt to expound H e i d e g g e r ’s t h o u g h t  a " it r e l a t e s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
to the a b o v e  t i tle a nd to its s u b j e c t :  D i f f é r e n c e .
it is readily apparent that Heidec.eer disagrees vith Hege 
at certain points, and he summarizes this difference in a ser­
ies of three questions: "V hat for each is the prime concern 
( Sa che ) of thought ? ’"■h^ t for each is the standard for a deba t
i t h I hi e i 1 is Lory of thought? And , V' ha t for e a c h is t he c fia rac 
ter of Dia 1 Oyue ?
k'her:--s for Hegel the "absolute concept" is
n c e.
trn.;ueht, for Heidegger it is the "Difference Hif' ,r 
a Ani who re He cel finds the standard for a debate '^i t.x
nistoricai thoucht in the power (Hraft) and extent of previous 
thought i ns Ui'a r as it is ordered in - "diaUx tical-spccul^tiv^ 
development," Heidegger looks not to ' hat has already l-een 
thought, but to -'’hat has yet to he thought, although he has 
alx-ays to < tudy ' hat so far has already been thought in order
7. ? h'l. n. h2 'i.9a . p.
t r.q t the ''Difference" may come to expression. Historical 
t hour at "releases" its "reserve" power when it is approsche.i 
from a vantage point continually in advance of it, i.e., from 
its future. Thus i t  can remain all that it ever was o r i g i n a l  l y . o 9
This approach is explained in terms of the "step backwards." 
Whereas Hegel approaches the history of philosophy with the aim 
of pressing its concepts into the mold of the "absolute con­
cept," Heidegger simply steps back from what is said "into that 
heretofore overlooked region out of which the essence of Truth 
first becomes notable."^0
"Insofar as the step backwards determines the character 
of our dialogue with the historv of Western thought, Thinrt- 
ing (Denken) breaks away (fuhrt ... hcraus) from what had 
hitherto been conceived in Philosophy in a known way. It 
steps back before the fact (Sache) and into Being. Thus 
it brings what has been thought into an opposition from 
whence we view the whole of this history and indeed deter­
mine its source, the whereabouts of which is generally made 
available. In distinction to Hegel, this is not the solution 
of a problem already posed, but is that which throughout 
this history has everywhere remained unasked. ... The step 
back goes from the unconceived - from the Difference as 
such - into its conception (zu-Oenkendc), which latter is 
the ve i1 (Verces senhe i t) of Difference."pi
Here we are reminded of the essay on The Dssence of Trutn.
The picture is the same: Stepping bacn into the future, i.e., 
into the realm of Being, and therefore into the realm of what 
has yet to come into being in a particular form, we come upon 
the primordial pre-structure of all beings, and hence into the
realm of the ____ , or concealment. Once, however, what has
hitherto been unconceived becomes conceived, it leaves conceal­
ment, i.e., future. Being, and enters into the Difference as a
p .  J f h f .  > 0 .  p .  I45, y l .  p .  I46.
positive conception. When so conceived, it may or may no‘ : ■ 
the "antithesis" or "synthesis" envisioned by He cel. it co--s 
not matter. Whatever its form, it will nave become "historical, 
i.e., revealed, and therefore no longer the Difference as sucn. 
All that can be said of it is that it now represents the Differ­
ence - as with an antithesis or synthesis - relative to a par­
ticular historical thesis.
Heideccer’s "step back" is a step into that realm which is 
a Iways future to every historical thought no matter how far it 
be projected into the future. From this vantage point in the 
eternally future, from this stance in absolute stability a nc 
endurance-^ - the absolute "ground" for all of history however 
long it lasts - Heidegger views the whole of history, even searcr. 
ing out the origins of particular thoughts as they show them­
selves in preceding thought. Is this vantage point the ssmc 
as the theological "end of time," the eschaton, the "place" 
where it is possible to gain the perspective necessary for 
the "last Judgment"? We will see shortly that it is not.
Wherever it is, this region "of the Difference as such"
makes it possible for metaphysics to be what it "is" - "mets
is a step
physics. The step back^out of traditional metaphysics as a 
body of thought and into the "essence" of metaphysics.^7 "Fs- 
sential" thinkiac, i.e., metaphysical thinking, moves "logic­
ally," and this means that it takes the "step back" out of his­
tory per se into that which stands in "opposition" to it. From 
this perspective it is possible to think, for example, the
-X. p. k'l- ,v3. p. h-7.
"essence of modern technique"^^ and appreciate it for what It 
is, namely, the abiding supposition that Being is fullv rex-eal- 
ed in beings as they are now conceived, that, the Truth is re­
vealed already and in the grasp of science, and that in this 
revelation we are to put our trust.
An illustration of the overall futurist attitude enjoyed 
by Heidegger’s step back is provided when he explains that "the 
meaning of the step back arises in an historical return to the 
earliest thinkers of Western Philosophy. When thought runs 
with the speed of light back several thousands of years to the 
very first thinkers and then, step by step, moves back towards 
this present day, and then on past this moment, ever moving in 
the same direction, it will eventually run into that future 
from which historical Judgment can be made. But this future 
is not to be conceived as the ever-future but only as that 
future which is but one step removed from this present moment - 
whenever that moment might be. It is the realm of privilege 
enjoyed by those who are enabled to think, in virtue of "pres­
ence" the experience of Identity, of Selfhood, It is the per­
ennial realm of the coming-into-beinc: that oscillating, vibrat­
ing, realm which is the "is" in the formula for Identity: A is A
The trouble Heidegger finds with the Hegelian formulation 
is this; that Hegel thinks of Thought as an absolute, closed 
totality which is therefore no longer open to future eventual­
ities.^^ Can not one say that Hegel was thinking "escnatolog- 
Ically” when he conceived of his absolute concept? But Heidec-
' p. ^6. 35• P" (our italics). 5^- p. U9f.
r is not content with this approach because eschato1oqica1 
tnought assumes the closed totality of every thing. its stance 
is at the "end" of time and not with!n it. heideccer has turn­
ed away from the Nothing, the Abqrund, and faces "forward" to­
wards history, and settles upon the moment, if you will, which 
is always "Now" - the moment of Identity within which Difference 
abides as such. And he treats this moment "onto 1og1ca1ly," tha+ 
is, as the variable constant which is the movement of that mo­
ment of Identity which has characterized all existing beings 
from their first moment til their last, and which, he antici­
pates, will characterize Identity from here on. He is not want­
ing to revert to "apocalyptic" and dwell in the future totally 
removed from the "opposition" of history, but maintains a con­
tinuing vis-a-vis confrontation with it, always "deciding" rel­
ative to it, which "decision" ( Aus tra r. ) is the authentic response 
of Identity. This attitude of thought is always open to the 
future and cannot, therefore, be a closed totality, an "absolute 
concept." No, Heidegger*s thought is not eschatologies 1 in the 
same way that Hegel’s is. His is the "step back," the removal 
from history by but one step only. His Is the open realm of 
relation which characterizes the "living," i.e., oscillating, 
mediation which is "presence," as over against or in opposition 
to both history and the ever-future when this latter is con­
ceived as a definite "place," e.g., at the "end" of time. This 
will become manifestly clear as we proceed.
We consider now why metaphysics (Heidegger’s "essential" 
thought) is both onto-loqical and theo-1oc1ca1. Takinq first
m e  ’’ente-," v;e need only observe that t.be .iiferenc • : r.
.i.'inç sni "eingr has, throughout c'ur i.:v-mi na t i on of he:.; r-
Luoucht, be a prime cons i uera t i on - r ^'ifibrencx v nieh '.
maintains still endures despite the technica1 proficiency of
science vith its presupposition that Being is fully revealec
in the "beincs" it "measures." He i e.e eger * s metaphysics is ont
logical. is it too i.undanc to argue that "by definition,” viz
, ■ . ontology gathers up s'ithin its compass "all that i ^ ”
(including the abstract creations of thought itself), and that
: i'i consequence "God," should he "be," and all his "anc'^ls."
Heaven and H il, the "devil," Goo î and Hvil, Right and Vror.c,
Truth an) falsehood, fiction and fact, are all include.:? Till
says, "Phi 1 csophyyïheology ask the question of bein.:.""'' But,A
he goes on to say that vûûle philosophy deals vith the struc­
ture of i itself; theology dc^Is •-•ith the r.caning cf
being for us. Hot so vith lieidecger*s philosophy. From the 
start he seeks the meaning of Being so as to bring those t' o 
historic .iisciplirt^s into one. Thus, do ve say that rntoi'-gy 
roust also be th'ology. "hetaphysics i t h e o l o g y  because it is 
ontology." It is "an '-xpross i on concq n.i ry: God because
coniGs into 'd;i i osophy . " But. . .
"The question, Hov: does God come: into philosophy? falls 
back upon th-* cues t i on : From vhqnce arises the onto-the o ] x-. 
ical essential disposition of metaphysics? And Ini'- cues - 
tion assumes, therefor" bids us take, the step ba ck'--^. r a s.
But before -'ctually tal-iinc this step backwards ^tt': pt-
. f vs term t j c T heolocy Vol. 1, Nist'ct, London, 197. , p. .
• and Ti:r e , p. 19.o
In:, to relate what happens, i.e., "occurs," "there," we ceer.
It wise to elucidate more fully the correlations invclv^'d in 
the "ontc-thco-iogicaI" disposition of metaphysics. For, as 
Heidegger look? at Hegel’s thought, we fear that our own expos­
ition of Heidegger’s thought may well have some of the character­
istics which he claims are Hegelian.
He alleges that Hegel thinks Being both in its "emptiest 
vacuity" and in its "completed fulness." Yet he denominates his 
"speculative philosopliy" not as ont o-t heo 1 ogy, but as the 
"Science of L o g i c . F o r  Hegel, the prime concern of thought 
is absolute "conception" (der Gedanke) in the sense of sincular^ 
tantum, a closed totality. According to tradtional usage,
Thought is the theme of "Logic," yet the prime concern of Thought 
is "beings" as such and in totality - " the movement of Being 
from its emptiest to its fullest development" as a completed 
movement. This means that Being is "grounded" in the "concep­
tion", that Thought fathoms and wholly comprehends Being. Hence
the ____  "in the sense of the lumping together of all that
"is," the t . V/ith Hegel, then, metaphysics is tnc "Sci­
ence of Logic" because, from the beginning, the business (Sache) 
of Thought is with the Being of that "grounding ground" which 
lays claim to Thought under the iinprimature of the In
a word, the correlation here between .Being and the /V '• is that
suggested in John’s Prologue: In the beginninc s the -. - :
and the i . w a s  with God; and the /' ' ^ was God. ^ 3 It is that 
of Identity. "...all metaphysics is at bottom that cround of
61. p. 53* 62. p. 3hf. 63, John 1:1.
-rounds which cives account of cround, is questioned by it, anc 
finally brings it to expression.
"Ontology and theology are *logia* to the extent that they 
fathom the beings as such and ground them in totality. They 
give account of Being as the ground of beings. They discuss 
the \ • and in an essential sense are A • % controlled, i.e.
by the logic of the A ' • >. Accordingly, they mean precisely
Onto-Logic and Theo-Logic. Metaphysics is simply and approp­
riately conceived Onto-Theo-Logic."65
It should be observed that when Being is conceived to be
the ground, it is also and at the same time conceived as the
"first cround" - _____.
"The primordial concern of Thought is represented as the 
first cause, the ca usa prIma « which in turn corresponds to 
the grounding retrogression to the ultima ratio, the last 
accounting (Rechenscha f t)."66
Hence the classical metaphysical den)mi na tion of God as the
causa sui.
"Metaphysics must contemplate God because the object of 
Thought is Being and this latter comes to be construed in 
the several modes of grounding; a?. , .
Substance and Subject."67 ’
Now, Heidegger is not at all content with these "tradition­
al" modes of conceiving the "onto-theo-1og1ca1 disposition" 
of metaphysics. They may well "touch something right" but 
they do not disclose how God comes into philosophy other than 
by way of a logical deduction. Indeed, he says that "It remains 
to be thought" in what way theology and ontology "belong to­
gether," and "unthought" tiie advent or arrival of this unity, 
and even "unthought" the differences which they unify. The 
unity of these is of such a nature, he says, that the one grounds
61.!. p .  5 5 ' 6 5 .  p .  5 6 . 6 6 . p .  5 6 f .  6 7 .  p .  5 7 .
the other a no vice versa. "And the distinction between the tvo 
wavs of ground i r, a which is termed the ’Difference* is still t c 
he concc i vcd .
The question of the essence of metaphysics as "ontc-theo- 
loçy" can only be discerned appropriately, i.e., in an unbiased 
way, when we consider the "debatable" element which persists in 
the formula: "the Being of. beings," in which the genitive is 
thought as cen i t i vus sub.|ec t i vus insofar as this denomination 
of the ncnitive treats only of the Differenced^ - and not of 
the Subject-vlbject schema.
The trouble with trying to think tlie Difference is that we 
objectify it as a "relation" so that it becomes "something" be­
tween the poles of the relation when in fact it is nothing. The
Difference is not a being, nor is it Being. It is the "differ­
ence" between t h e m . 70 gut then we ask, "From whence comes this 
’between* into which the Difference is, as it were, introduced?"’  ^
This is a difficult question, to say the least. It is a simple 
matter, on the other hand, to thinil Difference in a vulgar -av 
and we continually dc so quite as a ma tier of habit - so near tc 
us is it. Rut when we b’.gin to question Thought itself a no it'., 
notion of Difference, it is quite another matter. For the above 
question becomes: "What of Difference adheres both to Being and 
the be ill's in the formula, the Being of beings?" Being is ai-
ways the Being of ... (some definite concrete entity). And con­
versely, all beings "belong together" to B e i n g .
6c). p. 69. p. 39. 70. p. aq. 71. p. 60f.72. p. ol.
in order to answer our question, wu must take a step bacx, 
as it were, and by means of the "distance" afforded thcreb:. 
rain a vantare-point which is prior to the emergence of any 
"object." That is, from the stance afforded in the step back, 
thought can think in a realm which is free of any particular 
object as such.73
Now, in this privileged position, the formula still holds 
that Being is always the Being of beings, but at this point the 
particular being in question has not yet come into existence 
"as such." From here v;e can see that Being "comes over" or 
"changes into" in the sense of the "transitive" in "is."7d- 
Howcvcr, Being does not "vacate its place" in "going over" into 
beings. Rather it is more the case that Being becomes "uncon­
cealed" when it "comes over" and be-comes a particular be inc.
The "is" in the formula for identity, A is A, is equivalent to 
the "of" in the "ontological" formula, the Beinq of beings, the 
genitive in the latter denoting the Difference which is a "trans­
ition" (= "is") from the state of concealment in primordial and 
ccneral Being to unconcealment in historical and particular be in os
"Being, passes over, revealing when it comes (Kommt ent- 
bercend uuer), that which through this transition pober- 
kommni s ) first arrives as from its unvieling. But its ar­
rival means that Being is hidden in unconcealment and endures 
as hidden. ÂVhen it has arrived! it is a beino (Seiendcs 
sein)."73
Putting as he does the "sein" (with a small "s") after "Seiendes," 
Heideccer dramatizes how Being becomes "concealed" in the innoc­
uous forms of the berb "to be" which are always passed over
73. p. 61 f. 73'* P . 62. 75. p. 62.
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juite s 2 a matter of habit in favor of whe t-is, i.:., heinri.
"Seine (in the sense of revcaline. transition) and : i'.e 
being as such (in the sense of its self-concealing arrivai' 
occur ( V es n ) as distinctions v/itlii n the self, as dis-tincti 
(Lin te r -Schl ed ) . "76
in this way the "between" is first conferred and retained.
It comes out of each of these, Being and the being. The "pas-
sing-over" of Being into a being and the actual "arrival" of
the being are bound to each other in mutual dependence. They
each produce out of themselves the other. There is here no
priority either with Being or being.
Tiie "between," i.e., the Difference, first comes to be in 
the actiOTi here depicted as "transition," the transition wnicii 
both revf^als beings as such and conceals Being as such. It is 
in this "transit! on" (Ubcr kommni s ) , in this‘'movement from one 
state to another, each "state" equally involved, and each equal 
1 ' responsible for the other, that we sense the "vibrating," 
oscillating, "area of open relation" which has already been 
termed Identity and is here being disclosed as the oricin of 
the "Difference." And to the extent that this transition is 
made ; to the extent that the "between" which is both Identity 
and Difference is bestowed as such, v^ e have Judgment, decision, 
thinking, the "end" of the matter (in the sense of a product), 
the issin; which comes from this action. All of these meanings 
are gathered up in Heidegger’s single word "Austrac."
As an action of man, "decision" (which is thinking) is the 
effectual "projection" of a thought, the "content" of which can
?6. p. 62.
qq- thin ••'hich has already Lien thought, T
is yet to be thought, and will cono into the history n' : ho.: - ht 
in consequence of n tni nk i nc confrontation fhiaiocuo) - ith tho 
history of thoucht when Difference is sought for its own sake. 
For, thinking takes 11me ; that is, it uses its time. And 'hen 
using its tine in the only authentic mode, it thinks "logically,' 
the way of vrhich leads inevitably to the "step back," or to th ; 
origin of thie Difference. Nov/, this says in effect that "logi­
cal" thoughtt is led, as it were, to its origin in the "r.tom^nt" - 
i:i the e-vent -'here dis-tincti on comes to be. This is as clos, 
as ve can c one to siezing upon the abiding mystery v,h i ch is 
Time. All that can be said of Time '-’ill always be ca^t in 
ontological tei',- s , i.e., in terms of the Being of beinss.
"wh ere" - and not the "place" in ’h-herc" - there is "ncver.cn t , "
a "transition," an oscillating, vibrating realm.
h t r i c T i v  s p e a k i n g ,  I f '  i n c  do r  not  e x i s t  i n  an'"' oi  
Being, as s u c h ,  i s  n o t h i in g  -  n o - t h i n g .  Yet, no being i ' x i s t s  
that .ices n o t  "abide" ije Be inc. Now, does n o t  t h i s  ' -h o i  e " o n -  
t o l c g i C ' l "  r c i s ■/ come t o  f ociw; in th-.; "isomcnt" '•*’r i i c h  " i ^ "
T i me even t. hough neither of these terms ("moment" ans' "is") i <- 
apt? It is quite impossible to say anything about Time, or to 
think anything about "it" because it is not a "thine." It is 
Nothin/. And Yet, apart from this Nothing, there "is" nothing. 
Fvery being, everything - all that has ever "been" an-; ev^r vi 
"be" - a b ides In Time. And it is the consciousness of
inc-in" tb.is f lux, in this oscillating Difference, in this
c-H- 7
ibretinc identity of Selfhood i,wh 1 ch consciousness itself 
tAKcs time), that, accounts for, i. c rounds , ma n ’s concern 
for Time - not as Time as such, hut as liistorv, wheth'M' it ho 
the history of natural phenomena or the history of Man. The 
tyranny of Time, as some are wont to put it, is the abiding 
mystery in which "we live and move and have our b e i n g . "73 
is nearer than hands and feet, nearer even than breath inc.79 
No matter how finely we divide the "second," we will always 
have a "difference" as such. There will always be an "inter­
val," a "between" which both separates (as Difference) and 
unites (as Identity), thereby making possible the "realm of 
openness," an open relation, i_n which beings abide in their 
mutual Being. Such is the "steadfastness" of Time.
The genius of Heidegger’s "step back" consists in its 
ability to open up the "moment," as it were, and to demonstrate 
that it. is a miniature "history" in which "transition" plays 
the key role - as in human history. And here in this moment 
the transition always both reveals and conceals. As beings 
come into Being and make their appearance, so a_t_ the same t ime 
does that which is common to all slip into oblivion. For, from 
the moment of arrival onwards, so long as they endure, they 
abide in both ontological and ontical difference, the former 
neing the mystery that shrouds the "relation in unity," i.e., 
identity, and the latter being the yet unfinished business cf 
"scientific" differentiation involving "calculation" and "measure 
ments" ad infinitum. In each case, however, there is an ele-
70. Acts 17:23. 79.
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.f.ent of  s e a r c h  i n v o l v e d .  C n t o - t  heo-1 og i ca 1 t h i n k i n g  s e ar ches  
o j t  t he  m y s t e r y  a b i d i n g  i n  t he  u n i t y  o f  i d e n t i t y  w i t h  D i f f e r ­
e n c e ,  and c r i t i c a l ,  i . e . ,  s c i e n t i f i c ,  r e s e a r c h  d i v i d e s  e v e r  more 
f i n e l y  t he  " i n t e r v a l "  s e p a r a t i n g  t he  be i ngs  i n  t h e i r  B e i n g .
For H e i d e g g e r ,  h o we v e r ,  t he  i m p o r t a n t  " i s s u e "  coming out  
o f  t he  s t e p  back i s  " d e c i s i o n "  ( A u s t r a c ) .  W i t h  h i s  a b i d i n g  
i n t e r e s t  i n  " t h i n k i n g "  t he D i f f e r e n c e  and I d e n t i t y  o f  t h e  Bei ng  
of  b e i n g s ,  i t  i s  a s i g n a l  " e v e n t "  i ndeed t o f i n d  i n t h i s  open,
i . e . ,  f r e e ,  a r e a  o f  r e l a t i o n  t he  o r i g i n  o f  t h o u g h t .  F o r ,  when 
t he r o o t s  o f  d e c i s i o n  a r e  f o u n d ,  so a r e  the r o o t s  o f  t he ■:
and its "logic," indeed, the roots of the whole history of 
thought.^ ^
But we are well advised to keep tabs on what is involved 
here. We must recall that Heidegger’s Difference a_^  Difference 
is not "w'hat is different" in the almost vulgar sense that 
appears, say, between a thesis and its antithesis. This differ 
ence is merely the conventional variety and in no wise involves 
the thinker in the recollection of the oblivion of Being "as 
such." It is all well and good to think Being as Just beyond 
the limits of this moment and therefore within easy reach if 
wt^  merely "step back," but such behavior is far afield of that 
"metaphysical" thought which is onto-theo-iogica1.32 por this 
latter recognizes the utter strangeness of Being, and our im­
potence in confronting it anywhere - even in the step back.
Yet this procedure can, providing Being is concealed in obliv-
30. p. bbf. 31. p. 66. 32. p. ?2f.
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icn, appreciate somethinc of the uifference as Difference v i.cn 
this is r e a l i z e d  to be still unthoug’nt. It has yet to come inti 
conception, into the thinking process. it has yet to be form­
ulated.
Oh, this description may sound easy enough, but Heidegger 
makes it extremely "difficult" because he thinks of it "histor­
i c a l l y . "^3 Obviously, there is much which we as individuals 
have not yet thought, and it is a common experience to happen 
upon some "new" insight, but is it new to history? Has it 
never been thought before? Only if it has never before been 
thought can it become truly "destined" historically and become, 
as it were, a step back, that is, a step ahead in the course 
of history.
This, of course, means that one must not only be a student 
of history, say, as a specialist of the seventeenth Century, 
but he must be intimately acquainted with the whole history of 
thought as well. Now, this sounds like an impossible task, and 
surelv it is If history is conceived here in the usual sense as 
the "goings on" during a particular period in history. This is 
why ontclcy looms so large in Heidegger’s mind. Only as ontol­
ogy can thought cope with all the beings which have ever exist­
ed; and only as ontology can thought cope with the single b^ing 
to the extent that its own individuality is probed sufficiently 
to yield insight into its Identity, And only when ontology be­
comes also and at the same time theology does it think logically
0 3 . p. 7 2.
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enough to consistently move in the direction of the essence cf 
truth which is simultaneously the truth of essence.
When "decision" is conceived as a totally new creature, a 
new being, a new step forward in history’s destiny, then we can 
begin to appreciate why Heidegger can suggest that it is in 
decision that God comes into philosophy.
"God comes into philosophy through the decision which we 
think chiefly as the headquarters of the essence of the 
Difference between Being and being. The Difference deter­
mines the design in the structure of the essence of meta­
physics. "6I4.
With this emphasis upon the "new" in the sense of that 
which actually alters the destiny of thought, is not Heideccer 
but highlighting, as it were, a turning point which is corimon 
to each of us in every momimi t of existence? Is he not intimat­
ing that in the history of the individual - probably destined 
never to be a pivotal figure in "world" history - Difference 
is nevertheless, along with Identity, the focus, if you will, 
of that "vibrating" realm wherein the moment of historical ex­
istence comes into being from out of its source in oblivion?
Is he not speaking onto 1ogica1ly of the Nothing which "is"
Time, to wnicn even the 4  ^ bows by leading logicallv in a 
"meta-" physical direction?
Perhaps these are not fair questions to put. They may 
disclose our own traditionally entrenched theological bent, 
namely, to "name" the God, a sport which the consistent ontol- 
ogist can not bring himself to enjoy because no such "being"
Ok. p. 7 0.
istr es such. Y e t  metaphysics has i t s  os r. v a y s  o:  .’
Liiouch Its names h iff or (in the crude sense) from the o 1 c gy ’ s .
Can it be disputed that Heid^/gger ha s established an accor 
netv;ccn Bcinc, and Time and the Nothing as these themselves ac­
cord in Difference a nd Identity with beings, history and scme- 
tl.ing, respectively? And does he not specify that neither
Bcinc nor heincs are prior to the other in the sense of the
Adabsolute ground, but that each grounds the other? A n d  if 
this be so, then surely, if Identity arid Difference are the 
'’relation in unity," that which effects this relation is prior 
to it. The mutual encirclement of cacti other by Being and 
bcings^^' v,'hich constitutes the dialectical tension, or paradox, 
at this focal point must indicate that we have arrive^ at the 
ixact "magnetic pole" where our compass needle simply goes 
round and round, leaving us in a tizzie - unless we appreciate 
that here are truly on the threshold of the unknown, the un- 
thought, the inconceivable, the immeasurable, incalculable, the 
truly m y s t r  1 ous which pervades all without exception, thouch 
in secret end quietly.
To Venture the thesis that Time is for Heidegger, and 
consequently for ontc-thco-logic, i.e., theolocy and philos­
ophy, that which, grounds the Ah -s r nc sends it on its "his­
torical" '-."ay, i.e., on a "time line," is to our mind only <ay- 
i'vg explicitly ’-Tia t he says over and over again implicitly.
At the very last in "Beinc and Time," he himself asks, "Joes 
t- i m. c itself manifest itself as the horizon of Bein c ? " - ' Ann
Lx . p. ?C. Ob. p. 6g . Ü'?. op. cit., p. bo.
though he never answers this question explicitly, he neverthe­
less plows through his years of philosophizing since 1927 
bringing his thought closer and closer to that magnetic pole 
where thought boggies and finally acceeds to what is yet tc be 
thought. Yet, future thought, i.e., historically destined 
thought, is thought which comes to be fn time, that is, at the 
moment of its "transition" from "projected" future to "histor­
ical" being - neither future nor past, however, being in any 
w^ ay prior to the other in the most fundamental (grounding) 
sense. Nor is the "moment", that is, the coming-together of 
these two in identity, prior either.
For, what has yet to be thought, though it grounds what 
has already been thought, is in no less way itself grounded by 
the latter - as with Being and beings. Hence, our focus must 
fasten upon the mystery inhering in this exact center "between" 
the two "differing" poles in this "relation" which is also an 
identity. For, in the final analysis, it cannot be said that 
Being is s iinu .11 n "ous 1 y being, but only that "Being comes over 
into being" in the moment of "transition." Hence, Time enables, 
effects, and othorwise manes possible any motion, any movement, 
any agitation which consciousness senses in Identity and Dif­
ference, including the outcome, i.e., product, i.e., decision, 
which i_s thoucht. in this way do we find Heideccer "controlled" 
(even thoucii he has reversed his stance and no longer faces it) 
by the Nothing which inheres as the interval "between" in Dif­
ference ana as "the tie that binds" these differences together 
in Identity. H asks: "What of Difference ’adheres* both to
• ' 1 r /. 3 n LU x'irrc vihen these the
: ; : fer une c 1 " Arc: we ancv.-^  r : Time - : n the serre ei r. " .
1 , " ci "j. Ment," an oscillation, or :.Lovcr.ient , u u r i n ' '-•hich 
Bcinc "cornes over into beinqs, and in noinc so is over-cci.ie. 
Thus is futurity hidden in presence, i.e.. Da-se in, i.e., e.. Jf 
hood, i.e. . Identity and Difference al. 2Ü?. And the sa nr t i: .
•..e. p. 6/ .
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Cone 1nc inc Ronm rx"
The first thing that v-e vant to consider here is '-hat 
v'a s said in the first two sections cf our Introduction (pp. 1 - 
16), but more especially, section tvo (pp. 7-16). Indeed, 
would ask the r ea der now to reread those paces, for they are 
our best a 11 e mp t to summarize the results of our study as 
these are a py: 1 i ca b 1 e to demy tholociz inc. We cannot ove r -em- 
phasize t:ii s study’s relation to this latter. From demythc lo­
gic inc e dcpa r ted , bu t only to re tu rn a ga i n .
The ^;cond consideration here is an appraisal of the re­
sults of our study. As we indicated at the r. los-, of our I n t r c 
duct ion (p. i3), this study has been a n expo r i ment. .It 'lie
no t occur to us -hen v'e began that T in.e might possibly be con­
sidered a aynonyir for God. But as v-e progressed, this possi­
bility became more and more apparent. Nov.', there ha - been 
much di^'cussion through the years of the relation be tv e en the 
cud of met'-physics and the God of theology, and it h.as been 
r'f) t he r c on s i r 1 n IÎ y ma i n t a i ne d by t h c o i o g y that i t s 7^ o -j i s 
n->i that ■ hich can be deduced by clever philosophical minds.
C.n the other hand, it cannot be denied that philosopny )^ as 
had considerable influence upon tdie church’s doctrine of God 
as this doctrine has at various times been criticised by phil­
os ophy. ^
I. See, c . ... , F x 1 s t e n M  a li s t T heo 1 ocy . pp. } ff.
237
"It if lie i' - cer is richt in say i nr that he na r hrcu ' : 
to or.' tfrie v'huin metaphysical tradition, criminal ire : r. -nCiee 
ureeee an ■ eu Ir: i or t i nc in Hegel a n u Hi e tzsch^-, then his loe- 
t r ine shoe 1d not be cons i do red me ta phy sical. Indeed, a s we 
have shown immediately above, he considers that those thoughts 
which have traditionally been separate (i.e., metaphysics and 
theology) hav^' now been merged in "onto-theo-1ogic" in virtue 
of hi s 'OS Xr;'kt1on. Ve t, our study succosts lhat what i s 
ultimately prior in Heidec.ger’s thought is not Being, but is 
rather the Nothing, the Ab-crund, i.e., Time itself, even
though thi< latter cannot be considered apart from its occur­
rence in beings, i.e., in history. So that "onto-theo-1ogic" 
is not a n a d e qua te for mu la even yet f o r ' hat Heidegger is 
apparently intending. Rather, it accords with the biblical 
correlation of Cod with history and the Word. At this point 
we are of the opinion that T i m e , as we understand it, is a 
one-word un-hypnenated formula for the unity which these three 
elements in biblical thought represent when its implications 
for liistorv and language a re spelled out to some decree.
Yet, it is not our immed ia te concern to construct another 
formula to replace Heidegger’s - or the Bible’s either, for 
that matter. Rather, it Is merely to suggest that ve may 
indeed have in the concept of Time the heart of the biblical 
doctrine of God.
No'.', It should be understood that this conclusion is cniv
n t a 11 g , i *' for no other reason than that it va s culled fro;-, 
a study of a " p;n i os ophe r" of existence. in retrospect, e 
vonder why the better course would not have been to study, say,
pPultmann’s Theo I ogy of the Nev T e s ta me r. I. ~ For, is based 
on the Bible itself and its study won 1d afford more insight 
as to the proximity of these two heretofore distinct notions.-'
But the fact is that Heideccer*s thought provides the primor­
dial requisites for such a study of Bultmann. Such matter^ as 
"objectification," "cround," "the Nothing," "Truth," etc. - 
for us, at least - were essential to building a basic under­
standing of Time as it is revealed in and to existence.
Perhaps now. that is, after such a background understan­
ding has been rained, we can again turn to Bultmann’s theolocy 
and conduct a study that would be fruitful in the sense of 
affording a positive correlation of Time with God. But this 
could net be done before our bout vath Heidegger.
Our COntea:ion, then, is this: tha L the succes t i on we
have i.'.ade is only ion ta t i ve , that is, of a very prov i s : ona 1 
na tu re . V, a r s content tha t He i degge r * s thought y i e Id? to a 
temporal interpretation grounds for seriously considering this 
possibility, but until it is measured by scripture itself,
nothing of a definitive nature can be concluded one way or another
2 . l^y teacf'.er vu 11 recall that such a study was actually made 
in 1963, but •.'ita inconclusive results.
Indeed! Cf. S. Ccden’s essay, "The Temporality cf God" in 
Belt und Gerchi chte. the Fe s t s c h r i f t in honor of Buitmann's 
oOth birthday, J. C. B. Mohr, Tifbi n gen, I96I4. Here Ogden 
seems to think that it's about time God’s "temporality" is 
c ons i de re d .
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G;*, V. c tr.p. l th;i reader may have some assura nee that sj-h
stuiy v'oulci net be w i t h o u t  s o m e  m e rit, e ' i l l  tak: ' m o m e n t
or Lwo to a p 1 y this clue ' tiich ’• e maintain is significant tc
deiny tho 1 og i 2 i nc . At that point in the first volume of Buitmann’s
Theo1ogy of the New Testament where he takes up "Man under
Faith," we consider his first headinc: "The Righteousness of
God," but more particularly, "The Concept of Righteousness."^
We begin w 11h his first paragraph:
"fines Paul regards ma n ’s ex istence prior to f a 11 h in the 
transparency it !ias gained to the eye of faith, man's exis­
tence ' A ith has therefore already been indirectly pre-
sketched in tne presentation of pr>.-faith existence. If pre- 
faith man is man fallen into the po'^ -cr of death, man under 
faith is man who receives life. If man’s death nas its cause 
in the fact that man in his striving to live out of his own 
resources lores his self, life arises out of surrendering 
one’s self to God, thereby ca lining one’s se If. "9
Our initial concern here is to interpret "pre-faith man" 
as "fallen into the power of deat.l;," an eventuality which has 
cost him hi is "life," i.e., his "self." What has been "lost" 
ve take tc be e •.-s i s tence, or that existence '-hlch is prior to 
all that is objectified in the act of objectification - inclu- 
■ iir.9 the objectified, i.e.. "historical," self. Fallen man, 
in a ord, has "forgotten" that there Is a d i f f e r  cnee  between 
himself and history - as we 11 as an identity. He sees only 
the calcified forms of history, and is panic-stricken; he looks 
everywhere and tries everything, in or'der hopefully to recap­
ture something of that s e c u r i t v  he once kncv (as a child, per­
haps) when this difference, though pre-ccnceptua1, was "known"
. Op. cit., pp. RYCff. - hereafter referred to only by pace 
numbe r.
5 . p .  2 7 0 .
2tU
nevertheless. This lime cf innocence - ir.v tr.i ca Î 1 v dep:cic-. 
in. s c r Iptu r e a. s t h c-; G a r d e n of c d on - is h e f ç p ^  " k - e/-- i e i c e " of 
the historical "wor i d" and of "lancuaoc" has become sufficient: 
formulated to allow one to navigate in adult society vith a 
degree of assurance. It is a child’s "ignorance" of the con­
ventions of his particular culture, wherever and whenever it 
occur s .
Fallen man, then, because he has lost the d 1fference be­
tween historical and eternal existence, has lost nis "life," 
and knows himself to be a "sinner" to the extent that some thine 
is "missing" in M s  life. This "loss of life" is in Paul 
called "derth." And the ’-inning back of this difference in 
oqus I me a s u r e '^i t)i "identity vith history," is the rising from 
death to life, i.e, resurrection. And this, because the "esc il 
la tion" v'hich is the movement, or flov.', of time returns from 
its primordial source in the ever-future. Once this dynamic 
is restored, man is no 1 oncer "falicn," but is "faithful," and 
"knows" precisely "what" it is that has elver hin his new Iea e <
on life. he has been freed from the restrictions of histori­
en 1 f CTii.u la t ions . "Sticks and stonc^ can break his boner, 
but words can never hurt him." This childhood proverb takes 
on intense meaning; no verbal formulations - not even the 
Bible’s - can ever separate him from the love of the "living"
God once this d i f f e r e n c e is recaptured.
"Surrendering one’s self to God" is here taken to mean the 
thoughtful recollection (afforded by insight into the nature
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existed: ' n? both finit. 9nd eternal; of the privacy, t:
p r i o r i 1 v , f the future (a s eve r ~ fu t u r c } ove r all h i ?: I o r i c a 1
fornis, and the eratefui a c c e s s i o n  to this prin;acv. No thine
is really "surrendered,” however, when this term carries a
sense of a "forced” surrender. Rather, it is as Paul (?) put
it in his 1e 11 e r to the Ph i1i pp i a n s (p:L-l6 ):
"Thouch I iP.yself have reason for confidence in the flesh 
[hdstorvTj also. ...whatever ua in I had, I counted as loss 
for the sake of Christ. Indeed I count every thine as loss 
because of the surpassing worth of knowinc Christ Jesus my 
Lord. For his sake 1 have suffered the loss of all thinos, 
and count them as refuse ... that I may know him and the 
power of his resurrection, ... Brethren, 1 do not consider 
that I 'n^ve made it my own ; but one thing 1 do, f o r r, e 111 n e 
wha t lies behin d and strain! nr f orwa rd to ha t 1 1 es ahead ,
1 press on towa rd the goal for the prize of the upward call 
of God in Christ Jesus."6
After the introductory paragraph '^’hlcfi we have been con­
sider! ng , Pu11mann maintains that the insight there exp ressed 
is precisely what Paul meant in his interpre a tier, e f "richt- 
eousness. '
" S t r i c 1 1 y speakin c , r i eh te ou s ness i_s the ccnd i t i on f or re_- 
ceivin r. sa 1 vs t i on or * ... It is to those who p re
richtwised that salvation will br imparted (Rom. y : 1ff.) .
As sin led to :ea th, so righteousness l e a  is to life (Rom. 
17. 21; 0 :10), The goal ahead of him who has ri chteousiie^ s 
is ': ?■ ' : :< of life ( Mii i . 3 * ' .
But ' M W  this connection . .'t’--een righteousness nnd •■a*- 
va.’ c y tight and i nevi t" ' 3 e , r i chtcousness itself c  m 
bee Oil.o the essence of sa. Ivati ott. " 8
From this Bultmann goes on to explain that righteousness 
is a " forens ic-escha t c i ogica 1" term. "...it is alreaav i.'îotitr
t. o a_ rna. n i r: t he p resent (on the presupposition ttia t he *has
'... From, the Revised Standard Version, Thomas Nelson & Sons. Ne' 
Yo r k , etc., 19yf: ; ou r italics a- d dec for c imp ha sis.
T. p. 273. h. p. 270f.
2b;
tt. f ) . Bv '• forenv I c-crha to 1 ca !'• he i-.oarw that this
. u tur• ■ possibiii tv ha^ a 1 r*'ady heen ci % n - ?.s by a cou r t e
v],icr. Gcc is the Juccc, not man. "it does not mean th: ethic-Î
quality of a person," as evinced by his tori zing objectification
"It does not mean any quality at all, but a relationship. 
That is, d i ka i osyne is not something a person has as his 
own ; rather it is something he has i n the verdict of the 
Vforum* ... to which he is accountable. He has it In the
opinion adjudicated to him by another."9
It is quite apparent that the term "eschato!ocica1" for 
Bultmann is sugcestivc both of future time and of the pos s i h i1 -
yities that the future apparently o f f e r s . - t n c l  when he speaks 
jf righteousness as a "prc'-.cnt reality" he is saying someth.ing 
to the e f i' c c t t ha t 11 • fs p r e s en t a n :! f u tiro me et, as it '^ m^ r e . i n
a tension '-it!.in existence in such a way that both are felt an
t.nown. The future judgment is beginning now. ‘ It is this 
"relation" between the eschatoiogicai, i.e., future, and the 
present as perceived historically. Hichtcousness speaks to 
this relation and suggests the primacy of the future as possi­
bility eve r t. he present wncn this latter is conceived ais hir-
tury . fo that the effect upon "prescnt" existence is that of
e .u:n i no j_t ^  L'.' possibilities, rather than pressing it down 
into calcified historical formulations, i.e., judgments.
We nex t c on i dc r a y c t more c ojvp 1 i ca ted relation:
"The p r: sent rea1 i tv of richtccusncs^ rests uoon its ha vine
9. p. 271f.
T^. Sec, his discussions of soma (pp. I92ff, csp. p. 19é )
and of kosm.M (pp. TTh'T., esp. p. dye).
1 Î . p . 2 7  ( .
’rev ■ 1 ■’» ,,y the occurring \;f s a l v n i i o n  i n 2... 
f. . : -kf ; n  :or. : d 1 ; c2. J Cor. 1: A.
■''currenc , r.cv'cvcr, is tC:e v  c' /• 'ot % icn IA ; k
v’hicb Go.; cn .e.,’ the old course o f  the - or I ’ and intronuc r  
the new aeor."12
Here v’e have nil three temporal realms suggested: the ns s t., as
"event," the i > r ■ ; sent, and the future , as "eschatoiocica1."
Bultmann*s Christolocical formulation, then, is this: Christ
is the "present escha to lor. i ca 1 occurrence," where this last
named has the quality of "event": it happens, has happened, and
is yet still to happen. This temporally comi^licatcd formula
with its two f=reas of "relation": ho tv een t'ne past and present,
-nd be two ? n the present and future, is the or^ Christo logical
formulation. it suggests that Christ speaks to both of the^e
relations, i ndcc .1, is "Lori" of them. Hence, our earlier suc-
I ;:0 Stic I i - to the effect that that which seems to be intends] in 
such a f orr.u la tior. is none other than the seif-affecticn, the 
self-identification, of Tin.e vith itself. Roth Identity and 
ifferencc inhere in these relations. .And only because that 
are both temporaI relations can they be said to be one relation 
The "-one" relation in Bu 1 tir'ann * s formulation - a s so arc no* 
i n 13 rpro 15 n . i t - Is Chr1st, tha t 1s to say, Time, s c i c is 
manifest in existence. Christ is said to be Ui_e revelation 
because he (Jesus of Nazareth) was an historic figure 'ho dem­
on strate d c nc e a nd f o i" a 1 1 t he c onnc c ^ 1 on (i.e., "incar ns t i on " ) 
b : t 'eon God and man. Indeed, he is this connection, and we.
12, p . 2'.’6 . f ee x-sp . in this connecti on pp. - 's ' f f : Bu 11 ca nn ‘ s 
di scus i on of " '■ race. "I -. See above, p. 2;pf.
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H s if' i f: , find our ii''o i_r_ C u r i ' L , ihrt is. jus t^2LL __T_“
_^j2,LL1TI ' h .Ci. i: th identity and ; ' i :‘f e ronc • ■.
.it'ii this hriftf s t u d y  of hut a fc> p a c e s  of B u l t ^ ^ n n ' r  
T h é o  1 ocv c r the Ne^ -' Tes l a m e n t  se a r e  e n a b l e d  to see that the 
i n s i g h t  a f f o r d e d  in our s t u d y  of H e i d e g g e r  n o w  seeits to m a k e  
p o s s i b l e  r p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t ’-cen our d o c t r i n e  of T lire 
and the b i b l i c a l  d o c t r i n e  of God. But it is :tuch too b r i e f 
to ••fford eonvclusive e v i d e n c e  that tlic r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e n  
is one of c o m p l e t e  a c c o r d .  A g a i n ,  ’''c ii.ust he s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  
but a provision''!, t e n t a t i v e ,  c o n c l u s i o n ,  one t h a t  r e s e m b l e s  
r. qu e s t i on c r e t tip. n it d o es a s t ^ t e  uie n I or p r i n c i p l e .
Th i s s t u dy 1 ir s for us, t hen , the character of a first - t e p 
in the '•'ObLly business of learning to v'ttik if our intention i- 
to interpret scripture in a way that will open up to nodern ran 
a • ay of Lhouch* *''hich for sorie of us has been ^t ti'^.e sane tirr.e 
r •? ve 1 a 11 on " n i a I va t i on.
■■'e cannor. ••o into the iinp 1 i c  t i or:s - hich this r.od-^  of 
■ . i s t ei: t i a 1 1 s t interpretation opens ut). Needles^ to ra . , T : . : y
a r. r'anif.'-' : a., d very exciting - as di'ily seen frorr this prr- 
visiona] perspective. They riake the need to continue th- in- 
vest.ication a"' such interpretation a- ' 3ut this,
alas, iTrus. t a--a 1 r, another Li/.ie, anothw'.r " f f o r t, another paper, 
a h ) the r til Ic, and possibly another '-ritcr.
Vitiu'ut in the least Induiglnc in false nodes t\,  ^e say 
that t h'' r L a r .any ''ho are far be tier lualified to make the
'-•.up V- . hav,; L m a d e ,  a nd then te c e n t  i nn - in ' 3rx I 
i c o r r e l c t i n n  • ith Bull, arm* r theolo . i::' c o n t r i h e t i  e . :
r.nV , ila '• b e e n  bu t t o ?.uc,e■ 's t an or' 1 en t- tion. n he r,ticneu t ice ] 
clue, for i n t e r p r e t i n g  b o t h  H e i d e g g e r ' s  an d  B u l t m a n n ' s  I h o u c n t
V.'hich brings us to our final thought which v-e reiterate, 
namely, that ours has been i ntergre ta l j on. It ma it es no cre­
tonne at rye-present i ng Heidegger *s own thought. Rather, it 
approacnes his Lh'oucht and '-ith "viol nee" ' rests from it ’ hat 
tie himself did myt. say. Ours is, according to He i de peer's ovn 
practise a nd reaching, a case of "historical" thinking in that 
it finds in historical documents wha t ha s never been thought 
before - sc far a s wc knov. It is an instance, t he n , o f thos e
impie dec i s i ons " '-hich account, for, i.e., make, history.'
■hether or not it looms up in history and becomes, pivotal re- 
: a ins to be ^cen. Vie cannol at this point claim to have
b I’ ought a b ou t t he e n d of t h e who 1 e history of traditional
theological thought, not only because oar conclusion is tenta­
tive, but else because such a claim can only be made relative 
to tii'' thou oil t that is supposedly be in.. brou ht to end. That 
I' , it is lead? r 'lative to history. Therefore, it is itself 
historical i a but a continuation c\:' that history, ho’-'ever
pivotal it ma;/ b>..r:oiee in influencing the course 'hich history 
ta ke s .
If our suggestion doe= prove to be a clu^ to biblical 
interpretation, it vHll have managed no more than to make
1'.. Hxistcrc. 2jvg He inc. p. 309.
. pi ici I fer our own a go ha I o v i - i e n 1.1 > --a s sufficient! y
.iplicit for the : ritcrs, nrco chrrs, a nd audience of f; • Te^-t-
'-..lent to corninur; ica te the relation be t'-een God and man.
Tlia t is, if Time proves to he a clue to the "heart" of the
biblical witness, than all it does is expose to prescnt-dav
understanding what is already there. It w i 1] merely illuminate,
hit in so floinc, wi 1 1 communicate not only the knowledge im-
1 9licit in the kerygma, but the keryciru'. itself.
1G . Sec a hove , p . t , t he qu ota tion f r or. Bu I tma nn ' s The o 1 ocv of 
the New Testament Vo 1 II, p. 251.
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